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Abstract 
One of the key roles of corporate boards is to decide how the cash generated by these 
companies is distributed, and through these decisions they influence the wealth of many in our 
society.  But beyond this task what is expected of corporate boards? Although researchers have 
spent decades examining boards, a general consensus regarding the objectives and tasks that 
they should perform has yet to emerge. Using a combination of primary and secondary 
research, this study examines the expectations that shareholders and directors have of corporate 
boards in New Zealand and identifies some concordance between their views and some of the 
extant literature. These findings highlight the contingent nature of corporate governance 
and provide guidance to both practitioners and future researchers. 
New Zealand public companies were selected for this study because their directors and 
shareholders remain open to sharing their views and experiences with external researchers. 
New Zealand uses a straightforward variant of the common Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
model so there is some potential to generalise to other contexts.  Developing the foundation for 
this research required refreshing and extending the extant research concerning aspects of the 
NZ commercial environment including company ownership and control, shareholder and 
director demographics, and the underlying commercial environment. Subsequently, a mixed 
methods approach was adopted for the core study which included conducting focus groups and 
surveys with both shareholders and directors. Data were also derived from secondary sources 
including, company annual shareholder meeting minutes, the Companies Office’s records and 
the social media website Linkedin.  
The research finds that while both directors’ and shareholders’ expectations of boards 
are broadly aligned, the expectations that both groups have of boards are heterogeneous in 
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some key respects. Interestingly, the diversity of opinion that appears to exist within each of 
these groups tends to reflect the diversity that is apparent within the governance literature. 
Socio-economic factors including the influence of ‘women on boards’ lobby groups and 
company specific environmental factors such as a company’s financial position were identified 
as some of the influences which contribute to this diversity of opinion.  
Environmental factors not only appear to influence the opinions of directors and 
shareholders but also appear to influence other aspects of corporate governance such as the 
selection of directors, and the tasks that boards choose to perform. This suggests that a 
pragmatic rather than a doctrinal basis for this heterogeneity is applicable. So rather than 
boards adhering to a specific pre-established framework such as ‘shareholder advocate’ or 
‘company controller,’ corporate boards appear willing to adjust their objectives and practices to 
meet the circumstances at hand.  For researchers, these findings emphasise the importance of 
considering contextual factors when designing corporate governance research projects. They 
also highlight the importance of understanding stakeholder motivations when applying 
common governance theories. From a policy perspective, the findings reinforce the advantages 
of the ‘comply or explain’ approach to regulation and they add caution to making local and 
international best practice guidelines mandatory. 
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1  INTRODUCTION AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
It is corporate boards that determine one of the most important issues in our society: how the 
cash that flows from companies is distributed. So the decisions that corporate boards make 
directly or indirectly influence the wealth of shareholders, employees and company suppliers as 
well as their families and dependants (Gourevitch & Shinn, 2009). But what is expected of 
these boards, to whom are they responsible and what decisions should they make? These are 
questions that currently do not have clear answers. In this thesis I take a first step towards 
answering the first of these questions by addressing the question: “What do New Zealand’s 
shareholders and company directors expect from New Zealand’s public company boards?” 
New Zealand is a mature market, and the country has adopted a variant of the classic Anglo-
Saxon corporate governance model so this research also has international relevance.  
The international literature on corporate governance leaves open a degree of latitude 
when addressing some of the fundamental questions of governance, such as, what tasks should 
a board perform and to whom is it responsible? (Petrovic, 2008). Furthermore, it is generally 
acknowledged that many of the theories that attempt to either describe or predict board 
behaviour are incomplete    (Dalton, Daily, Certo & Roengpitya, 2003). An added challenge to 
gaining an understanding of corporate governance is that research into many of its aspects fails 
to elicit repeatable results across multiple studies (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010). However, 
researchers generally agree that aspects of governance are jurisdiction specific and that the 
learning from one country cannot necessarily be applied to another without due consideration 
being given to the local environment (Davies & Schlitzer, 2008). When conducting governance 
research an understanding of the local governance environment and how it differs from that 
described in international literature is required. Given this local aspect to corporate governance, 
questions regarding the expectations that New Zealand shareholders and directors have of their 
boards are best answered with primary research.  
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New Zealand research in this area is scant (Ingley & Van der Walt, 2005). Most of it 
predates the 2007–8 global financial crisis (GFC) and the subsequent changes to financial 
market regulations; these are events that in other jurisdictions, it has been argued, have changed 
board behaviour (Conyon, Judge & Useem, 2011). Therefore my first research task was to 
review aspects of the New Zealand commercial environment, including the role of public 
companies in the national economy, their ownership and demographics (along with those of 
their shareholders and directors), and the legal and regulatory environment. 
Governments and regulators have traditionally had relatively little involvement in 
defining the role, function and responsibilities of boards. Since its inception, corporate 
governance legislation in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions has always treated boards with a light hand 
(Herrigel, 2006). Beyond mandating that companies form boards and perform a few basic 
activities, legislators have for the most part left it up to boards themselves to organise their 
affairs as they see fit. Indeed, at a fundamental level, little has changed since the first UK 
Companies Act was introduced (Joint Stock Act, 1844). Changes in law and regulation, where 
they have occurred, have generally happened in response to some real or perceived failure of 
the market. In the United States, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
was established as a direct result of the 1929 banking failure, which was the event that led to 
the Great Depression (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2014). More recently the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) resulted from the high-profile failure of companies 
including Enron and WorldCom (Coates, 2007).  
Stock exchanges, through their listing rules, have always mandated certain structural 
and procedural aspects of board activity for public companies, but they also leave most 
substantive issues to boards to address as they see fit (NYSE, 2010; NZX, 2013). Since the 
1960s, stock exchanges, major institutional investors and others have attempted to exert some 
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influence over board activities by promoting initiatives such as best practice codes, board self-
evaluation schemes and board charters (Long, 2006; Gregory 2008). All of these initiatives 
have been designed in part to satiate investors’ demands for increased protection from the 
actions of both boards and management (Davies & Schlitzer, 2008). Overall the impact of these 
initiatives has been limited because compliance has generally been voluntary. Even when these 
initiatives have been made compulsory they have proved difficult to police effectively, leaving 
it to boards to decide what they will and will not implement. Given that boards are renowned 
for the secrecy surrounding their activities, (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007) they are able to reduce 
their obligations to simple box-ticking exercises if they so choose. Lord Halifax summed up the 
situation well when he said that ‘the trouble with boards is that they mark their own exam 
papers’ (Garratt, 2004). That this quote from Halifax, who died in 1959, is still relevant today is 
a small but telling illustration of how slowly change happens in the boardroom. There is 
evidence suggesting that this change occurs in waves triggered by economic crisis. Most 
recently, the GFC instigated a series of corporate failures which were in large part attributed to 
failures of governance. This, in turn, motivated investors worldwide to demand increased 
protection from the actions of both directors and management (Conyon et al., 2011). In the US, 
legislators responded by introducing the Dodd–Frank Act (2010), while in New Zealand the 
Securities Act received a major rewrite and the Financial Markets Authority was established 
(Securities Act 1978 reprint 1/2014; Financial Markets Authority Act 2011). In addition, 
clauses of the NZ Companies Act 1993 relating to directors’ behaviour were tested in the courts 
for the first time. The overall effect of these events is that directors are now being held to a 
higher standard and appear more accountable for their actions than ever before. In exceptional 
cases a failure to meet standards has resulted in NZ directors being incarcerated (Bond, 2012).  
Boards are also coming under pressure from other sources that are not traditionally 
associated with governance. For example, employees and unions have encouraged legislators to 
18 
 
make directors accountable for company occupational safety and health issues, an area 
traditionally delegated to management (Bridges, 2014). And women’s groups are demanding 
greater representation for women on boards (Branson, 2011). As in other aspects of society the 
internet and digital technologies are having an effect on governance. For example, in many 
industries digital technologies are changing the fundamental way that companies compete, and 
the challenge for their directors is to keep abreast of technological changes in order that they 
might provide useful advice to company managers; advising management is an activity that 
boards regularly engage in (Ong & Wan, 2008). Overall these external pressures are likely to 
be changing the role of the board and the activities they perform and consequently what 
directors and shareholders expect of boards. This thesis examines how boards are responding to 
aspects of this new regulatory and commercial environment and the expectations that both 
directors and shareholders now place on them. 
Shareholders feature prominently in theories surrounding governance; for example, the 
application of agency theory to governance generally casts shareholders as the principal in the 
principal–agent relationship that is central to this theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
question that arises, and has yet to be answered in the New Zealand context, is this: “do 
shareholders see themselves as owners who have contracted with directors to do their bidding 
and, if so, are boards worth the ‘agency’ cost?” Another common theory applied to governance 
is shareholder theory (Friedman, 1962), which is predicated on a set of assumptions about 
shareholder characteristics that are largely untested in the NZ environment. For example, the 
theory characterises shareholders as owners, but in practice this may not be the most 
appropriate definition. Issues such as these were first raised by Berle & Means in their 1932 
classic The Modern Corporation and Private Property, but have not been definitively answered 
in the context of twenty-first century New Zealand.   
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The role of the shareholder in governance is set out in law (Companies Act 1993). 
When a company is trading normally, the most significant governance tasks that shareholders 
are called upon to perform are to elect the directors and to quiz them once a year at an annual 
shareholders’ meeting (ASM). From time to time shareholders may also approve or decline 
certain major transactions (Companies Act 1993). But just as there is very little understanding 
of how well boards perform their role, there is also very little understanding of how well 
shareholders perform theirs. Do shareholders take seriously their responsibilities toward the 
companies in which they hold shares, and do they execute their responsibilities with due care or 
do they consider these tasks to be simply box-ticking exercises that require no serious 
consideration? These are important questions – the New York Stock Exchange (NYX), for 
example, recognises their significance when it reminds shareholders of their duties and 
responsibilities and encourages them to ‘vote their shares in a thoughtful manner’ (NYSE, 
2010, p. 3). In the New Zealand context there is no comprehensive research into the role of 
shareholders in corporate governance. This thesis begins the process of addressing this lacuna 
in the literature by developing an understanding of the expectations of both directors and 
shareholders. 
A brief example involving the UK-based confectionery manufacturer Cadbury provides 
a practical example of why these questions matter. There was a period when Cadbury was 
under threat of a hostile takeover by the US conglomerate Kraft. Its shares were trading at 
£8.00 and some hedge funds decided that there was 20p per share to be made if they purchased 
a strategic stake in the company. Their hunch proved correct: they purchased the shares and just 
weeks later achieved their objective by tipping the takeover in favour of Kraft (Bennedsen, 
2014). In the opinion of Roger Carr, the former chairman of Cadbury, the fate of the 186-year-
old, quintessentially British company was decided by a handful of shareholders who had owned 
their shares for just a few weeks and were interested only in a small, short-term gain. Carr is 
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not alone when he states that he doesn’t believe that this is how the fate of the company should 
have been decided (Bennedsen, 2014). The case clearly highlights the importance to boards, 
regulators and, indeed, investors themselves of understanding more about the nature and 
demographics of shareholders. If we are to progress our understanding of governance in New 
Zealand then it is important that we also progress our understanding of New Zealand 
shareholders. 
Shareholders’ and directors’ expectations of governance may differ in certain 
circumstances. While little has been published about the nature of these differences, it is 
relatively easy to foresee situations whereby such differences could arise and cause 
considerable frictions between the groups. Returning to the Cadbury case, had it occurred in 
New Zealand, Carr would have been entitled to defend the takeover from Kraft if he believed 
that doing so was in the company’s best interests. Such defensive action would have been 
against the wishes of the majority of shareholders, who were in favour of the takeover, and 
would have undoubtedly led to friction between the board and those shareholders. 
Understanding the differences between each group’s expectations, then, is clearly important not 
only from a practical perspective but also in order to develop a sound theoretical framework for 
governance.1  
 There is no question that public companies play a significant role in determining the 
wealth and quality of life for many in our society (Gourevitch & Shin, 2009). Directors and 
shareholders alike are expected to contribute to this situation. Yet in spite of the importance of 
both the director and shareholder roles, sitting as they do at the heart of corporate governance, 
                                                 
1 NZ law allows directors to oppose a takeover that they believe to be not in the best interests of the company, 
whereas under UK law directors must follow the shareholders’ directive. This highlights the importance of 
observing country-specific factors when utilising governance literature. 
21 
 
very little is known of these groups and what they expect from corporate governance. Who are 
these shareholders and directors, what do they believe is their role in the governance, and what 
are their motivations? These are important questions that warrant further exploration – not only 
to place our understanding of corporate governance on a more empirical footing, but also 
because these groups play such an important role in our capitalist system. This thesis sets out to 
expose these questions as substantial and complex issues that do not lend themselves to simple 
‘sound bite’ answers. Furthermore, it will be shown they cannot be satisfactorily answered if 
approached from a single perspective or with the use of a single tool, and that this is an area 
where opinions and perspectives may prove to be as important as hard facts. Rather, we need to 
approach the issues from multiple perspectives and conduct multiple pieces of research, and 
then use the results to triangulate towards a more complete understanding – as is the case with 
this research. 
 
1.1 The Significance of the Research 
New Zealand is a small market that has adopted a variant of the classic Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance model. The advantage of conducting research in this environment is that good 
quality data are available and both directors and shareholders are relatively accessible. New 
Zealand boards have a lot of exposure to directors from other jurisdictions and the legal 
environment is not dissimilar to other Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions; consequently the research has 
the potential for international relevance.  
The research is intended to contribute to the body of corporate governance literature in 
the following ways: 
1. To provide a better understanding of the expectations that directors and shareholders 
hold of the  purpose, goals and objectives of corporate governance in New Zealand.  
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2. To elucidate any differences between shareholder and director expectations of New 
Zealand public company boards. The research is timely given that the issue is at the 
heart of a number of recent lawsuits, including the class action by shareholders of the 
failed carpet firm Feltex against their former directors (Underhill, 2012) and the case of 
the Crown vs former Justice Minister Douglas Graham (R vs Graham, 2012).  
3. To provide some insight into the applicability of popular definitions and theories of 
corporate governance in the New Zealand context. This will be achieved by exploring 
how shareholders and directors approach corporate governance and what they expect 
boards to achieve.  
4. To provide an up-to-date picture of the environment in which corporate governance in 
New Zealand operates. This understanding will provide future researchers with a more 
robust stepping-off point for their research into many aspects of New Zealand 
governance by clarifying some of the fundamental assumptions that researchers are 
currently forced to make due to a lack of evidence. It will also help researchers place 
learnings from New Zealand research in an international context. 
Given that the research investigates an area seldom examined, it can be expected not 
only to provide a useful contribution to the literature but also to be of assistance to 
organisations such as the Institute of Directors, the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX), the 
Shareholders’ Association and the Financial Markets Authority, all of whom have an active 
interest in this area. 
 
1.2 Organisation of this Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. 
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Chapter 2 reviews the relevant definitions and theories of corporate governance. It looks 
into some of the broader international literature surrounding corporate governance in order to 
provide a global context for the research. It compares and contrasts the basic definitions and 
common theories of governance, providing the working definitions that will be used throughout 
the thesis. It also discusses theories – namely agency, stewardship, stakeholder, and shareholder 
– that are commonly used to explain aspects of the board–stakeholder relationships. The 
governance practices of the US, UK and other key jurisdictions are then discussed, compared 
and contrasted to the NZ governance framework; this enables research drawn from these 
jurisdictions to be applied to the New Zealand context. Finally the chapter evaluates the 
literature surrounding a number of board performance and evaluation topics. These topics are 
reviewed because they touch on potentially contentious issues for both shareholders and 
directors and are therefore likely to influence the expectations of both parties.  
Chapter 3 discusses the goals and objectives of the research and details the specific 
research questions that are addressed by this thesis. It outlines the overall approach to the 
research, and discusses the research methodologies that are adopted at each stage. Ethical 
considerations and data security issues are also addressed. 
Chapter 4 examines the governance environment for New Zealand’s public companies 
from the perspectives of shareholders, directors, the companies themselves and the legal 
environment.  These sections examine some historic research that has been extended with 2013 
data generated specifically for this research. In addition new research has been conducted 
drawing on data from secondary sources which investigates aspects and features of New 
Zealand companies, shareholders and directors that have not previously been researched. 
Chapter 5 discusses some initial focus group research that was conducted to assess 
whether the research was addressing the issues that both shareholders and directors considered 
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most influenced their expectations of the role of the board. The findings from this study’s two 
principle pieces of research are then presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 presents the 
results of an analysis of the minutes from ASMs. These meetings are the only occasion on 
which most shareholders formally meet with the directors, so the minutes provide a unique 
record of the direct interaction between these two groups. Chapter 7 evaluates the survey 
responses that canvass the opinions of directors and shareholders towards boards. 
Chapter 8 draws together the results from the individual research initiatives that are 
discussed in Chapters 4 to 7, and compares and contrasts these findings to identify common 
themes and highlight any anomalies or contradictions in the research. Chapter 9 presents the 
conclusions drawn from this research and summarises the contribution of the thesis to the 
overall body of literature.   
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, the literature relevant to the role of shareholders and directors in corporate 
governance is reviewed. The chapter defines the key terms and some of the popular theories 
used in the field. It also investigates international practices, and finally examines some of the 
literature relating to board performance and evaluation. 
This review shows that there is no universally agreed definition for the term ‘corporate 
governance’, nor is there a consensus on the role of the board, and that this has the potential to 
create ambiguity and confusion. Because certain terms are central to this research, some of the 
many definitions in common use are examined and appropriate working definitions established. 
Four of the most popular theories that are applied to governance are examined, namely the 
agency, stewardship, stakeholder and shareholder theories. These theories outline different 
philosophical approaches to governance and they provide insights into shareholder and director 
behaviour and hence their expectations of boards. Because these theories are central to much of 
the published corporate governance research, an understanding of their strengths and 
limitations is required in order to interpret this research.   
Corporate governance models vary from country to country (Davies & Schlitzer, 2008; 
Agarwal, Erel, Stulz & Williamson, 2007). The corporate governance models of four countries 
are examined: the US, UK, Germany and China. The US and the UK were selected because, 
like New Zealand, they are based on the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance and, as 
will be shown, are the source of much of the literature on which New Zealand research is 
based. However, as was shown with the Cadbury acquisition case discussed in Chapter 1, 
relatively subtle variations in these models can have major implications on the way corporate 
governance is practised, so it is important to understand the nuances of these environments 
before applying any conclusions to New Zealand. The German corporate governance model is 
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discussed because it provides a contrasting model of governance and serves to highlight how 
even fundamental aspects of corporate governance can be approached in different ways. 
Finally, the Chinese corporate governance model is comparatively new, being based in part on 
what Chinese officials consider to be current international best practices, so it provides a useful 
contrasting reference point (Yang, Chi & Young, 2011). 
Literature examining board performance and evaluation is also reviewed. Because 
governance practices vary across jurisdictions, not all of this body of literature is necessarily 
relevant within the New Zealand context, so the research is confined to those topics that are 
considered likely to influence directors’ and shareholders’ expectations of boards. The topics 
discussed are: director independence, CEO remuneration, board size, corporate governance 
codes, board self-evaluation, and external corporate governance rating systems. Finally, 
attributes of the key protagonists – the directors themselves – are examined. 
 
2.1 Definitions of Corporate Governance 
The term ‘corporate governance’ is used frequently by researchers, commentators and 
practitioners, but, as the following table shows, it has no universally agreed definition. In 
practice, because the term is so commonly used it frequently goes undefined and has a taken-
for-granted character. Table 1 shows a sample of the definitions used in the literature.  
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Table 1.  
 
Definitions of corporate governance 
Definition Author 
If management is about running businesses, governance is 
about seeing that it is run properly. 
(Tricker, 1984, p. 4) 
The system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.  
(Cadbury, 1992, section 
2.5) 
The mechanisms which ensure that shareholders receive a 
return on their investment. 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1996,  
p. 737; Macey, 2008, p. 1) 
The subset of a ﬁrm’s contracts that help align the actions 
and choices of managers with the interests of shareholders. 
(Armstrong, Guay & 
Weber, 2010, p.181) 
All the influences affecting the institutional processes, 
including those for appointing the controllers and /or 
regulators, involved in organising the production and sale 
of goods and services. 
Turnbull, 1997, p. 183 
The determination of the broad uses to which resources will 
be deployed by the organisation and the resolution of 
conflicts among participants in organisations.  
(Daily, Dalton & 
Cannella, 2003, p. 371) 
The system of checks and balances, both internal and 
external to companies, which ensure that companies 
discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and 
act in a socially responsible way. 
(Solomon & Solomon, 
2004, p. 14) 
Thinking about strategic issues, rather than the operational 
day-to-day running of the business.  
(NZ Institute of Directors, 
2012) 
 
This lack of a clear and unambiguous definition can be problematic. Each of the definitions 
outlined has a set of assumptions about what corporate governance is all about and what 
problems corporate governance is intended to solve. Therefore, the choice of definition 
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inﬂuences the direction and interpretation of any subsequent debate and analysis, and it also has 
the potential to shape the views and opinions of directors and shareholders. 
A theme that is central to most of these definitions is the concept that governance 
involves some degree of monitoring and control of the business operations. This theme is either 
specifically addressed in the definitions (e.g. Solomon & Solomon, 2004; Cadbury, 1992; 
Donaldson, 1990), or is implied (e.g. Tricker, 1984). Beyond this theme differences of opinion 
emerge. The stakeholder theory versus shareholder theory debate, for instance, which 
essentially addresses the merits of placing either shareholders or all stakeholders at the locus of 
the enterprise, features in some of the definitions. For example Shleifer and Vishny (1996) 
favour shareholders, while Solomon and Solomon (2004) argue that governance should benefit 
all stakeholders. The scope of the definitions varies from the exceptionally broad to the very 
specific. Tricker (1984) considers that governance is about ensuring the business is run 
properly, which is an exceptionally broad definition, so broad as to the point of arguably being 
unusable. At the other extreme, the Daily et al. (2003) definition focuses on the two specific 
issues of resource allocation and conflict resolution; yet this is seemingly to the exclusion of all 
other activities, including those that are mandated by law, such as reporting to shareholders. 
The overlap between governance and strategy also creates ambiguity. The NZIoD (2012) 
essentially sees strategy and governance as almost being one and the same; others such as 
Cadbury (1992), Tricker (1984), and Daily et al. (2003) leave room in their definitions for some 
overlap between strategy and governance; while Turnbull (1997) and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1996) appear to see no implicit connection between the two.  
Given the diversity that exists within the definitions of governance the opportunity 
exists for both shareholders and directors to choose a definition of governance that meets their 
needs and supports either their collective or their personal views and preferences. For example, 
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shareholders may gravitate towards the Shleifer and Vishny definition, which focuses 
specifically on their needs, while directors may favour the NZIoD definition, which defines a 
far broader role for the board and seems to imply there is less accountability for its actions.  
As stated previously the choice of definition influences the scope of any subsequent 
discussion. In the context of this research, it is necessary to use a broad definition that does not 
introduce significant biases or restrictions in terms of the scope of the governance activity or 
the party whom the activity is intended to benefit. Furthermore, the definition should not 
exclude any particular activity generally undertaken by boards, nor any of the common 
governance theories. In this context, none of the definitions discussed is entirely satisfactory as 
they all appear to introduce their own biases and restrictions on governance. In order to meet 
the requirements of this research a working definition has been developed, which is ‘the 
relationship and interaction of the board with its environment’. This definition does not aim to 
exclude any of the themes identified in Table 1; furthermore, it delineates governance from 
operational management, thereby specifying a boundary on the role of governance. Lastly, this 
definition is not intended as an alternative to those outlined in Table 1; its purpose is simply to 
define the term and some boundaries for this research. 
 
2.2 The Role of the Board 
The role of the board is absolutely central to corporate governance. Although there is general 
agreement that the board’s role must be defined, there appears again to be little consensus on 
the form this definition should take (Petrovic, 2008; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Table 2 
summarises the significant activities that underpin some of the more common definitions of the 
board’s role. 
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Table 2  
 
Primary board responsibilities 
Primary board responsibilities Advocates 
Strategy, leadership, controlling management and 
reporting. 
Moltz, 1985, p. 87;          
Cadbury, 1992, section 2.5;       
OECD, 2004, p. 24. 
Shareholder advocate. Shleifer & Vishny, 1996, p. 737; 
Monks, 2001, p. 146;        
OECD, 2004, p. 18;            
Macey, 2008, p. 1. 
Directing, controlling and reporting. Forbes & Milliken, 1999, p. 492; 
Aguilera, 2005, p. 42;    
Nicholson & Kiel, 2007, p. 10. 
Contingency approach; directors effectively define 
their own roles. 
Blake, 1999, as cited in Long 
2006, p. 548;                        
Huse, 2005, p. 68. 
Monitoring, serving management, strategy and 
resource provision. 
Ong & Wan, 2008, p. 318.  
 
Table 2 is not intended to be comprehensive, but to highlight themes common to many of the 
definitions of the role and activities of the board. It does, however, support the assertion that 
there is only limited consensus on the role of the board (Donaldson, 1990; Monks & Minow, 
1995). This lack of consensus has potential to influence stakeholder expectations. Shareholders, 
for example, may be attracted to Macey’s (2008) definition, which makes their interests 
paramount, while directors may favour Cadbury’s (1992) definition, which gives the board a 
more active role in defining the direction of the company.  
One reason for this lack of consensus may be that the role of the board varies from 
enterprise to enterprise (Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 2010). Another contributor to this 
ambiguity is created by different conceptualisations of the mix of the ‘what’ of the board role 
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with the ‘how’ of the role (Nicholson & Newton, 2010). The ‘why’ of the role may also 
contribute to this ambiguity. For example, Macey, a well-known shareholder advocate, sees the 
role of the board as simply ensuring that management serve shareholders (Macey, 2011, p. 1). 
Conversely Cadbury makes no reference to shareholders or returns to shareholders in his 
definition; instead, he sees the board as being responsible for setting the strategic direction of 
the company and providing leadership (Cadbury, 2010).  
Cadbury’s view – that boards take a leadership role and set strategy – is in practice 
more radical than it first appears because, as will be shown, NZ boards are dominated by 
independent directors. Independent directors, by definition, have little or no direct management 
experience of the company they govern. Because of this lack of hands-on experience it can be 
argued that they are not best equipped to develop strategy, and that a more appropriate role for 
the board may be to evaluate and monitor the strategy developed by management. Previous NZ 
research has provided some evidence that suggests that some directors support the Cadbury 
(2010) view, e.g. Northcott & Smith, 2011 and Ingley & Van der Walt, 2005. There is 
however, no research that I am aware of which examines the issue from a shareholder 
perspective which is a significant omission given the role of shareholders in governance.  
Another stream of the literature considers that the role of the board is set by individual 
directors according to the circumstances (Blake, 1999; Huse, 2005), which include factors such 
as geography, industry type, ownership dispersion, firm size, business life cycle, and the tenure 
of the CEO. This contingent approach may appeal to some directors. New Zealand boards do, 
however, have obligations imposed on them from a variety of sources, including legislation and 
stock exchange regulations. These obligations play a largely non-negotiable part in defining the 
role of the board and therefore place some limitations on the contingent aspects of corporate 
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governance. So in practice there are aspects of corporate governance which are not represented 
in this definition. 
These examples show that there is a range of definitions for the role of the board that on 
face value appear to be more aligned with the interests of one stakeholder group than with 
another and therefore have the potential to bias the research. Eliminating any such bias from 
this research calls for a working definition for the role of the board that is sufficiently broad as 
to capture all of the tasks performed by boards and does not favour any particular stakeholder 
group. Based on these criteria the role of the board has been defined as ‘to perform those 
activities necessary to meet the expectations of the key stakeholders and to meet its legal 
obligations’. This definition is not intended to be a general alternative to the definitions 
outlined in Table 2; rather it is simply a working definition that defines a boundary for this 
research. 
 
2.3 Theories Addressing Governance 
In this section, four of the theories that are most commonly used in a governance context are 
examined. Each is examined from the perspective of understanding shareholder and director 
attitudes and views of governance. Agency theory and stewardship theory are both 
descriptive/empirical and instrumental theories which are used to describe and explain how 
certain aspects of governance operate and to predict certain behaviours and outcomes. 
Shareholder theory and stakeholder theory, on the other hand, are predominantly normative 
theories that describe a philosophical approach to operating businesses. However, they are also 
on occasion used as descriptive/empirical theory to describe what is happening within an 
organisation (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  While none of these theories attempts to explain 
governance as a whole, they all provide pointers towards the expectations that shareholders and 
directors have of boards. 
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2.3.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory was developed to help understand the problems that arise when one party (a 
principal) gets another party (an agent) to perform certain tasks. Agency theory makes some 
assumptions about the parties (self-interest, bounded rationality and risk aversion), and, based 
on these assumptions, it is used to examine the contract between two parties. From an agency 
theory perspective two problems can occur with this contractual arrangement: firstly the parties 
can have different, possibly conflicting objectives; and secondly, the parties can have a 
different appetite for risk (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 Agency theory is the most common theory that is used to explain corporate governance 
behaviours (Dalton et al., 2003). Indeed, a recent review of research into governance in leading 
US and international academic journals found that in 54% of articles agency theory was 
employed as the main theoretical perspective (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). The theory is used 
in a wide range of areas such as the role of independent directors (Aguilera, 2005), CEO 
remuneration (Gregory-Smith, 2011), board structure (Fauzi & Locke, 2012), board size 
(Conyon & Peck, 1998) and CEO duality (Boyd, 1995).  However, meta-analysis of many of 
these types of studies has found little statistical evidence to support the veracity of the theory 
when applied to many of these issues (Dalton et al., 2003). While agency theory is criticised 
from a number of perspectives (Daily et al., 2003; Huse, Hoskisson, Zattoni & Viganò, 2009), 
an underlying reason why the theory is not as insightful as would be expected, particularly 
given its popularity, is that the assumptions made about the principal and agent may not always 
be correct. Nonetheless, possibly because of the simplicity of the theory reducing, as it does, 
complex problems to just two parties and one contract, it continues to be used extensively in 
extant research (Daily et al., 2003). 
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2.3.2 Stewardship theory  
Stewardship theory can be considered as either a complement or an alternative to agency 
theory. Stewardship theory defines situations in which managers are not motivated by personal 
goals, but rather are stewards whose objectives and motives are aligned with those of their 
principals (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). The key 
difference between agency and stewardship theories is an assumption about human nature. 
Agency theory assumes that people are individualistic utility maximisers, while stewardship 
theory advocates that people self-actualise and achieve utility through organisational 
achievement (Davis Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). Stewardship theory proponents argue that 
if the CEO’s objectives are aligned with the shareholders’, then the fewer constraints imposed 
on the CEO the better.  
Stewardship theory is subject to some of the same criticisms as agency theory, in that 
the assumptions regarding human nature underpinning the theory cannot be applied in all 
governance situations or across all jurisdictions. So with agency theory, we have a situation in 
which directors and shareholders can draw on a theory to justify contradictory positions on a 
wide range of corporate governance issues.  
 
2.3.3 Stakeholder theory 
The underlying principle of stakeholder theory is that companies exist not only for the benefit 
of shareholders, but for the benefit of all parties that have a stake in the organisation, and 
therefore no specific group of stakeholders or any individual party’s interests should be placed 
above any of the others (Jensen, 2001). Stakeholder theory justifies this assertion by arguing 
that a firm cannot maximise value if it ignores the interests of its stakeholders (Jensen, 2001; 
Smith, 2003; Freeman & Reed, 1983). A challenge with stakeholder theory is identifying and 
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evaluating the needs of the large number of stakeholders that are involved with a modern 
corporation. This leads to the claim that, because stakeholder theory is encouraging boards to 
be accountable to all stakeholders, it is in effect making a board accountable to everyone, 
which is akin to being accountable to no one (Sternberg, 1997).  
 
2.3.4 Shareholder theory 
Shareholder theory asserts that the primary responsibility of a firm is to maximise the wealth of 
its shareholders (Friedman, 1962, p. 112). Advocates of the theory argue that because 
shareholders are the residual claimants on a firm’s profits (profits being what’s left after all 
other stakeholders have been satisfied), by default it takes into consideration the other 
stakeholders’ needs. A criticism of shareholder theory is that it places too much emphasis on 
shareholder objectives and that these objectives may not always be in the best long-term 
interests of the company. For example, pressure from shareholders has led boards in the US to 
adopt shareholder wealth maximisation strategies, which in turn have led to a very short-term 
focus for companies and arguably created a culture of excessive risk taking (Lazonick & 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Gamble & Kelly, 2001). 
 
2.3.5 Summary of theories addressing governance 
The problem with the theories discussed in this section from a perspective of shareholder and 
director expectations is the lack of consistency between them. Applying the two normative 
theories, stakeholder and shareholder, to common governance issues can result in different 
outcomes. Similarly, using agency theory and stewardship theory to interpret corporate 
governance activity is likely to result in different and possibly contradictory interpretations of 
the activity. The impact can potentially be significant and, as will be shown in subsequent 
sections, these differences between theories can influence the interpretation of some 
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fundamental aspects of governance including board accountability, board control, and CEO 
power. This apparent lack of consistency between theories also highlights the possibility that 
both shareholders and directors can disagree on various aspects of corporate governance and 
yet support their position by citing one of these established governance theories. 
The differences in outcome that can occur when applying different theories to the same 
situation suggests that selecting the appropriate theory to apply is arguably as important as the 
application of the theory itself. One factor that may influence the appropriate selection of 
theory is the status of the external environment. The link between corporate governance 
practices and the broader organisational environment is not generally discussed in the classic 
treatise on these theories (e.g. Jensen, 2001; Eisenhardt, 1989). However, it has been postulated 
that the lack of consideration for this link is a limitation in these theories (Aguilera, Filatochev 
& Jackson, 2008).  
The mutually contradictory aspects of these theories highlight the importance of 
research such as this, which can assist in calibrating the theories against actual board 
experience and practice and can also explore the link between governance practices and the 
broader commercial environment. 
 
2.4 International Corporate Governance 
The practice of governance differs substantially from country to country. The legal framework, 
the extent to which governance is aligned with either stakeholders or shareholders, financial 
systems (e.g. bank versus market driven) and the political governance of the economy (e.g. 
state directed, associational, or market driven) along with societal and cultural values all 
influence the fundamental features of a country’s governance system (Davies & Schlitzer, 
2008; Agarwal, et al., 2007). Therefore, in order to determine the applicability of international 
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research to the New Zealand environment (and vice versa) it is important to understand the 
salient features of both the New Zealand environment and the relevant offshore counterparts. 
Because much of the governance research on which New Zealand research is based emanates 
from the US or the UK, the governance practices and environments of these countries are 
examined in some detail. In addition, a brief overview of the key features of Germany and 
China, whose governance practices differ significantly and therefore act as a useful contrast, 
are also included. 
 
2.4.1 United Kingdom 
The first example of a company that resembled the modern corporation with distinct 
shareholders and a board was the Russia Company, formed in 1553 in the UK (Todd, 1932). By 
the 19th century the advantages of this type of corporate structure had become widely apparent. 
Specifically, the unlimited life of the corporation, the transferability of ownership and the 
limited liability of the shareholders were well understood and this, combined with a need to 
raise large amounts of capital to execute many of the business opportunities that were then 
available, resulted in corporate structures becoming the preferred structure (Grant, 2003). In the 
19th century the directors of a company were all shareholders in their own right and they 
generally worked full time in the company in senior executive positions (Todd, 1932). In 
addition to their executive duties, they also had some relatively minor responsibilities for 
monitoring their company performance and reporting on progress to the body of shareholders. 
These duties were specified in the UK Joint Stock Companies Acts of 1844 and 1854.  
The 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act defined the substantial powers and responsibilities 
of both the directors and the shareholders. It states that the directors are responsible for actively 
managing the company and reporting to shareholders. Specifically the Act states that directors 
must: 
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 conduct and manage the affairs of the company, and for that purpose enter into such 
contracts and to execute all such acts and deeds as the circumstances require; 
 appoint and remove the secretary, clerks and servants, and appoint and remove other 
persons for special services as required; 
 hold meetings periodically and from time to time as the concerns of the company shall 
require; 
 appoint a chairman to preside over such meetings (Joint Stock Act 1844, p. 433). 
During the course of the 19th century, board members progressively withdrew from the 
day-to-day management of the company, and consequentially the requirement to monitor 
management and report to shareholders increased (Todd, 1932). However, the UK government 
continued with a largely hands-off approach to governance, leaving shareholders to determine 
the rules, roles and responsibilities of the board through the company’s articles of association. 
The current (1985) version of the UK Companies Act states, quite simply, that public 
companies require only two directors and that the board must perform certain administrative 
and reporting tasks. Those tasks appear, by the author’s assessment, to be similar to those 
outlined in the 1844 Act.2 In this environment a model of corporate governance has developed 
that is known as the Anglo-Saxon model. The underlying assumption of this model is the 
concept of market capitalism and that the idea that the purpose of a company is to serve its 
shareholders (Cernat, 2014). The model assumes that shareholder interests are best served by 
decentralization and self-regulation. This has led to an environment where ownership of public 
companies is widely dispersed and the stock exchange takes a prominent role in facilitating 
raising the capital (Cernat, 2014). Companies are structured with a single board, usually with 
                                                 
2 Each UK and NZ Companies Act from 1844 has been compared to its predecessor and the significant inclusions 
and omissions from a corporate governance perspective have been noted. The details of this analysis are beyond 
the scope of this research and therefore have not been included. 
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the roles of chairman and CEO separated, and employees play no role in the governance of the 
company (Cernat, 2014).  
Even though the UK government has left corporate governance largely unregulated, it 
has arguably led the world down a path of governance reform by promoting best practices 
through a series of recommendations based on the findings of expert committees (Larcker & 
Tayan, 2013). The findings of these committees have influenced not only UK corporate 
governance practices but also New Zealand governance practices, as will be shown. This 
approach of voluntary codes of practice that focus on the concepts and broad principles 
contrasts with the US practice, which relies heavily on detailed and specific regulations (Kane, 
2012; Romano, 2004). 
The Cadbury Report (1992) laid the fundamentals for empowering boards and limiting 
CEOs’ influence over the board and decision making (Zalewska, 2013). Among the 
recommendations made were the separation of the chairman and the CEO, the appointment of a 
significant number of independent directors, an independent audit committee, reducing 
conflicts of interest between directors and the company, and improved financial reporting. To 
encourage compliance, the London Stock Exchange has incorporated many of the 
recommendations into its listing rules, but, rather than make compliance mandatory, it has 
adopted the ‘comply or explain’ approach, whereby issuers are required to either comply with 
the rules or explain the reasons for not doing so (London Stock Exchange, 2014). The report 
also led to the UK’s first combined UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2010). Despite the widespread adoption of the Cadbury Report there is scant evidence 
to suggest that these reforms have had any positive impact on company performance (Weir & 
Laing, 2000). 
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The Cadbury Report was followed by the Greenbury Report (Greenbury, 1995), which 
recommended independent remuneration subcommittees, and the Turnbull Report (Turnbull, 
1999), which looked at risk management, and finally the Higgs Report (Higgs, 2003). The 
Higgs Report placed more emphasis and responsibility on independent directors and 
recommended board self-evaluation. Most of the recommendations of these reports have 
subsequently been incorporated into the Combined Code of Corporate Governance (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2010). Many of the issues raised, such as the role of independent directors, 
age limits on directors, and CEO remuneration, have been the subject of public and shareholder 
scrutiny (Brickley & Zimmerman 2010; Sonnenfeld, 2004). The lack of evidence-based 
research to support many of the recommendations made in these reports appears not to have 
been an impediment to their incorporation into the combined code. 
 
2.4.2 United States 
The foundations of corporate governance in both the US and the UK are similar to those of 
New Zealand. Indeed, even today the laws of the three countries have much in common. 
However, a number of factors, including the size of companies, the spread of shareholders, the 
way the law has been interpreted, and the emphasis on regulation, have created a governance 
environment that is quite different to the New Zealand environment. 
One of the early defining pieces of US case law was set by a case between a 
shareholder, Mr Dodge, and the Ford Motor Company. In this case the courts decided that: 
‘The directors of a corporation, and they alone, have the power to declare a dividend of the 
earnings of the corporation,’ and that ‘a business corporation is organised and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for 
that end.’ (Dodge vs Ford Motor Co, 1919, p. 2). With this ruling the courts essentially defined 
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where shareholders’ powers ended and directors’ powers began. It also placed shareholders in a 
privileged position above that of other stakeholders, a status that is not afforded to New 
Zealand shareholders (New Zealand Companies Act 1993). On the basis of the Dodge vs Ford 
ruling, directors secured almost unlimited power over their corporations. It was not until 1942 
that shareholders could even put resolutions to a vote at a shareholder meeting; that right was 
enshrined in UK and NZ law nearly 100 years previously (Joint Stock Act 1844). Even today 
the process for getting a shareholder resolution tabled in the US is not straightforward because 
the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allow directors to reject 
shareholder proposals for a wide variety of reasons (Grant, 2003). However, given the large 
number of shareholders that most US public companies have and the potential for proposals 
with narrow interests to be advanced, it is perhaps understandable that such constraints are in 
place. Proponents of the US governance model argue that a company is not a democracy and 
therefore democratic principles should not be applied. If investors object to the decisions that 
the directors are making then they can sell their shares (Thompson & Edelman, 2009).  
The stock market crash of 1929, in which the Dow Jones index fell from a high of 391 
in September 1929 to a low of 41 in July 1932, led directly to the US establishing the SEC in 
1934. The role of the SEC is to protect shareholders and it undertakes this by endeavouring to 
ensure that shareholders are kept fully informed, so that they may make rational decisions on 
the sale or purchase of their securities, and by ensuring that manipulative practices and false 
and misleading statements are prohibited. It achieves this largely by administering the 1933 and 
1934 Securities Acts (one of which deals with new listings and the other secondary trading of 
shares (Grant, 2003). The SEC is also responsible for accounting standards, although it 
delegates the process of drafting standards to the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), a not-for-profit organisation comprising experts from industry, accounting firms and 
academia.    
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A curious feature of the US governance environment is the role that the State of 
Delaware plays in the registration and administration of public companies and the role its 
judiciary plays in settling commercial disputes. Over 63% of US companies are registered in 
Delaware (Larcker & Tayan, 2013, p. 38).  This situation had its origins in the early 1900s 
when New Jersey began imposing high taxes on corporations. Companies migrated to 
Delaware largely because its constitution requires a bipartisan judiciary, a structure unique to 
this state. Over time the Delaware courts have developed a reputation for fairness and speedy 
resolution in civil litigation. The state’s company law has also influenced that of other US 
states; for example, in recent years Delaware has set standards of conduct for company 
directors in law, ensuring that the board’s focus on processes is more than simply box-ticking 
exercises. The Delaware courts have a reputation for not second-guessing business decisions, 
which gives boards some confidence that their decisions will not be judged with the benefit of 
hindsight (Veasey & Di Guglielmo, 2005). 
Two key pieces of recent legislation have had a significant effect on the US corporate 
governance landscape. These are the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the Dodd–Frank 
Financial Reform Act of 2010. SOX was introduced in the wake of accounting scandals and 
corporate failures that had brought down one of the US’s largest companies (Enron) and the 
world’s largest accounting firm (Arthur Andersen). The purpose of SOX was to restore investor 
confidence by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. From a 
governance perspective, some of the key provisions of the Act are making the CEO and CFO 
criminally liable for any misrepresentations in the company accounts, ensuring that the 
majority of audit committee members are independent directors and banning most personal 
loans to executives and directors. Opinion is divided over the effectiveness of the Act (Petra & 
Loukatos, 2009; Linsley & Linsley, 2008). 
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From a governance perspective, the Dodd-Frank Act introduced three key reforms: say 
on pay, proxy access and increased disclosure. The say on pay amendment led to the SEC 
mandating that at least once every three years shareholders shall be entitled to vote in a non-
binding referendum to approve or reject the compensation of the company’s executives. The 
increased proxy access enabled under Dodd-Frank makes a limited allowance for substantial, 
long-term shareholders to nominate directors (SEC, 2010, Rule 14a-11). Previously, 
nominating directors was virtually the sole domain of the board. By US standards, this is a 
radical change, one that had been under consideration by the SEC for some 30 years (Schapiro, 
2010). Companies must also disclose more information in areas such as executive 
compensation, the independence of remuneration committee members, and the surrounding 
decision of whether or not to have an independent chairman. In spite of these increased powers 
shareholders in the US do not appear to be in a hurry to exercise them, given that the number of 
shareholder proposals submitted to Fortune 1500 companies has been declining year on year 
over the last five years. In 2007, 665 shareholder proposals were submitted, dropping to just 
417 proposals in 2011 (Georgeson, 2011). Another key element of the US environment is that it 
has a very active market for corporate control. Quite simply, underperforming companies or 
companies with weak governance are likely to be acquired or merged with other businesses. 
This is considered a significant incentive for directors to maximise the short-term performance 
of their companies (Jensen, 1983; Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, 1988). 
From the perspective of director and shareholder expectations, key differences between 
the US corporate governance model and its New Zealand counterpart include: the size of US 
companies relative to New Zealand companies; the expectation that US firms place shareholder 
requirements ahead of those of other stakeholders; the greater power that is invested in US 
boards; and the active market for corporate control. 
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2.4.3 Germany 
The German corporate governance system provides an interesting alternative to the Anglo-
Saxon type adopted by, among others, the US and UK. An examination of the German model is 
useful also in that it highlights and brings into sharp contrast some aspects of the NZ corporate 
governance model that might otherwise go unnoticed. It is also worth considering for no other 
reason than that some of the world’s most successful and respected companies are listed on the 
German DAX stock market and are therefore required to comply with its rules (von Rosen, 
2007). 
Under German law companies are given less latitude than their Anglo-Saxon 
counterparts to define their own structure and rules. For example, German companies are 
required to have two boards. One is a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), which consists of non-
executives who are elected annually by the shareholders, and is responsible for compliance 
issues, major financial decisions and approving the payment of dividends. This board is 
required by law to have a minimum of 33% employee representation when the company has 
more than 500 employees and 50% employee representation when its employee numbers reach 
2000. It is also common for supervisory boards to have representatives from German national 
banks and members of the company’s founding family. The second board is the management 
board (Vorstand). This board is responsible for strategy, product development, and the 
operational aspects of the business (Larcker & Tayan, 2011, p. 45). Notwithstanding that 
ownership of German companies is less fragmented than in the UK or US, given the influence 
of banks and employees, German shareholders have far less influence than their Anglo-Saxon 
counterparts (ibid.).  
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In 2002 Germany introduced its first corporate governance code 
(Regierungskommission, 2015). The code, which draws on the OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) corporate governance code, appears to be a step 
towards aligning German corporate governance practices with OECD and European best 
practices. The code makes suggestions that the supervisory board create audit and risk 
management and remuneration committees. Questions are starting to arise around the 
composition of supervisory boards and this suggests a possible trend towards a more Anglo-
Saxon–centric governance model over time (von Rosen, 2007).  
So overall the German corporate governance model provides a sharp contrast to the 
Anglo-Saxon model. Given that many successful German companies operate under this regime 
it demonstrates that there is not necessarily a single best approach to corporate governance.  
 
2.4.4 China 
China is one of New Zealand’s largest trading partners (Statistics NZ, 2013), and while its 
influence on NZ public companies is relatively small at this stage – there are only three 
directors of NZSX-listed companies who are domiciled in China, for example, (4.4.5) – it 
seems likely that trade links will continue to grow, so its influence will increase over time. The 
Chinese governance model is relatively new and reflects the country’s partial transition to a 
capitalist economic system. Like the German model it also provides a useful contrast to the NZ 
model. 
In 2001 it was estimated that the state controlled some 81% of shares in publicly listed 
companies in China. This control is achieved by holding some 9% of the shares directly and 
some 72% indirectly through pyramid share holdings (Yang et al., 2011). Different classes of 
shares are issued which can be traded on different exchanges in different currencies and by 
different people (e.g. Chinese nationals and others). Like Germany, China has adopted a two-
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tier board structure, with a supervisory board that reports to shareholders and a management 
board. Management are not represented on the supervisory board. One-third of the supervisory 
board must comprise independent directors. However, there is evidence to suggest that the 
market does not always consider these directors to be independent (Qui & Yao, 2009). The 
precise role that banks play in the governance of Chinese companies is not well researched. In 
many cases the government is majority owner of both the corporations and the banks. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the government frequently places social and political 
objectives above financial objectives and this has led some commentators to assert that banks, 
because of their control, are not an effective monitor of company performance (Yang et al., 
2011).  
In 2002 China also established a corporate governance code that recommends audit 
nomination and remuneration committees aligned with international best practices. The code is 
based on the ‘comply or explain’ principle first introduced in the UK in the Cadbury Report 
(Cadbury, 1992). However, many companies appear to consider ‘comply or explain’ to be a 
loophole allowing them to legally opt out of the more arduous aspects of governance; very few 
Chinese companies have set up audit committees, for example (Yang et al, 2011). That said, the 
Chinese approach to corporate governance is changing, and some companies are incorporating 
features of the Anglo-Saxon governance model, such as independent audit and remuneration 
committees, into their practices. Change is largely being driven by the expectations of 
international investors, particularly when these companies list on European or US stock 
exchanges (Larcker & Tayan, 2013, p. 52).   
From a New Zealand perspective the Chinese model, like the German model, shows 
that approaches other than the Anglo-Saxon model can provide corporate governance that 
meets the requirements of key stakeholders. Evidence that some Chinese companies, like their 
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German counterparts, are increasingly adopting aspects of the Anglo-Saxon governance model 
may also be significant as it may suggest a global trend towards a more common set of 
governance arrangements that are more closely aligned with the New Zealand approach to 
corporate governance.  
 
2.4.5 Summary of international corporate governance models  
Table 3 is the authors assessment of some of the key differences in international corporate 
governance models that have been discussed in the literature reviewed in this chapter, and for 
comparison purposes it introduces the New Zealand corporate governance model (which will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 4). 
Table 3  
 
International corporate governance models 
  UK US Germany China NZ 
Ownership 
fragmentation High High Low Low Moderate 
Shareholder centric Yes Yes No No Moderate 
Board 1 tier 1 tier 2 tier 2 tier 1 tier 
Employee participation No No Yes No No 
Legal environment Strong Strong Strong Weak Strong 
Bank involvement Low Low High Unknown Low 
Takeover market Moderate High Low Low Low 
CEO duality Low Moderate Nil Low Nil 
Role of stock exchange High High Low Low Moderate 
Size of market Large Very large Large Very large Tiny 
 
Table 3 highlights that, even at this very general level, material differences can be seen 
between the New Zealand governance model and those of other countries. This suggests that 
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New Zealand shareholders and directors may behave differently and have different 
expectations of boards than their overseas counterparts. It also confirms findings (e.g. Davies & 
Schlitzer, 2008; Agarwal et al., 2007) that it is important to understand the country-specific 
aspects of governance practices before applying learnings from other jurisdictions. Because 
most of the literature on corporate governance referred to in this and other New Zealand based 
research is sourced from either the US or the UK, differences between these three countries are 
particularly relevant to this research. 
2.5 Empirical Measures of Boards and the Implications for Stakeholder 
Expectations 
How boards organise themselves and what they choose to do is likely to influence both 
directors’ and shareholders’ expectations of boards. Stakeholders can influence board activity 
by controlling the size of the board (Boone, Casares Field, Karpoff, & Raheja 2007) and by 
influencing board behaviour through corporate governance codes (Davies & Schlitzer, 2008). 
Boards have been encouraged to evaluate their performance through self-evaluation processes 
(Long, 2006) and independent companies have been established in the US and elsewhere to 
evaluate board performance (Brown & Caylor, 2004).  However, before examining this 
literature it is first necessary to gain an appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
research methodologies that are frequently adopted for such research. This section first 
discusses the research methods commonly used for empirical research into board performance, 
then reviews some of the literature on each of these aspects of corporate governance in order to 
identify elements that are likely to influence shareholder and director expectations. The 
elements reviewed are: board size, corporate governance codes, board self-evaluation, and 
external corporate governance evaluation methodologies.  
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2.5.1 Research methodology 
A large body of literature has developed around the idea that company performance is linked to 
some easily measurable attribute either of the board or of directors themselves. The attributes 
frequently researched include: board size, CEO remuneration, director independence, and many 
of the other attributes that potentially influence shareholder and director expectations of boards. 
Studies tend to rely on easily accessible data and use a relatively standard ‘black box’ 
methodology (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). A review of corporate governance research 
published in leading US and European journals found that 78% of the research published in the 
journals was based on this approach (ibid.). Because much of the research referred to in this 
and the following section is based on these methodologies it is important to understand how the 
research is conducted and its limitations. 
 These studies frequently consider the board to be a ‘black box’ (Gabrielsson & Huse, 
2004), and they look for a relationship between an input to this black box – which is typically 
some aspect of corporate governance that can be observed without interacting with the directors 
– and the output, which is some measure of overall company performance. This approach to 
governance research has the advantage of avoiding interaction with directors, an important 
consideration given that directors have a reputation for not only jealously guarding their 
privacy but also operating in near-complete secrecy, making it difficult to engage with them 
directly (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007). Inputs in these types of studies are generally any aspect 
of corporate governance in which data are freely available, with the size of boards, number of 
independent directors, and the gender of directors all being typical candidates. The output is 
typically a proxy for company performance and is generally a group of financial metrics such 
as ROI, ROAE, Tobin’s Q and EVA (Petrovic, 2008). To test for a relationship between the 
input and output, regression analysis is performed and the results are generally explained in the 
context of one or more of the popular governance theories. The challenge with these research 
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initiatives is that they fail to yield consistently repeatable results (Brickley & Zimmerman, 
2010; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996). Possible reasons for this include: 
 Accounting measures. The validity of using basic accounting measures such as 
ROI and ROAE as a proxy for company performance has long been questioned 
from an economic standpoint (Chen & Lee, 1995). Arguably a more 
fundamental weakness is that these accounting measures seldom reflect 
company performance as assessed by either shareholders or directors because 
they do not necessarily reflect the strategic objectives that the company has set. 
For example, technology companies in their start-up phase frequently drive 
towards market share even if it results in years of poor financial results.  
 Closed system approach. These research initiatives treat the board as a closed 
system and fail to take into account the impact of external factors, such as 
economic influences, and shareholder influences on the actions of the board 
(Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). Much of this research still relies on Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) application of agency theory (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004), 
which lends itself to considering corporate governance as a two-party closed 
system.  
 Time frames. The research initiatives tend to measure the element of the board 
under investigation at the beginning of a year and the output (company financial 
performance) at the end of the year. Given the strategic and long-term nature of 
much board activity this might not always be the most appropriate time frame on 
which to measure performance.   
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These ‘black box’ studies are also frequently criticised for failing to take into account 
the contingent nature of corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Indeed, Finkelston 
and Mooney (2003) and Gabrielsson & Huse (2004) argue that this type of research does not 
yield strong research results or lead to robust governance practices. Therefore given these 
limitations some caution is required when extrapolating the results of such research to more 
general situations.  
  
2.5.2 Board size 
The size of the board is a metric that is likely to influence directors’ views and expectations of 
boards more strongly than those of shareholders. From the directors’ perspective, a board’s size 
will affect the degree of influence they can exert over it and their ability to ‘get things done’ 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999). So the size of the board is likely to play a key part in influencing 
directors’ expectations. Shareholders may also have an interest in board size because it is a 
criterion used by rating agencies who evaluate governance quality on behalf of shareholders 
(Donker & Zahir, 2008). 
Board size is frequently viewed as a trade-off between firm-specific benefits from the 
expertise that directors contribute and the cost of monitoring (Boone et al., 2007). However this 
trade-off may be specious, as the relationship between board size and company performance is 
one of the few areas where research has reasonably consistently shown a negative correlation 
across research studies: the larger the board, the weaker the company’s performance (De 
Andres, Azofra & Lopez, 2005; Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells, 1998, Guest 2009). However, 
there are exceptions and not all research has found this correlation (Conyon & Peck, 1998; 
Chin, Vos & Quin, 2004).  
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Boone et al. (2007), in a comprehensive study into the board size of firms from their 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) through their first 10 years as listed companies, found that, while 
average board sizes slowly increased over time, this was influenced by economic 
considerations and by firm-specific issues, such as the power of the CEO and the strength of 
the management team. They therefore concluded that boards are tailored to meet their own 
unique environment.  
2.5.3 CEO Remuneration 
CEO remuneration has long been a contentious topic, with debates occurring in the 
popular press, at ASMs, and presumably within remuneration committees of boards themselves 
(Tosi, Werner, Katz & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). Over the last two decades or so CEO salaries in 
many countries have risen substantially faster than median salaries and arguably faster than 
company returns (Thomas & Watson, 2013). This has led to public and shareholder outcry, 
with much of the criticism being pointed at directors for approving such increases. 
Shareholders argue that CEO remuneration is a proxy for management power and influence, 
and that directors who allow such salaries are captured by management and simply aren’t doing 
their job (Boyer, 2005). While this may not necessarily be the case (Boyd, 1994), the outcry has 
been sufficient to motivate regulators in many countries including the UK, Australia and the 
US to introduce so-called ‘say on pay’ regulations, which give shareholders the right to vote on 
CEO remuneration (Thomas & Watson, 2013). While these regulations seem to have been well 
received by shareholders, directors continue to argue that say on pay is an unnecessary 
intrusion into their area of responsibility (Bainbridge, 2008).  
At the heart of the arguments regarding CEO remunerations is the relationship between 
the level of remuneration and company performance. International research has shown that in 
practice, on average, there is relatively little relationship between executive compensation and 
performance (Tosi et al., 2000). The limited amount of recent research conducted in New 
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Zealand has reached a similar conclusion (Elayan, Lau & Meyer, 2003). However it cannot be 
assumed from this research that financial incentives given to CEOs are not improving company 
performance. One possible explanation for the research not identifying the linkage is that the 
research may not consider the lag between when an incentive payment is made to a CEO and 
when the performance improvement is apparent. For example, if CEOs are rewarded for 
initiatives such as making acquisitions, opening new markets or launching new products, then 
the period in which the compensation is paid may not match the period in which the 
performance upswing occurs. 
 
2.5.4 Corporate governance codes 
Corporate governance codes are voluntary sets of principles, standards or best practices that are 
related to the internal governance of businesses. The codes themselves grew out of a desire to 
reduce the number of corporate scandals and failures (Davies & Schlitzer, 2008). Today, 
guidelines are published by a variety of sources. In New Zealand probably the most well-
known example is the former Security Commission’s Corporate Governance in New Zealand: 
Principles and Guidelines (2011), although the IoD (2012) and the NZX (2012) also publish 
codes. Many stock exchanges make adherence to a specific guideline a mandatory condition of 
listing (Gregory, 2008; ASX, 2007; NZX, 2012). Comparing codes highlights issues where 
shareholders and directors may disagree, as well as topics that they consider important.  
Table 4 summarises the key issues addressed in codes developed by the following eight 
organisations: The New Zealand Securities Commission (NZSC), the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYX), the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), the OECD, the United Nations (UN), 
the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association – College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-
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CREF), the combined International Corporate Governance Network and California Public 
Employees Retirement System (ICGN/CalPERS), and General Motors (GM). 
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Table 4 
 
Corporate governance codes 
Affiliation Stock exchange Government Shareholder Co. 
  
 Author NZSC NYX ASX OECD UN 
TIAA-
CREF 
ICGN/ 
CalPERS GM 
Company objectives         
 Disclose objectives         
 
Formal charter 
 
        
Ethical standards         
 Conflicts of interest         
 Fair dealing         
 Legal responsibilities         
 Independent judgment         
 Confidentiality         
 Fully informed         
 Diversity policy         
 Director loans         
 
Setting the ethical tone 
  
        
Board composition         
 Director appointment         
 Director independence         
 Independent chair         
 Retirement age         
 
Limit to number of 
directorships 
        
 
No role for former CEO 
 
        
Board practice         
 
Attendance at board 
meetings 
        
 Role in strategy         
 Board evaluation        
 
For presentation purposes the codes have been grouped by the affiliation of their author, i.e. 
stock exchange, government body, shareholders and company. This highlights how the nature 
of the organisations promoting the code influences its content. Shareholder organisations 
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emphasise board composition and board practice, government organisations focus on ethical 
issues, and stock exchanges tend to keep their codes to the minimum. The content of the codes 
themselves has been divided into four categories: company objectives, ethical standards, board 
composition and board practices. This table is not definitive and some of the codes address 
other issues, many of which are of particular importance to the sponsoring organisation; for 
example, the CalPERS code includes clauses requiring companies to report on greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
This structure reveals some common themes across governance codes, including: 
 Ethics. Each of the corporate governance codes reviewed in Table 4 specified 
that the board is responsible for setting the ethical standard and tone for the 
business. This highlights a gap between these stakeholders’ expectations of 
boards and the corporate governance literature, given that none of the definitions 
of the boards’ role identified in Table 2 consider setting an ethical standard to be 
a primary board responsibility.  
 Board composition. With the exception of the OECD all the governance codes 
promoted the role of independent directors, and 50% of the codes (including the 
two US-based pension funds) also advocated independent chairs. This shows 
strong support for the concept of independence, notwithstanding the lack of 
evidence to support a tangible link between director independence and firm 
performance.  
 Board practice. This is the area that is the least specified in the codes reviewed. 
This suggests that the codes’ advocates are still keen for directors to have the 
freedom to set their practices to meet the challenges of their businesses as they 
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see fit. The shareholder codes and most of the stock exchange codes single out 
strategy as an area that boards should focus on. These codes all propose that the 
role of the board is to review, approve and guide, but not to develop corporate 
strategy.  
 Outliers. Some corporate governance codes are alone in highlighting certain 
areas of governance. The ASX is alone in advocating that companies establish a 
gender diversity policy and report annually on progress towards achieving this 
objective (ASX, 2007). Surprisingly neither the OECD nor the UN codes raise 
the issue of gender diversity. The OECD code is unique in not advocating that 
all directors should be able to exercise independent judgement on corporate 
affairs (OECD, 2004). The shareholder sponsored codes are mindful of the time 
commitment that being a director requires and recommend a limit to the number 
of directorships that an individual can hold.  
The key point that Table 4 illustrates is that these organisations all have different 
expectations of boards. The table shows that these codes are like manifestos, in that they appear 
to be an attempt by the sponsoring organisation to exert a degree of compliance with their 
views over companies within their investment spheres. For example, companies that want to 
attract some of the US $370 billion that the US-based TIAA-CREF have under management 
must adhere to their code. The TIAA-CREF code includes guidelines for environmental and 
social issues that are not often found in other codes, but which probably reflect the views of 
their clients (Gregory, 2008). The OECD (2004) and UN (2006) codes also reflect the nature of 
their sponsoring body, as both of these codes place a heavy emphasis on the legislative aspects 
of governance and ensuring a level playing field where shareholders’ rights are respected. The 
NYX code appears to be written from a company directors’ perspective; it is unique among the 
codes discussed in recognising that governance is not the sole domain of boards, and it 
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emphasises the role and responsibilities of both shareholders and management in the overall 
governance process. NYX considers that ‘the critical role of management in establishing proper 
governance has not been sufficiently recognised’, and shareholders, it says, ‘have the right, the 
responsibility and a long-term economic interest to vote their shares in a thoughtful manner’ 
(NYX, 2010, p. 3). Another area where NYX is at odds with the other codes is that it cautions 
against having only one executive on the board; its concern is that boards with a sole executive 
may lack the required in-depth knowledge of the company (NYX, 2010). The GM code appears 
to be designed to attract as many investors as possible, presumably to ensure a strong share 
price. It incorporates some unusual and potentially provocative ideas; for example, in an 
uncontested appointment election a director must still receive 50% of votes cast or stand down. 
Directors must, after an initial period on the board, own a minimum of $300,000 in GM shares. 
Presumably the idea behind this is that directors will have enough equity at risk to encourage 
hard work and entrepreneurship, but not so much as to drive them towards purely defensive 
strategies that favour equity preservation. The NZX has the most minimal code of all of those 
discussed (NZX 2012). It recommends that boards establish an ethics procedure, a series of 
subcommittees, and a relationship that is independent of management with the firm’s auditors. 
It is difficult to see how this would in any way alter the behaviour of New Zealand’s listed 
companies.  
Overall these codes show some distinct differences in perspectives of different 
stakeholder groups and they highlight some of the issues that influence these stakeholder 
groups’ expectations of boards.  
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2.5.5 Board self-evaluation 
Lord Halifax’s observation on how British boards ‘mark their own examination papers’, noted 
in the introduction, predates the recent penchant for board evaluation, but his comment still 
holds true: boards continue to evaluate themselves. The concept of formal board self-evaluation 
has its origins in the wider debates of the 1990s that centred on how to improve overall 
corporate governance by making boards more effective, engaged and accountable (Long, 
2006). The concept of board self-evaluation has since been incorporated in a number of 
corporate governance codes (Table 4). However, this push for board evaluation has been 
diluted somewhat by directors, who have generally resisted such demands and ensured that 
these guidelines and regulations stipulate only that some form of director self-evaluation 
process be performed (Long, 2006). The codes themselves do not specify the evaluation 
criteria, nor do they require the board to disclose the results of the evaluation, so it is difficult to 
tell how committed directors and boards are to this process.   
Based on the adage ‘you are what you measure’ (Ariely, 2010), an examination of the 
central themes of these methodologies may provide an indication of the issues and features of 
boards that directors consider important and therefore influence their expectations of boards.  
Some of the proposed methodologies for board self-evaluation are based on checklists 
(Kiel & Nicholson, 2005; Kuprionis, 2011). For the most part these checklists focus on soft 
skills, such as leadership, teamwork and communications skills, rather than on easily 
measurable ‘hard’ outcomes, such as company financial performance and specific objectives. 
This raises a question: to what extent do directors consider themselves responsible for their 
company’s financial performance? Others argue that a checklist approach is overly simplistic 
and fails to take into account the dynamics involved in the boardroom (Ingley & Van der Walt, 
2002; Huse, 2005). For those that don’t favour checklists the Montreal Bank’s director 
60 
 
evaluation process is often cited as an exemplary model of evaluation, with its directors 
performing full 360-degree evaluations on each other (Comper, 2001). It is significant that the 
Montreal Bank’s approach, like many of these checklist-style evaluation methodologies, also 
focuses on soft skills, rather than the more measurable ‘hard’ outcomes. A New Zealand self-
evaluation tool that is an extension of the checklist approach was developed by Northcott and 
Smith (2011). Their tool is unusual among those published in that it places an emphasis on 
EVA, ROI and share price factor. Overall, the board self-evaluation methodologies suggest that 
directors’ expectations of boards are influenced by the personal attributes of their fellow 
directors. 
 
2.5.6 External corporate governance rating systems 
Between comprehensive company reporting regimes, continuous disclosure requirements and 
myriad informal communications channels, such as investor newsletters and shareholder-driven 
internet forums, shareholders have access to a wide range of information from which to access 
the quality of governance of any particular company. In spite of, or perhaps because of, this 
abundance of information, in the US and elsewhere an industry has developed that supplies 
corporate governance rating data for publicly listed company boards. The largest governance 
rating firm, International Shareholder Services (ISS), assesses corporate governance practices 
by focusing on the following areas: board structure and composition, audit issues, charter and 
by-law provisions, laws of the state of incorporation, executive and director compensation, 
qualitative factors, director and officer share ownership, and director education (ISS, 2012). 
The effectiveness of the ISS ratings as a predictor of future equity value is debateable (Brown 
& Caylor, 2004; Daines, Gow & Larcker, 2009; Donker & Zahir, 2008); however, given that 
investors pay for the data it may provide a pointer towards the characteristics that investors 
value in boards.  
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ISS’s methodology is based on eight key attributes that it credits with influencing the 
quality of corporate governance (Donker & Zahir, 2008); the majority of New Zealand 
companies adopt the same position on most of the attributes, either because of regulation or due 
to convention. For example, all New Zealand companies have separated the functions of 
chairman and CEO. Two attributes that ISS includes in its evaluation methodology and which 
are relevant in the New Zealand context are the size of the board and the number of 
independent directors. It is possible therefore that these are two attributes that New Zealand 
shareholders consider important in their expectations of company boards.  
 
2.6 Director Attributes 
Given that boards are composed solely of directors it is likely that attributes of individual 
directors influence both shareholder and director expectations. For example, directors with a 
finance background are likely to have expectations regarding the board’s involvement in 
financial matters. Although directors have been the subject of much research, there is little 
consensus on who makes a good board member (Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill, 2013). This 
section examines several attributes of directors that are easily observed by both directors and 
shareholders and are therefore likely to influence their expectations of directors and boards. 
The attributes are: director independence, executive directors, busy directors, women directors, 
celebrity directors, director tenure, and director human capital. These attributes have also been 
comprehensively researched, arguably because they are easily measured (Gabrielsson & Huse, 
2004). 
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2.6.1 Independent directors 
‘Independent directors are like bidets – no one knows what they are for but they add a touch of 
class.’ So says former chairman of the BBC Michael Grade (Garratt, 2004 p. 69). While 
Grade’s comment is somewhat facetious, the reality is that ‘independent director’ is another 
governance term that does not have a single or commonly held definition. Even within the 
narrow field of European corporate governance codes, there are some 37 unique definitions 
(Berghe & Baelden, 2005). To further complicate the issue, terms such as ‘independent’, 
‘outside’, ‘non-executive’ and ‘non-employee director’ are often used interchangeably. 
Choosing not to define the term can create other problems because not only is the term used in 
different ways but conclusions based on one assumed definition are often inappropriately 
applied in other contexts (Clarke, 2007). 
At its simplest, an independent director is any director who is independent of 
management and is elected by the shareholders (Brudney, 1982). Another common concept of 
the independent directors is the director who acts in the public interest and is independent of 
everyone including management, major shareholders and anyone else with a material interest in 
the company. This is the definition that the NZX has adopted (NZX, 2013, section 1.6).  
Regardless of the definition adopted, the main argument in favour of independent 
directors is that their presence on boards counterbalances the power of management and further 
protects shareholder interests by reducing the chances of damaging conflicts of interest both 
with management and with major shareholders and their board appointees (Crespí-Cladera & 
Pascual-Fuster, 2014; NYSE, section 303A, 2012; Donaldson & Davis, 1994). There are also 
arguments that because independent directors are less tied to management and their vision they 
are more inclined to make decisions that will increase shareholder value as measured by share 
price (Gordon, 2007). Others argue that independent directors are able to objectively evaluate 
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senior management, review the business strategy and oversee the role of the auditors (Larcker 
& Tayan, 2013, p. 143; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).   
A weakness associated with the independent director concept is that, in practice, 
independent directors may not act in a truly independent manner. This is because a director 
with limited tenure who enjoys the role is likely to feel responsible to whoever appointed them 
(Clarke, 2007). It is also argued that social ties between independent directors and CEOs, can, 
for better or worse, limit the ability of independent directors to act truly independently 
(Westphal, 1999). To address this issue researchers increasingly are turning their attention to 
some of the ‘softer’ aspects of independence, and the term ‘independence of mind’ is entering 
the lexicon (Berghe & Baelden, 2005).  
In spite of the strong arguments in support of independent directors there is extensive 
evidence to show that there is, at best, no correlation between directors’ independence and firm 
performance (Agarwal & Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat & Black 1998). Some researchers claim there 
is a negative correlation between independent directors and company performance (Donaldson 
& Davis, 1994; Hossain, Prevost & Rao, 2001; Gordon, 2007). A possible explanation for these 
disappointing findings can be traced back to Adam Smith, who argued that the lack of a 
director’s financial commitment to a firm reduces their alignment with shareholder objectives 
(Smith, 1776). It can also be argued that, when faced with a risky but potentially lucrative 
opportunity, independent directors are unlikely to support the opportunity, irrespective of the 
objectives of the shareholders. This is because in this scenario they have little to gain 
financially but would be placing their most valuable asset, their reputations, at risk (Ong & 
Wan, 2008). 
Regardless of the actual value that independent directors add to the companies they 
serve, US shareholders certainly value independent directors. When analysing the impact on 
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share price of the sudden death of independent directors, Nguyen & Nielsen (2010) discovered 
that on receiving the news of such a death, the value of the firms associated with the recently 
departed director dropped by an average of $35M. 
  
2.6.2 Busy directors 
The vast majority of directors sit on just one public company board (Larcker & Tayan, 2013). 
Directors who sit on multiple boards are frequently referred to as ‘busy directors’. Busy 
directors are seen as adding value to boards through their in-depth knowledge and experience 
of public company governance (Field, Lowry & Mkrtchyan, 2013) and through their 
connectivity to other directors and executives (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2008). Others suggest 
that busyness certifies a director’s ability; as the saying goes, ‘if you want something done give 
it to a busy person’ (Cashman, Gillan & Jun, 2012). Busy directors are also seen to have 
limitations, as they are sometimes considered to be ineffective monitors of company 
performance (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). 
Research into the effectiveness of busy directors on overall company performance has 
produced mixed results, with some research finding that busy directors have a positive effect on 
firm performance (Ferris, Jagannathan & Pritchard, 2003), others finding that busy directors 
have a detrimental effect (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 1999), and 
some finding mixed results (Cashman et al., 2012; Field et al., 2013). Regardless of the actual 
impact that busy directors have on company performance it is likely that both directors and 
shareholders will have opinions on the impact of busy directors and hence it will influence their 
expectations of boards. 
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2.6.3 Women on boards 
Women tend to be under-represented on corporate boards worldwide. In a 2007 review of 42 
countries, the number of women directors ranged from a high of 22% in Slovenia down to just 
0.2% in Japan (Terjesen & Singh, 2008). However, in many countries this is changing and the 
number of women directors is slowly increasing. In some countries the increase is being driven 
by government policy – for example, both Sweden and Norway have set minimum quotas for 
women on public company boards. Norway now mandates that a minimum of 40% of seats on 
corporate boards be held by women (Wang & Kelan, 2013). The European Commission (EC) 
has recently followed the Norwegian lead; in November 2012 it set an objective (to be achieved 
by 2020) that 40% of non-executive directors of substantial public companies should be 
women. This is more than a simple act of appeasement or an aspirational target, as the EC 
proposal is backed by a requirement that member states apply sanctions to companies who do 
not achieve this minimum threshold (Sealy & Vinnicombe, 2013). Pressure is also being 
applied to increase the number of women directors in many other western countries such as the 
US (Dobbin & Jung, 2010). In New Zealand the Ministry of Women’s Affairs is actively 
engaged in lobbying businesses to increase the number of women directors by sponsoring 
organisations such as Women on Boards. All this activity makes the presence of women on 
boards one of the most prominent issues currently within the corporate governance domain. 
Given that the number of women on boards is increasing, an important questions is: 
“what is the likely impact of this increase on both board and company performance?” 
Unsurprisingly, the results are mixed, with some studies finding a positive link (Carter, 
D’Souza, Simkins & Simpson, 2010) and others suggesting a negative impact on firm value 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2010). There is also the suggestion that women are appointed to the boards 
of successful companies as ‘tokens’ (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002). Increasingly the debate is 
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moving away from finding a direct link between the gender of directors and firm performance 
towards behavioural differences between the way men and women operate in small group 
situations such as board meetings. The argument in favour of gender diversity revolves around 
the idea that it allows groups to come to better decisions more quickly (Nielsen & Huse, 2010), 
while the opposing argument holds that gender differences can lead to conflict in small groups, 
which in turn leads to less effective decision making (Jackson, Josi & Erhardt, 2003). There 
appears to be no obvious consensus emerging in this debate and it seems likely that it will 
continue for some time.   
 From a shareholder and director perspective an important question is: “why are women 
being appointed to boards?” Are women being appointed because of their ability to contribute 
to the board and the long-term success of the company or for other reasons? Given that there is 
no obvious link between company performance and the appointment of women it is possible 
that boards are aware of this and are looking for other benefits from women directors. One of 
the key non-financial benefits of having women on boards is their contribution to the 
company’s reputation (Burke, 2003). It has also been argued that directors encourage the 
appointment of women because they believe that it will please institutional investors (Dobbin 
& Jung, 2007). Given that in the US institutions control some 80% of shares and their 
institutional investors are active in governance such action would be both rational and 
understandable (Gillian & Starks, 2000). 
 
2.6.4 Celebrity directors 
A celebrity in this context is a person who enjoys wide public recognition (Cardow & Wilson, 
2015). Celebrity directors have long been a feature of corporate boardrooms. It is argued that 
their appointment is seen as an endorsement of the future prospects of the company (Fich, 
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2005). In the US it has been observed that the appointment of a celebrity to a board coincides 
with a jump in stock price and that this improved share price performance relative to companies 
that lack celebrity directors is maintained in the long run (Ferris, Kim, Nishikawa & Unlu, 
2011). This is curious given that most celebrities are not known for their business acumen. 
Ferris et al. assume that this improved performance could be attributed to celebrities making 
firms more visible, which in turn results in increased analyst coverage and increased 
institutional ownership, which, they argue, results in increased share prices. Celebrity directors 
can also endorse the company’s product, which in turn can lead to greater sales.  
An example of this in New Zealand is found in the publicly listed finance company 
Lombard. The founding directors included three former Ministers of the Crown, two of whom 
were likely ranked as some of the most trustworthy people in New Zealand, and the company 
relied on endorsements from these directors to sell their investment products. The strategy was, 
for a time, very successful, although the firm subsequently failed (Cardow & Wilson, 2015). 
The failure of the Lombard finance company was attributed to a failure of governance and the 
board was subsequently convicted of a number of securities-related offences (R vs Graham, 
2012). The court cases surrounding the failure have received widespread publicity in the 
mainstream media (Rutherford, 2012) and may therefore have influenced both directors’ and 
shareholders’ expectations of boards. 
 
2.6.5 Director tenure 
The duration of a directorship and the amount of time board members have served together are 
both metrics that are publicly available, and the question of what is an appropriate tenure for a 
director periodically arises in the popular press (Gaynor, 2014). As a result it is a topic that is 
likely to influence both directors’ and shareholders’ opinions of boards.  
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There are advantages and disadvantages of boards serving together for a long time, as 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) have identified. As board members notch up time together, they 
can acquire a high degree of firm-specific knowledge, as well as a high degree of cohesiveness. 
This cohesiveness can also lead to a lower degree of cognitive conflict, because in working 
together the directors have developed a shared understanding of the challenges facing the 
company and the likely responses. Similar arguments are made around the tenure of individual 
directors. Those in favour of long-tenured directors suggest that they have greater engagement 
with the company because of their greater expertise and knowledge of the firm (Vafeas, 2003). 
Those against long-tenured directors claim they simply run out of new ideas and that, over 
time, directors become less demanding of management (Canavan, Jones & Potter, 2004).  
 
2.6.6 Executive directors 
The relationship between management and the board is considered one of the key elements of 
corporate governance (Moltz, 1985, p. 87; Cadbury, 1992, section 2.5; OECD, 2004, p. 24). 
Executive directors are company employees who sit on the board (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Initially all directors were also executives, but over time executive directors have progressively 
given way to independent directors. In the US, for example, the number of independent 
directors increased from 20% in 1950 to 75% by 2005, largely as a result of executives being 
displaced (Gordon, 2007).  
The arguments in favour of having executive management on the board are supported 
by those who favour the board taking a more active role in the affairs of the company 
(Cadbury, 1992, section 4.2). The arguments against having an executive presence on the board 
are led by those who see the board as primarily a control mechanism to protect shareholders 
from management opportunism (Macey, 2008). The presence or otherwise of executive 
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directors can also be seen as a measure of the relative power between the board and 
management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). One area where this manifests itself is in the appointment 
of new directors. Westphal & Zajac (1995) observed that influential CEOs were able to 
persuade boards to appoint independent directors that were demographically similar to 
themselves. This, they observed, calls into question the commonly held assumption that 
independent directors are more likely to exhibit independent judgement in board decision 
making.   
 
2.6.7 Director human capital 
Human capital, from a governance perspective, comprises the personal skills and experiences 
that individual directors contribute to the board (Johnson et al., 2012). The literature 
acknowledges the influence that a director’s background and experience can have over a 
company and its performance (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001), but, as with many of the other 
aspects of governance, multiple research studies seldom produce consistent results. Based on 
Singh, Terjesen & Vinnicombe’s (2008) taxonomy, the human capital of directors has been 
examined from the following perspectives: education, commercial and professional experience, 
and previous board experience.  
Education 
Education is thought to affect directors’ decision making, and it is argued that advanced 
education is a starting point for the independent thinking that is required by directors (Singh et 
al., 2008). Some of the research linking directors’ educational qualifications to company 
performance has failed to find a link (Daily & Dalton, 1994); but in the case of independent 
directors, a positive link has been identified (Kim & Lim, 2010). It is also possible, although 
not specifically identified within the literature, that advanced qualifications or qualifications 
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from prestigious universities may add to a director’s social capital, which in turn could 
influence both directors’ and shareholders’ expectations. 
Commercial and professional experience 
Previous industry experience, financial expertise, and experience as a CEO all have the 
potential to influence director and shareholder expectations of boards. For example, directors 
with these attributes may be considered to ‘know what they are doing’ from a shareholder 
perspective. Directors with previous industry experience have generally been found to benefit 
the companies they are associated with (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2008). Financial expertise has 
proved difficult to precisely define, so its boardroom benefits are not well understood (Johnson 
et al., 2012). However, in the US there has been a significant increase in the number of 
directors with a financial background, so presumably either directors or shareholders place a 
value upon it (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007). CEOs of outside firms are frequently 
appointed to boards. One of the key benefits they bring is a certification benefit for the 
appointing firm (Fahlenbrach, Low & Stulz, 2010), which suggests that they influence 
shareholder expectations. 
Previous board experience 
The degree of governance experience that directors have acquired prior to joining their 
existing boards is not well understood, possibly because such data cannot be easily obtained. 
There is, however, evidence to suggest that previous governance experience is valued by both 
directors and shareholders alike. For example, companies listing on stock markets for the first 
time tend to appoint independent directors who have previous governance experience (Chahine, 
Filatotchev & Zahra, 2011).   
 
2.7 Summary 
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When examining the corporate governance literature discussed in this chapter as a whole, the 
central theme that emerges is that there is little conformity around most of the aspects of 
corporate governance investigated. The review has shown that there is little consensus 
regarding the purpose of corporate governance and of the role of the board. In the absence of 
general agreement, the literature very quickly forks into multiple paths. For example, the 
principal theories employed to either explain or predict corporate governance behaviour appear 
to be based on different underlying assumptions regarding the purpose of corporate 
governance. Different countries have adopted different approaches to corporate governance, 
which adds further complexity. Even those countries that have adopted a common approach, 
such as the Anglo-Saxon model, have been shown to exhibit significant differences in the way 
that they practise corporate governance. Within countries corporate governance practices 
further fragment, with different companies appearing to adopt different approaches to many 
aspects of corporate governance (Boone et al., 2007). This raises considerable challenges for 
researchers, who must select from the wide range of theories available in order to apply the 
most appropriate theory for any given situation. (Daily et al., 2003).  
The open-system nature of corporate governance may contribute to this complexity as 
environmental factors outside of the immediate governance domain appear to influence 
governance practices (Aguilera et al., 2008). This raises the possibility that directors and 
shareholders who have different exposure to these environmental factors may have different 
expectations of boards. Although the literature reviewed does not yield clear insights into 
shareholders’ and directors’ views and expectations of boards, it has helped to illuminate 
factors that are of particular interest to shareholders and directors, and which may influence 
their expectations. 
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3 RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the research question: “what do New Zealand’s shareholders and 
company directors expect from New Zealand’s public company boards?” and some 
supplementary questions. It then discusses why a traditional corporate governance research 
methodology would be unlikely to yield full answers to these questions, and hence the 
requirement for an alternative research methodology. The methodology employed is then 
discussed. Finally the ethical considerations and the limitations of the research are detailed. 
 
3.1 Primary Research Question 
The principal question the research seeks to answer is: 
What do New Zealand’s shareholders and company directors expect from New 
Zealand’s public company boards?  
The literature review (Chapter 2) has highlighted some important aspects within this 
question that must be taken into consideration when formulating an answer. Specifically the 
literature suggests that external environmental factors may have a significant influence on both 
shareholders’ and directors’ expectations of boards (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003). The opinions and expectations of shareholders and directors are likely to be 
aligned on some issues but not others. This can be illustrated graphically, as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1  
Conceptual model of the corporate governance environment 
 
 
The rectangle represents the environment in which corporate governance is practised. One of 
the challenges of this research is to identify those environmental factors that might have a 
material impact on the behaviour of shareholders and directors and thus should be included 
within the rectangle, and to exclude those that don’t. The fuzzy ellipses surrounding both 
shareholders and directors illustrate the potential lack of homogeneity within these groups. The 
research will also assess the degree of homogeneity that actually exists within these stakeholder 
groups; this is important because, as was shown by the Cadbury case study in Chapter 1, 
differences between group members’ expectations of boards can sometimes have serious 
consequences. Equally important is the extent to which there is conformity between the views 
of shareholders and directors, so the research will identify issues on which the two groups 
generally agree and issues on which they generally disagree.  
In order to fully address the research question it is necessary to answer the following 
supplementary questions:  
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1. How heterogeneous are the shareholders and directors in their expectations of NZ 
boards?  
2. As groups, how homogeneous are shareholders in their expectations of boards, and 
how homogeneous are directors in theirs? 
 
3.2 Addressing the Traditional Corporate Governance Research Limitations 
As discussed in 2.5.1, the most common approach to corporate governance research is to treat 
the board as a ‘black box’, with inputs drawn from public data sources and outputs measured as 
financial performance metrics (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). These ‘black box’ studies, 
however, are not without their limitations as they are frequently criticised for failing to take 
into account the contingent nature of corporate governance or the influence of environmental 
factors on corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). The 
approach taken in this research has been designed to mitigate as much as practicable these 
limitations.  
 
3.3 Research Methodology Overview 
This research is exploratory in nature in that its objective is to gain an understanding of 
the expectations of shareholders and directors. Its intention is not to solve any specific problem 
or prove or disprove any particular theory. However, by gaining this understanding of   
shareholders and directors expectations evidence will be obtained that will likely support or 
refute elements of the current body of corporate governance literature. Because of the 
exploratory nature of the research it can be expected that the findings will also highlight areas 
where future, more conclusive research, may be required. In this respect, the research may also 
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assist in determining future research design, sampling methodologies and data sources and 
collection methods (Singh, 2007, p.64). 
A relativist ontology has been adopted for the research. This assumes that there are no 
universals and that truth is determined through a consensus between different viewpoints and 
that facts are dependent on the viewpoint of the observer (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 
2008 p.62).  This ontology has influenced the design of the research methodology in two ways. 
Firstly it has created a requirement for the research to capture the viewpoints of a wide a range 
of shareholders and directors from as many different perspectives as is possible, and secondly it 
has created a requirement to take into consideration the background, perspective and 
expectations of the author in respect to corporate governance (see 3.7). As will be shown in this 
section, these two requirements have added considerable complexity to the research 
methodology. 
A relativist epistemology has also influenced the approach adopted. This epistemology 
has created a requirement for the research to be designed to ensure that the question is 
approached from multiple perspectives and to triangulate amongst the various perspectives in 
order to identify any consensus Easterby-Smith et. al. (2008 p.63). This has been achieved by 
developing a series of individual but complementary research initiatives many of which draw 
on different data sets and use different research techniques. Particular care was taken to ensure 
that, wherever possible, sufficiently large samples were collected to ensure that the results have 
credibility. Where small samples have been taken this has been clearly identified. 
In order to obtain the wide range of perspectives required for this approach it was 
necessary to adopt a mixed methods approach. The fundamental principle of mixed methods 
research is to collect multiple data using different strategies, approaches, and methods and to do 
so in such a way as the resulting mixture or combination results in complementary strengths 
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and non-overlapping weaknesses Johnson & Turner (2003). The methods adopted include 
surveys, focus groups and content analysis of data derived from secondary sources. 
The specific approach adopted for this research involves expanding on the traditional black box 
approach to take into consideration external environmental factors and by engaging directly 
with company directors. This is achieved by dividing the research into a series of linked phases. 
Table 5 provides a summary of the objectives of each phase of the methodology. 
Table 5  
 
Research methodology objectives  
 
Phase Objective 
1 Understand director and shareholder demographics and the key 
elements of the corporate governance environment that could 
influence shareholder and director expectations of boards.  
 
2 Consider the assumptions of shareholder and director expectations of 
boards that were derived from the literature and gain some preliminary 
insights from experienced directors and shareholders. 
 
3 Gain insights from the actual interaction of directors and shareholders 
at annual shareholder meetings. 
 
4 Survey directors and shareholders to understand their views, opinions 
and motivations. 
 
 
The phases as outlined in the table can be further explained as follows: 
 Phase 1. Director and shareholder demographics, and an environmental 
assessment. This involves collecting data from a wide range of secondary 
sources including company annual reports, the companies office directors 
database, Reserve Bank statistics and NZX  data in order to develop a basic 
understanding of shareholders, directors and the environment in which they 
77 
 
operate. This is effectively treating the board as a ‘black box’ but enhancing the 
traditional methodology by using a far wider range of input data than are 
typically acquired in such research (Daily et al., 2003). This phase also takes 
into consideration some of the external environmental factors and some historic 
trends, as the additional data can assist in addressing Aguilera & Jackson’s 
(2003) criticism that such research fails to take into account the dynamic and 
contingent nature of corporate governance.  
 Phase 2. Focus groups. Focus groups are conducted with shareholders and 
directors. The objective is developmental and the focus groups are conducted to 
ensure that the relevant issues are identified so that the Phase 4 written survey 
can address them in more detail.  
 Phase 3. ASM minutes analysis. Evaluating direct interaction between 
shareholders and directors at company ASMs provides not only some unique 
insights into the question, but also more data to refine the content of the Phase 4 
survey. 
 Phase 4. Postal survey. Directors and shareholders were surveyed directly for 
their opinions. 
 
3.4 Director, Shareholder and Environmental Influences on the Research 
Methodology 
Before discussing the detailed approach to the research it is necessary to gain an understanding 
of the three key elements in the research: the environment, the shareholders, and the directors. 
Each presents challenges that must be considered when developing a research methodology 
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capable of addressing the primary research question. This section addresses each of these 
factors.   
 
3.4.1 External environment 
There is a wide range of external factors with the potential to influence both shareholders’ and 
directors’ expectations, some of which have been previously identified in the international 
literature (e.g. Aguilera et al., 2008; Davies & Schlitzer, 2008). This research will explicitly 
focus on the legal and commercial environments and on political and social trends from the 
wider community that appear to have an immediate and direct impact on directors’ and 
shareholders’ expectations of boards. Most of the factors were included because they have been 
identified in the international literature as potential influences on board behaviour. These 
influences are outlined below. 
 Legal environment. Research has been conducted into the influence of the legal 
environment on various countries’ corporate governance practices (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999 and 2006). While there are numerous laws 
and regulations that affect the way boards operate, this research focuses 
primarily on company law, securities law and NZX listing rules. These laws and 
rules directly affect both shareholders and directors and therefore have a direct 
influence on their expectations of boards. One other law – the NZ Health and 
Safety in Employment Act 1992 – is considered, for two reasons. Firstly, it 
contains severe penalties, including incarceration, should directors not comply 
with certain clauses contained within it. Given the severity of the potential 
consequences for noncompliance, it is assumed that this Act would also 
influence director behaviour. Secondly, the Act is comparatively new and it 
79 
 
therefore provides an insight into how quickly boards respond to outside 
influences. 
 Commercial environment. Aspects of the commercial environment have been 
shown to influence board behaviour, for example, the market for corporate 
control (Jarrell et al., 1988) and the role of the banking sector (Rosen, 2007). 
They are likely to influence NZ shareholders and directors and so have been 
considered in this research.  
 Political and social influences. Directors are subject to the broad political and 
social influences and trends from outside of the boardroom. Two issues will be 
considered: the role of women on boards and the role of overseas-based 
directors. The role of women is considered because, as was shown in section 
2.6.3, this is the main social and political factor currently influencing board 
behaviour in New Zealand. The role of overseas investment in general is a topic 
that is currently being debated in the broader community (Raziq & Perry, 2012), 
but to date this debate has not included the role of overseas directors in New 
Zealand’s public companies. Including the topic will provide an opportunity to 
lead the debate and to contribute to an area that has not been previously 
researched in New Zealand. 
 Company issues. Some characteristics of the companies themselves may 
influence the way boards operate and the expectations of both shareholders and 
directors. For example, the size of a company will influence the amount of 
resources that can be dedicated to the boards and to the qualifications and 
experience of the directors that the company can attract. Probably the most 
significant factor influencing director and shareholder expectations is the degree 
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to which ownership of a company is dispersed and control is centralised, as 
identified by Berle & Means (1932). Current data on the ownership and control 
of New Zealand companies is not available, so it was necessary to undertake 
some fresh research in this area.    
A number of other external influences were considered for inclusion in the research. 
Most prominent among these is the influence of the Institute of Directors and the Shareholders’ 
Association. In the course of this research meetings were held with the CEO of the IoD, the 
policy director of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and the chair of the Wellington branch of 
the Shareholders’ Association. Based on these meetings it was decided that insufficient 
resources were available to fully assess the indirect impact that these groups have on 
shareholders and directors. 
Other environmental issues, such as the role of Maori investment companies and the 
role of government as an investor in public companies, were considered for inclusion in this 
research, but after an initial assessment were excluded. Maori companies were excluded 
because there are very few public company directors who identify themselves as Maori and 
attempts to track Maori investment in public companies proved unsuccessful. The government 
as an investor was not considered because of resource constraints and because, until the recent 
listing of several electricity companies, their direct participation in NZX-listed companies was 
relatively small. The one exception to this is the Accident Compensation Commission (ACC), 
which in practice acts in the same manner as other institutional investors (ACC, 2014). The 
government superannuation fund invests in the NZX equities indirectly through other 
institutional investors. 
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3.4.2 Directors 
Company directors are a challenging subject for any research, not least because researchers 
have found it almost impossible to observe boards in action (Daily et al., 2003). Indeed, even 
obtaining opinions directly from directors has proved difficult for many researchers (Leblanc & 
Schwartz, 2007). As a result, most research focuses on the following demographic factors, 
which have been shown to likely influence directors’ expectations of boards and governance 
(Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). These are: the number of directors (Reedy, Locke & 
Scrimgeour, 2010), their experience (Goldfinch, 2004), their independence (Clarke, 2007), and 
the number of boards that each director sits on (Larcker & Tayan, 2013). Research has also 
been conducted into directors’ personal opinions and attitudes and expectations of boards; the 
techniques that were adopted to research these aspects and to overcome the access issues raised 
by Leblanc and Schwartz are outlined in section 3.5.1. 
 
3.4.3 Shareholders 
From a research methodology perspective the biggest challenges that New Zealand public 
company shareholders present is their diversity. Shareholders likely range from individuals 
with small investments and limited investment experience through to multinational 
corporations with highly experienced investment specialists and substantial portfolios. Chiu 
and Monin interviewed some New Zealand fund managers to gain their perspective on 
corporate governance (Chiu & Monin, 2003) to my knowledge this is the only research that has 
been conducted regarding the expectations that any New Zealand shareholders have of any 
aspect of corporate governance. No research appears to have been conducted into the 
expectations of individual shareholders so there are no precedents on which to base this aspect 
of the research.  The approach taken to identify a sample of this population and collect data 
regarding their expectations of boards is outlined in the following section.    
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3.5 Research Methods and Data Sources 
As shown in Table 5 the research is divided into four distinct phases: (1) understanding the 
New Zealand environment, (2) developmental focus groups, (3) ASM minute analysis, and (4) 
written surveys. This section discusses each of the phases, including the specific approach 
adopted, the reasons that certain factors were included and others excluded, and the limitations 
of each phase. 
 
3.5.1 Phase 1: Understanding the NZ environment 
While some data on shareholders and some key environmental factors such as the regulatory 
environment are available, the literature regarding director, and company demographics is 
incomplete. The objective of this phase of the research is to improve this situation so that the 
subsequent phases can be based on a thorough foundation. By drawing on data from a wide 
range of secondary sources such as company annual reports and stock exchange 
announcements, the Companies Office director database and the social media site Linkedin a 
more comprehensive and up to date view of the New Zealand public company environment is 
developed than is currently available. Some of the existing literature is updated and refreshed 
with recent data and new research is conducted to fill the key gaps that exist within this 
literature. Wherever practicable the existing research has adopted the same methodologies to 
allow long-term trends to be analysed. 
NZX companies 
A review of the literature showed four features of companies that have potential to 
influence directors’ and shareholders’ expectations of boards. These are ownership distribution 
and shareholder control, both of which were first flagged by Berle & Means (1932), as well as 
board size (Koerniadi, Krishnamurti &Tourani-Rad, 2014) and shared directors (Kor & 
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Sundaramurthy, 2008). Company size was not identified within the literature as a possible 
influence, but it has been included in this analysis because it may possibly influence the 
resources available to dedicate to shareholder communication and also influence the quality of 
directors. It is possible that other demographic features of NZ companies could influence 
director and shareholder expectations of boards, but, due to resource constraints and a lack of 
compelling evidence to justify their inclusion, no other features were included.   
The approach to data collection and analysis for company-specific factors is as follows. 
The primary source of data for NZX-listed companies was the NZX website (NZX.com) and 
company annual reports. The reports were all sourced from company websites. All such 
information was collected in December 2013. The annual reports were the most current 
available at that date and all of those analysed had financial years that ended in 2013. Wherever 
possible, data were collected on all 112 companies. However, in some cases the sheer volume 
of data required to analyse all 112 companies was beyond the scope of available resources. In 
these situations, detailed data were collected for analysis from a randomly sampled subset of 40 
companies. The sample size of 40 met the requirements of both the resources available to 
collect the data and the need for a sufficiently large sample to ensure an appropriate degree of 
confidence in the results of statistical tests employed (O’Leary 2010). The NZAX companies 
have been excluded from this analysis because of the market’s relatively small size (its 
capitalisation is less than 1% of that of the main board) and because companies listed on this 
board are subject to less demanding rules than those on the main board. Table 6 summarises the 
approach to this section of the research. 
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Table 6  
 
Company research: data sources and size 
  Data source Sample size 
Company size NZX website 112 
Ownership distribution Company annual reports 40 
Control Company annual reports 40 
Board size Company annual reports 112 
Shared directors Companies Office director database 112 
 
 Company size. Market capitalisation data were collected from the NZX website in 
December 2013 and some basic descriptive statistics produced. 
 Ownership distribution. A premise of this research is that the greater the level of 
investment a shareholder has in a company, the more interested they are likely to be in 
the governance practices of the firm (Berle & Means, 1932). Accordingly it is important 
to understand the distribution of share ownership. Previous studies (Hossain et al., 2001; 
Fox, Walker & Pekmezovic, 2012) have focused on ownership distribution purely from a 
company control point of view and have not considered the potential influence that 
minority shareholders can have on board practices. They have not collected basic 
demographic data on shareholders, such as the number of shareholders and the size of 
their holdings, so their findings cannot be used as a starting point for this component of 
the research. The approach adopted involved taking a random sample of 40 of the 112 
NZX main board companies and collating the shareholder distribution data published in 
their 2013 annual reports.  
 Control. Previous studies of ownership of New Zealand listed companies have focused 
solely on the largest companies (Fox et al., 2012; La Porta et al., 1999) and have used a 
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classification scheme that is not reflective of current business practices and has a number 
of weaknesses. For example, it is unclear if they have correctly accounted for custodial 
services companies. In addition, they do not differentiate between private, government 
and institutional shareholders who, as will be shown, all have different voting behaviours 
and exert different levels of control, which are not necessarily in proportion to their 
shareholding. To overcome these and other related limitations, fresh research was 
undertaken. The methodology adopted was to select a random sample of 40 NZX-listed 
companies and collect data from their 2013 statutory declarations. When considering 
these shareholders an adjustment was made to the statutory declaration data to exclude 
minor shareholdings held in aggregate by custodial services companies. This is because 
these organisations simply hold shares on behalf of other entities and they do not 
participate actively in the governance process. The data were then collated, and finally 
the controlling shareholders were identified and segmented by type (government, 
institution or private investor) and classified according to influence using Maume and 
Walker’s (2012) taxonomy. 
 Board size. Boyle and Ji’s (2011) data covering the period 1995 and 2011 were updated 
using data from the Companies Office director database. Data on all 112 NZX main 
board companies were obtained.  
 Shared directors. The Companies Office director database provides data on every 
director, including information on every public company board of which they are a 
member. These data were collected and a network analysis performed to better 
understand the linkages between company boards.   
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Directors 
A review of the literature showed six demographic features of directors that have 
potential to influence directors’ and shareholders’ expectations of boards. These are executive 
directors and independent directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983), director tenure (Mitchell, Fortmann 
& Weiss, 2013), gender diversity (Fauzi & Locke, 2012), busy directors (Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2008) and director experience (Goldfinch, 2004). Where directors are 
domiciled was also included. While this is not currently an issue for New Zealand directors and 
shareholders, the issue of overseas investment in New Zealand is a contentious topic (Raziq & 
Perry, 2012) and the debate may move to company boards, hence its inclusion. Other 
demographic features may influence shareholder and director expectations of boards, but 
resource constraints and a lack of compelling evidence restricted the research to these six 
features. 
The primary source of data for directors was the New Zealand Companies Office 
director database (www.business.govt.nz/companies) and company annual reports. These 
reports were all sourced from company websites. All such information was collected in 
December 2013. The annual reports were the most current available at that date and all of those 
analysed had financial years that ended in 2013. Table 7 summarises the approach to these 
elements of the research. 
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Table 7  
 
Sources of data used in this research 
  
Data source 
Sample 
size 
Executive directors Company annual reports 175 
Independent directors Company annual reports 417 
Tenure Companies Office director database 567 
Gender diversity Companies Office director database 567 
Domicile Companies Office director database 565 
Busy directors Companies Office director database 567 
Director human capital Company websites, Linkedin, NZX website 76 
 
The specific methodologies adopted for each element of this research are discussed as follows: 
 Independent and executive directors. Companies are obliged to lodge 
statutory declarations with NZX stating which directors are independent. These 
data were collected in December 2013 and the results collated. Executive 
directors were identified from information published in company annual reports 
at the same time. 
 Tenure and gender diversity. This information was obtained from the 
Companies Office director database. A limitation of this data source is that it 
only shows current directorships. There is no information on previous positions 
held, so it is not possible to calculate a director’s total experience as a public 
company director. However, this shortfall has been addressed in part in Phase 3 
of the research. Data on all 567 directors serving as directors of companies listed 
on the main board of the NZX in December 2013 were collected and basic 
descriptive statistics produced. 
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 Domicile. The research into directors’ domicile involved collecting director 
addresses from the Companies Office director database and collating the data. 
Data on all but two of the 567 directors serving on the boards of NZX-listed 
companies in December 2013 were collected and collated. In spite of a legal 
obligation for directors to disclose their addresses the two directors had chosen 
not to and were therefore excluded from the analysis. To the author’s 
knowledge, this data has not previously been collated and published. 
 Busy directors. Data were also sourced from the Companies Office director 
database and analysed to show the number of directors holding multiple board 
seats.  Data on all 567 directors were analysed. 
 Human capital. This research uses publicly available data to understand the 
backgrounds and experience of all directors appointed in 2013. Data on 10 
human capital characteristics were collected using a taxonomy based on that 
employed by Singh, Terjesen & Vinnicombe (2008), and the data were collected 
from sources including company annual reports, media releases, and the social 
media website Linkedin.  
 
3.5.2 Phase 2: Director and shareholder focus groups 
Before conducting comprehensive surveys of both directors and shareholders it was intended to 
conduct focus groups with experienced directors, shareholders and institutional investors. 
Focus groups are a methodology which has proven to be useful for understanding topics from a 
specific populations’ perspective and are useful for gaining a perspective of issues not 
generally addressed in the literature (Asbury,1995). Focus groups are therefore suited to this 
phase of the research which has a developmental objective. The purpose of this phase was to 
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tease out the key issues, to ensure that the concepts being examined were relevant, and to 
identify any other issues or factors that either shareholders or directors considered significant 
when considering their expectations of boards; and, to ensure that the subsequent research 
initiatives were positioned appropriately in terms of the topics covered, the language used and 
the depth to which issues were probed. To overcome the reluctance of many directors to discuss 
boardroom activity (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007), it was decided to approach five very senior 
directors, all of whom have been chairmen of NZX20-listed companies, and four of whom were 
approaching retirement. It was assumed that directors at this phase in their careers may be more 
inclined to discuss these issues than younger, less experienced directors. Contact was made 
through an intermediary (himself a former chairman of a very large New Zealand company) 
who vouched for the researcher. A similar approach was adopted in an attempt to conduct a 
focus group for key executives within institutional shareholders, but it proved unsuccessful as 
the CEOs were reluctant to be interviewed, either as part of a focus group or individually. A 
second focus group was conducted with six individual shareholders. In this case contact was 
made directly with the shareholders, who were identified by the Shareholders’ Association 
based on the following criteria: experience in investing, amount invested, gender, general 
commercial experience.   
Both the focus groups and the interviews followed the same process. Firstly group 
members were asked for their comments on a series of questions on topics that the literature 
review suggested may influence their expectations of boards, and then a round table discussion 
tackled the broader board and shareholder issues. There was no shortage of comment or debate 
in either focus group and both continued for over three hours. Recordings of the focus groups 
were transcribed and some basic content analysis was performed to highlight the key themes 
along the lines described by Cavana, Delahaye & Sekaran (2001, pp. 171–175).  The results of 
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this analysis along with the literature review were then used as inputs to Phase 4 of the 
research, the director and shareholder surveys. 
 
3.5.3 Phase 3: Annual shareholder meeting minutes analysis 
Annual shareholder meetings (ASMs) are the one instance where directors are legally obliged 
to meet with shareholders to discuss the affairs of the company (Companies Act 1993, section 
120). Minutes of these meetings are taken but they are not circulated to shareholders and the 
board is not required to ratify them at the following meeting, so for the most part they are 
unscrutinised by shareholders. There is no obligation for companies to divulge the contents of 
these minutes to anyone other than shareholders, although, as will be shown, a few companies 
do publish them on their websites. The contents of these minutes provide a unique perspective 
on the director–shareholder relationship because they often record questions that shareholders 
raise regarding the performance of the board, as well as the directors’ responses. The minutes 
also record details of any motions raised and they frequently record the votes cast in favour and 
against such motions. This provides further information on the degree to which shareholders 
participate in the governance role and the degree to which they are satisfied with certain aspects 
of the directors’ performance. The author is not aware of any such analysis of ASM minutes 
being conducted previously in New Zealand.  
The methodology adopted for this phase is as follows: 
1. Data collection. The company secretaries of all 112 listed companies were approached 
for copies of ASM minutes from their last three meetings. 
2. Validity check. In order to ensure that the sample companies were indicative of the 
market as a whole, comparisons were made between those companies that provided 
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minutes and a reference sample of NZX companies. The size of the largest shareholder, 
market capitalisation, number of shareholders, and board size of the two samples were 
compared. These features were selected because they were considered to have the 
potential to influence the decision to provide copies of their ASM minutes. In each case 
a t-test was conducted to check for variance between the companies who provided their 
minutes and a reference sample of companies. The reference sample consisted of either 
the entire market, when evaluating the board size and market capitalisation, or a 
selection of 40 companies selected at random for the remainder of this analysis. A 
threshold of p < 0.05 was set to determine the significance of any variations. 
3. Analysis of questions asked by shareholders. All of the questions asked by 
shareholders that were recorded in the minutes were collected, manually coded and 
grouped in line with the content methodology analysis proposed by Cavana et al. 
(2001).  The content analysis methodology is a ‘‘systematic replicable technique for 
comprising many words of text into fewer content categories, based on explicit rules of 
coding’’ (Stemler, 2001). The coding was performed manually because it required a 
comprehensive understanding of the content of the minutes. The categories selected 
were derived from the data itself, and include company strategy, reporting, risk and 
operations. In total the questions were grouped into 12 categories.   
4. Analysis of votes cast. The results of all votes cast at the meetings were collated and 
summarised. They were also analysed according to the nominating party (either the 
board or a shareholder) to see if there were significant differences in the outcome 
depending on who proposed the motion.  
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3.5.4 Phase 4: Director and shareholder surveys 
This section of the research consisted of two surveys: one targeting directors and the other 
shareholders. The director survey was sent to 400 NZX main board directors and the 
shareholder survey was sent to 1083 individual shareholders, whose names and addresses had 
been sourced from a public company share registry. Sample sizes were determined by budget 
and resource constraints. A large share of the director population was sampled because it was 
assumed that directors would be less likely to respond to the survey. To increase the probability 
of directors responding, the survey omitted personal questions such as gender, director status 
(inside or outside), and anything that may identify the company/ies of which they are a director. 
This led directly to a limitation of the survey: because directors were not asked to reveal the 
boards they are associated with it was not possible to determine the degree of heterogeneity 
within individual boards. 
The surveys consisted mostly of questions requiring closed responses, and were 
constructed so that most of the data could be recorded using either nominal or ordinal scales to 
simplify analysis and to allow for comparisons between the results of the two surveys. There 
were also opportunities for respondents to add free-form comments. These comments were 
collated and later used to reinforce the themes identified in the numeric data. The questions 
were based around the following four areas: 
1. Qualifying. These questions ensured respondents were qualified to answer the survey and 
to provide data for further detailed segment analysis.  
2. Roles and responsibilities of the board. These questions evaluated opinions regarding 
board responsibilities and priorities. This is an area that had previously been explored by 
Ingley & Van der Walt (2005) from a director perspective. However, that research was not 
restricted to public company directors, and it occurred before the global financial crisis and 
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the subsequent changes in legislation. Furthermore, it did not examine in detail the tasks 
that directors are expected to perform. This survey therefore extends and updates Ingley & 
Van der Walt’s research from a public company perspective by examining shareholders’ 
views as well as directors, and by investigating the role of the public company director in 
more detail. For example, it considers the role of the director when the company is trading 
normally and the role of the board when the company is under financial stress. 
3. Governance theories. These questions were designed to assess if respondents are more 
favourably disposed towards agency or stewardship theory or to stakeholder or shareholder 
theory. 
4. Topical issues that may cause friction. These were issues that had been identified as 
being topical, either through their frequent discussion in the popular press or because they 
were issues raised by shareholders and directors in the focus group research phase of the 
project as potential points of difference, either between directors and shareholders, or 
within these groups themselves. The specific issues examined included the role of women, 
CEO remuneration, dividend policy, and board–shareholder communication. 
Numerous sets of guidelines and checklists exist to assist with questionnaire 
development; Fowler (2009), Schwartz (1999) and the US General Accounting Office (1993) 
were used as reference points. A cognitive interviewing approach was adopted for refining and 
testing the survey. The surveys were first laboratory-tested and then field-tested with a small 
group of directors and shareholders, with refinements made incrementally as required, in line 
with the process outlined by Beatty & Willis (2007). The data analysis was performed in two 
stages: first the results from each of the director and shareholder surveys were collated and 
analysed separately; next, a comparison was made between the two groups. Chi-squared tests 
were performed to test for variations between segments, and in line with traditional governance 
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research practices a significance threshold of p < 0.05 was set (Nuzzo, 2014). Industry-specific 
data were not collected, because there is no evidence from either the literature review or the 
preliminary focus groups to suggest that board practices or director and shareholder 
expectations vary by sector or industry.   
 
3.6 Ethical Considerations 
The research did not present any significant ethical challenges. Approval for the research was 
sought and received from Victoria University of Wellington’s Ethics Committee and the 
research fully conformed to its guidelines. The research also conformed to Tolich & 
Davidson’s five key ethical principles (2011, pp. 155–157). The focus group participants were 
fully briefed, and all signed consent forms. No issues were raised subsequent to the research. 
The identities of the individuals and the companies discussed remain confidential. The postal 
surveys were anonymous and the responses cannot be linked to the individuals who were sent 
the survey. All of the other research was based on publicly available data and therefore raised 
no ethical issues.   
Because confidentiality was very important, issues such as who has access to the data, 
where it is stored, and how and when it is disposed of were of paramount importance. The UK 
Data Archives policies on data management have been adopted in this regard (van den Eynden 
et al., 2011). 
 
3.7 Positioning the Researcher 
A relativist ontology has been adopted for this research which acknowledges that the 
background of the researcher has the potential to influence what has been observed (O’Leary, 
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2010) and this has been considered in the design of the methodology. Specifically my 
background as the managing director of an NZX-listed company has been taken into 
consideration and has influenced both the design of the research methodology and its 
implementation. Potentially this background has advantages when interacting with other 
directors and with company representatives such as company secretaries, as I am viewed as an 
insider, and this may have allowed access to individuals and data that would not normally be 
accessible to researchers. Unfortunately this background also has disadvantages, particularly in 
interactions with shareholders and other stakeholder groups. For example, during preliminary 
discussions with representatives from some lobby groups it became apparent that I was being 
treated as a director who needed to be ‘sold’ to rather than as a researcher. I therefore 
concluded that I could not conduct effective interviews with these groups and so this element 
was not included in the final research methodology. The focus groups were the formal, face-to-
face component of the research and they were used sparingly to assess the breadth and variety 
of views rather than to form the primary component of the research. When conducting these 
focus groups particular care was taken to reduce the possibility of researcher bias – for 
example, the sessions were conducted on neutral ground, and effort was made to ensure that the 
research conformed to the guidelines outlined by O’Leary (2010), such as ensuring the 
researcher acted as a facilitator and moderator and not a participant.  Throughout the research 
the results of individual research elements were triangulated and cross-referenced with other 
elements to identify common themes and highlight potential anomalies in the results that could 
have arisen due to researcher influence, such as discussion at focus groups that emphasised the 
researcher’s own company and circumstances.  
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3.8 Summary  
The principal question that this research is intended to answer is: ‘What do New Zealand’s 
shareholders and company directors expect from New Zealand public company boards?’ To 
address this question, the research considered three elements – directors, shareholders, and the 
environment in which they operate – and conducted a series of individual research initiatives, 
each of which focused on some aspect of these elements. The results of these individual 
research initiatives were then compared and contrasted to obtain an overall answer.  
The research itself comprised four individual phases. Phase 1 was designed to update 
some demographic data such as board gender diversity, foreign ownership and director tenure. 
It also fills in gaps not previously researched such as the contribution of director human capital 
to boards. This provides a comprehensive foundation for the subsequent phases of the research. 
Phase 2 involved conducting two focus groups, one with experienced directors and the other 
with experienced shareholders. These focus groups were intended to ensure that the subsequent 
phases of the research addressed relevant issues. Phase 3 involved analysing the minutes from 
company ASMs. This provides a unique perspective on the interaction of the two stakeholder 
groups. Finally, Phase 4 involved conducting written surveys to obtain the views of 
shareholders and directors directly. 
The research has been approached from a post-positive perspective, with particular 
attention being paid to the researcher’s background, and care was taken to ensure that every 
aspect of the research complied with VUW Ethics Committee research guidelines. 
The main limitation of the research was the inability to obtain primary data from 
institutional investors. As will be shown in Chapter 4, institutional investors play a significant 
role in the New Zealand market and their reluctance to participate directly in this research has 
limited its overall scope. This has been partially mitigated by obtaining data from secondary 
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sources. Resource limitations also influenced the scope of the research, specifically restricting 
to 40 the number of companies whose ownership and shareholdings were analysed, and 
limiting the size of the postal shareholder surveys. The samples are, however, of sufficient size 
to allow statistically sound inferences to be drawn from the data.  Overall the research 
methodology adopted is comprehensive and in drawing on data from multiple independent 
sources is robust enough to minimise any impact of these limitations.  The following chapters 
outline the results of this research and provide an answer to the question, “what do directors 
and shareholders expect from NZ public company boards?” 
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4 THE NZ CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT 
It has long been recognised that certain structural aspects of a country’s commercial 
environment strongly influence corporate governance practices (Shleifer & Vishny, 1996; 
Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Therefore it is important to gain an understanding of the New 
Zealand environment in order to appreciate how it can influence shareholders’ and directors’ 
expectations of boards. In recent years the NZ commercial environment has gone through a 
period of significant change, most notably the impact of the 2007–8 global financial crisis on 
company performance. This has led to a hardening of the courts’ attitude towards recalcitrant 
directors, the introduction of the Financial Markets Authority, and an influx of new listings to 
the NZSX. As a result of these changes, some of the literature on the structure of the NZ public 
company market is now outdated. 
This chapter examines the New Zealand corporate governance environment in order to 
identify features that have the potential to shape or influence shareholders’ and directors’ 
expectations of New Zealand boards. Five specific elements are examined beginning with the 
legal environment which is addressed by reviewing the current literature. The equities market, 
the companies listed on the NZSX, and the characteristics of shareholders and of directors are 
all then reviewed. The literature on each of these elements is reviewed and, as will be shown, 
was found to be incomplete or outdated. To address this issue, wherever possible, the existing 
research was updated with more recent data; this ensures that any effects of the recent changes 
in the environment are captured, and it also allows longer-term trends to be identified. This 
updating has been necessary when considering aspects of the environment such as: company 
market capitalisations, board size, the share of executive, independent and female directors, and 
director tenure. The literature review also highlighted some areas of relevance to directors’ and 
shareholders’ expectations of boards where research had either not previously been conducted 
or was incomplete. In these cases new research was conducted, to include research into the 
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distribution of shareholdings, the control of public companies, the linkages between company 
directors, and an analysis of the intellectual capital that directors contribute to boards. The 
chapter concludes by summarising the overall NZ corporate governance environment and 
highlighting the key trends and factors which are likely to influence both directors and 
shareholders expectations of boards. 
 
4.1 NZ Company Law 
Until 1993 all New Zealand company law was derived directly from UK company law and is 
therefore firmly based on the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model (Cernat, 2014). The 
British acts were simply incorporated with a few minor changes to reflect New Zealand’s 
status, first as a colony and later as a dominion. In 1993 New Zealand adopted its first truly 
‘home grown’ Act. The Act was introduced in the aftermath of the 1987 stock market crash, an 
event that had a considerable impact on the psyche and financial well-being of many New 
Zealanders. In July 1987, over 40% of the country’s adult population owned shares and by 18 
September the market had risen 600% since 1982 to an all-time high. Then on 20 October, a 
drop in the US equity markets triggered a collapse that resulted in a drop of over 40% in the 
value of the equities market over the following 10 months. Of the 309 companies listed on the 
NZX in 1987 only 140 remained by 1993 (Grant, 1997). This was the most significant event to 
date for the New Zealand Share Market; it quite probably influenced the legislators drafting the 
Act, and it may be the reason that the 1993 NZ Companies Act arguably sets higher standards 
for director behaviour than either the US (Delaware) or UK acts of the time. 
From a director perspective, the 1993 Act sets some clear guidelines for director 
responsibilities and behaviour. Section 128 states that: ‘The business and affairs of the 
company must be managed by, or under direct supervision of the board of the company’ 
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(Companies Act, 1993, p. 113). By including this section in the Act, the legislators have quite 
clearly established that responsibility for the company and its actions sits squarely with the 
directors and the board. The Act also provides some boundaries for board and director 
behaviour; it states, for instance, that ‘to act in good faith and in the best interests of the 
company and when exercising their powers, directors must exercise the care and diligence and 
skill that a reasonable director would exercise in similar circumstances’ (ibid., p. 121). This is 
essentially defining a statutory safe harbour for directors and boards. Provided that directors 
adhere to these guidelines they will not be personally liable to the company or to the 
shareholders. This is a substantial raising of the bar, in terms of the behaviour that is required in 
order for a director to avoid personal liability, as it replaces the previous moral standard for 
director liability with an objective standard. Some argue that this move to an objective standard 
makes New Zealand companies more risk averse, a trait that they see as undesirable (Gillman 
& Hogan, 1999). 
‘To act in good faith and in the best interests of the company’ is a significant 
philosophical shift for boards that requires further discussion, given that it arguably moves New 
Zealand from a shareholder-centric model of governance to a stakeholder-centric model. 
Although previous versions of the Act were silent on the question of who the board is 
responsible to, it is reasonable to conclude that prior to this Act directors assumed they were 
responsible to the shareholders. This is because the shareholders appoint directors, and it is the 
shareholders who had typically been considered for all practical intents and purposes the 
company’s owners. In effect the 1993 Act decrees that, although shareholders have certain 
rights, ultimately they are simply another stakeholder group and as such should not be afforded 
any special consideration. The directors must ensure that the company’s interests are the 
priority. The Act therefore creates an environment where directors are appointed by 
shareholders but are responsible to the company. Situations can, and do, arise that place 
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directors in conflict with shareholders. For example, in the situation where a company holds a 
large cash reserve, directors may choose to retain the cash while shareholders may prefer that it 
be returned to them. The conflict occurs because the shareholders, on whom the directors must 
rely for their appointment, have a short-term objective (cash in the pocket), which may be 
different to the longer-term objectives of the company. 
The Act also acknowledges the complexity of modern business in that it allows 
directors to rely on reports and the advice of experts. This was recently tested in a dispute 
between shareholders and directors of the former carpet maker Feltex. Some 800 shareholders 
joined together in a class action against the directors (Stewart, 2012); subsequently a case was 
taken by the Ministry of Economic Development against five of the former Feltex directors. 
The case hinged on whether it was reasonable for Feltex directors to rely on expert advice from 
an external accounting firm even though one of the directors was a former chair of New 
Zealand’s accounting standards body. The court felt that it was reasonable for the directors to 
rely on the advice they received, and they were acquitted. This case also highlights an example 
of directors and shareholders having different expectations of the role of the board (Mohd-
Sulaiman, 2013). 
Like British and US law, New Zealand law leaves the task of setting most of the rules of 
the company to the directors and shareholders. In New Zealand, these rules are recorded in the 
company’s constitution. The NZX listing rules provide some constraints on what can be 
included in company constitutions; for example, so-called poison pill or anti-takeover clauses 
cannot be included (NZX, 2013). 
The regulatory environment governing the issuing of securities to the public has 
changed substantially in recent years. The Securities Act 1978, which is the underlying law in 
this area, underwent a substantial revision in 2009 (Securities Regulations, 2009). The new Act 
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increased the penalties for behaviours such as making false or misleading statements or false 
trading. These actions are now criminal offences punishable by fines up to $1M or five years’ 
imprisonment. In addition to firmer regulations, the Financial Markets Authority (FMA) was 
established to enforce them. The FMA’s main objective is to promote and facilitate the 
development of fair, efficient and transparent financial markets (FMA, 2014), and its 
establishment marked a major shift in the way securities law is implemented in New Zealand. 
Prior to the FMA era the issuing of securities, such as shares in public companies and bonds, 
was overseen by the Securities Commission. The Securities Commission oversaw an 
enforcement regime that relied largely on private enforcement, and because the Commission 
did not have the power to enforce securities law directly in a timely and effective way, NZ was 
considered by international standards to provide a low level of protection for investors (La 
Porta et al, 2006). With the introduction of the FMA enforcement has now moved from a 
private to a public regime, with the FMA actively prosecuting directors and others for alleged 
breaches of securities law. However, civil remedies also remain available (Securities 
Regulations, 2009). The impact of this new environment on director and shareholder behaviour 
has yet to be researched, and there is moreover a view that the regulatory environment still 
requires fine tuning, so it may be some time before the ultimate impact of these regulations on 
shareholders’ and directors’ expectations of boards can be determined (Maume & Walker, 
2013). 
The NZX has adopted a continuous disclosure regime which obligates companies to 
disclose anything that could potentially influence a company’s share price as soon as the 
company is aware it (NZX, 2013, section 10). The objective of this policy is to eliminate 
insider trading by ensuring that all shareholders have access to share price and other potentially 
share price–sensitive information at the same time. 
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4.2 The Equities Market 
The size and importance of the equities market relative to the overall economy likely influences 
the general public’s and legislators’ attitudes towards public companies and their governance. 
This section briefly discusses the place of the equities market within the overall New Zealand 
economic environment. 
The New Zealand stock exchange consists of two boards: a main board, the NZSX, and 
a secondary board, the NZAX. The NZSX has 112 companies listed and there are a further 19 
on the NZAX board. This is similar in scale to the Belgian stock exchange, which has 131 
companies listed, but is dwarfed by the Australian market with 2153 companies and London 
with 2455. In September 2013 the market capitalisation of NZX-listed companies was $81.6B, 
or approximately 37.5% of GDP (NZX, September 2013; Reserve Bank, September 2013). As 
Figure 2 shows, the New Zealand share market plays a relatively small part in the economy 
when compared to some other advanced economies. Recently the contribution of the NZ stock 
market has grown from a low of 31% of GDP in 2011 to 37.5% of GDP, largely as a result of 
the listing of a number of SOEs on the NZSX and a surge in NZ equity prices. However, the 
longer-term trend suggests that the gap between the contribution of the New Zealand share 
market to the economy relative to other advanced countries is widening. In 1996 the NZ market 
was 56% of GDP and the Australian market 68%; some market analysts expect that in the 
longer term Australia’s stock market will continued to grow in importance while New 
Zealand’s will decline (Doyle & Cheong, 2011). 
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Figure 2  
 
Market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP 2011 
 
Source: Doyle & Cheong (2011). 
 
Another reference point for the relative unimportance of the NZX is the residential housing 
market; residential housing is a popular investment for New Zealanders and likely competes 
with NZX equities for New Zealanders’ investment dollars. The retail value of all residential 
homes in New Zealand is estimated at $689B, over eight times the combined market 
capitalisation of all NZX equities (Reserve Bank, September 2013). This suggests that, for most 
New Zealanders, investment in local equities is not a major contributor to their total net worth, 
and this is a factor that may influence their attitude towards NZX-listed companies and their 
boards.  
 
4.3 NZ Public Companies 
This section examines the companies listed on the NZSX market. Berle and Means (1932) first 
identified that the size of companies, the distribution of their ownership, and who controls them 
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are all factors that influence board behaviour, so these aspects of NZ public companies are now 
discussed. The size of company boards (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) and the sharing of directors 
between companies (Johnson et al., 2012) have also been shown to potentially influence board 
behaviour and hence director and shareholder expectations of boards, so these features of NZ 
companies are also discussed. 
 
4.3.1 Company size 
Table 8 summarises the market capitalisation of companies listed on the NZX main board as at 
December 2013.  
 
Table 8  
 
Market capitalisation of NZSX-listed companies 
 
Market capitalisation ($M) 
Size 
<100 100–500 
500–
1000 
1000– 
2000 >2000 
Number of companies 41 34 13 13 10 
Share (%) 37 31 12 12 9 
 
The mean market capitalisation is $680M and the median market capitalisation is 
approximately $229M. This table shows that the NZX is dominated by a large number of 
relatively small businesses. Smaller companies have fewer resources to dedicate to investor-
related activities and this may well influence both director and shareholder expectations of 
boards. 
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Table 9 shows the trend in the mean market capitalisation of companies from 1995 to 
2013, expressed in 2013 dollars.3  
Table 9  
 
Mean market capitalisation of NZSX-listed companies 
 
Company market capitalisation (2013 $M) 
Year 1995 2010 2013 
Mean 696 611 680 
Median 102 123 229 
Sample size 86 117 112 
 
Source: 1995 and 2010 data from Boyle & Ji (2011) 2013 data from NZX December 2013. 
   
As Table 9 shows, the market has remained relatively static since 1995. However, the median 
market capitalisation has jumped substantially in 2013, possibly as a result of a number of large 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listing on the stock market and a meteoric rise in market 
capitalisation of some IT companies. Overall, however, the picture is of a market that is 
essentially static, which reinforces the view that NZ company owners and investors are 
somewhat ambivalent toward the NZX. A consequence of having small companies listed in the 
exchange with low liquidity is that it is not economically attractive for brokering groups to 
research these companies.4 As will be shown in section 7.2, many investors are reluctant to 
invest in firms without the benefit of research, and this further reduces their liquidity. 
                                                 
3 Adjusted using the Reserve Bank’s Inflation Calculator 
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary_policy/inflation_calculator/. 
 
 
4 Forsyth Barr, one of New Zealand’s largest retail share broking firms, conducts research on just 68 of the 112 
listed companies (Forsyth Barr, 2015). 
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4.3.2 Ownership distribution 
One of the key issues defining and shaping the overall governance process and the relationship 
between shareholders and directors is the degree to which ownership is dispersed and control is 
centralised. The issue was first addressed in a US context by Berle and Means (1932) and it is 
their assumptions around these parameters that have underpinned much of the theory and 
literature on governance ever since. More recently, research has been conducted into the 
distribution of ownership of NZ companies. 
 In order to develop an indication of how widely distributed ownership is among NZSX-
listed companies a random sample of 40 companies was taken and the statutory shareholding 
information that is disclosed in their 2013 annual reports was analysed. Table 10 summarises 
the results. 
 
Table 10  
 
Distribution of shareholdings in NZSX-listed companies 
Shareholding distribution 
Size of holding5 1–1000 1001–5000 
5001–
10,000 
10,001–
100,000 100,000+ 
Proportion of shareholders (%) 27.6 40.2 13.9 17.0 1.3 
Proportion of shares held (%) 0.9 4.4 4.3 13.4 77.0 
Average number of shareholders 3028 4411 1521 1870 141 
 
Sample size: 40 companies. 
 
                                                 
5 The divisions selected match those used by companies in their annual reports. 
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Of the 40 companies sampled, the total number of shareholders in each company ranged from 
846 to 49,646 with an average shareholding of 10,971 and a median of 6152. The small median 
once again highlights that a large number of small companies is listed on the NZSX. 
Furthermore, in 38 of the 40 companies surveyed at least 50% of the shares were held by 2% of 
the shareholders. Conversely 77% of shareholders own just 9.5% of the shares. This highlights 
the relatively significant power of a few individual shareholders and is likely to influence 
director behaviour and attitudes towards shareholders. 
 
4.3.3 Control of New Zealand companies 
From a governance perspective the answer to the question ‘What level of shareholding 
constitutes control?’ does not have a single numerical answer. To have total control over all 
aspects of a NZ company requires a 75% super majority (Companies Act, 1993). However, 
from a practical perspective it is generally agreed that a 20% shareholding is sufficient for 
effective control of a publicly listed company, and in certain circumstances 10% may be 
sufficient (La Porta et al., 1999).  Investment bankers Goldman Sachs consider shareholdings 
of 10–20% to be ‘strategic’ shareholdings that are significant enough to influence the direction 
of a company (Maume & Walker, 2012).    
To determine the level of control shareholders can exert over New Zealand companies, 
again the same sample of 40 companies has been analysed using the cut-off points of 10% and 
20% as references. The analysis looks back one level of ownership – so, for example, where a 
block of shares is owned by a company, the ownership of this and any subsequent companies in 
the chain has not been traced to determine the ultimate ownership of the share parcel. Although 
attempts at such analysis have been made in the past (La Porta et al., 1999; Cameron, 2007), 
such analysis is of limited value for two reasons: firstly it cannot account for any agreements 
and undertakings between shareholders to block vote their individual shareholdings, and 
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secondly there are situations where a strategic or controlling shareholder such as an institution 
or government entity may, as a matter of policy or simple expediency, choose to not actively 
participate in the governance of the company in which it holds shares unless an extraordinary 
event occurs (Tan & Keeper, 2008; Ingley & Van der Walt, 2004). So in practice it is 
impossible to precisely quantify the level of control shareholders have over boards or the 
situations where they would choose to exercise this control.  
Using the same sample of 40 companies, the statutory shareholding information that is 
disclosed in their 2013 annual reports was analysed to identify the largest shareholder. Figure 3 
shows the percentage of the company’s shares that the largest shareholder holds and the nature 
of the shareholder (i.e. private investor, institutional investor or public entity). Public entities 
are government-owned bodies.  
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Figure 3  
 
Size of largest shareholder’s stake 2013 
 
 
 
The chart highlights the importance of institutions in the governance process. Not only are 
institutions the largest or even the controlling shareholder in a substantial number of companies 
(19 of 40), but their position towards the head of so many share registers places them in a 
strong position to shape the broader governance agenda in New Zealand. How they choose to 
exercise this influence is discussed later in this chapter. In 27 of the 40 companies sampled the 
largest shareholder has a shareholding of less than 20% of the total shares on offer, which 
suggests that in a significant number of New Zealand’s public companies no individual 
shareholder has practical control of the enterprise. This is the situation that so concerned Adam 
Smith (1776) and which has underpinned much of the thinking on governance practices from 
Berle and Means (1932) to Jensen and Meckling (1976), and through to the present day. This is 
significant from the perspective of both shareholders’ and directors’ expectations of boards, as 
there is some evidence to suggest that NZ companies with large block shareholders outperform 
those with more dispersed shareholdings (Boone, Colombage & Gunasekarage, 2011; Bhabra, 
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2007). Also, as will be shown in section 4.4.4, large block shareholders have more ability and 
incentive to monitor the performance of both the company and its governance structures and to 
take action when performance is unsatisfactory, suggesting that the size of shareholding may 
influence shareholders’ expectations of boards.   
From a director perspective the lack of a controlling shareholder clearly removes a 
substantial constraint on behaviour. The threat of being taken over by another company 
(commonly referred to the market for corporate control) is considered a strong external control 
mechanism on management and boards alike (Jensen, 1983). Quite simply, the threat of being 
seen as the steward of underperforming assets and ultimately losing one’s job is seen as a 
strong incentive to perform. However, NZX-listed companies are seldom the targets of 
takeover bids either friendly or hostile (although 2013 was an exception, with two friendly 
takeovers occurring and one unsuccessful hostile takeover attempt). There are a number of 
factors that make takeovers in general (and hostile takeovers in particular) more difficult in the 
New Zealand environment. These include the impact of the 1993 Takeovers Act and the 
practice of staggered board appointments (Marshall & Anderson, 2009; Adams et al., 2010). It 
therefore appears unlikely that the threat of takeover is a significant constraint on the behaviour 
of New Zealand boards.  
 
4.3.4 Board size 
The size of a company’s board is a topic that has been researched regularly in the governance 
literature both internationally and in New Zealand (Reedy et al., 2010; Koerniadi, et al., 2013), 
perhaps because it is such an easy metric to collect. The relationship between board size and 
company performance has been well documented and is shown to be tenuous at best (Reedy et 
al., 2010). Koerniadi et al. (2013) claim that larger New Zealand boards are more risk averse 
than smaller boards. This assertion is based on the assumption that the variations in share 
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returns are a proxy for board propensity for risk taking. Although Koerniadi et al. suggest some 
possible reasons for this they do not assert that there is a causal relationship between board size 
and propensity for risk taking. However, their research, and much of the other research in this 
area, uses the traditional ‘black box’ methodology discussed in section 3.2 and therefore is 
subject to the criticism raised by Gabrielsson & Huse (2003). 
The average size of New Zealand public company boards has been reasonably static 
since at least 1995, as Table 11 shows. 
 
Table 11  
 
Trend in board size of NZSX-listed companies 
Board size 
  1995 2010 2013 
Mean 6.6 5.9 6 
Median 6 6 6 
Sample size 86 117 112 
 
Source: 1995 and 2010 data from Boyle & Ji (2011), 2013 data from NZX company websites 
Dec 2013. 
 
The number of directors on NZSX-listed companies ranges from three to 12. Figure 4 
summarises the distribution in December 2013. 
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Figure 4  
 
Board size of NZSX-listed companies 
 
Source: Derived from the Companies Office director database (Companies Office, 2013). 
 
There is a correlation (r = 0.398) between the size of a company as measured by market 
capitalisation and the number of directors, suggesting that companies with a larger market 
capitalisation tend to have larger boards. This is consistent with findings from other 
jurisdictions (Yermack, 1996; Boone et al., 2007). 
 
4.3.5 Shared directors 
Some directors sit on the boards of several NZSX companies. A company director who serves 
on the board of two NZSX companies creates a link between the two companies. Figure 5 
shows the frequency of such links between NZSX companies. 
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Figure 5  
 
Links between NZSX company boards 
 
Figure 5 shows that 87 of the 112 NZSX companies (78%) have such links to one or more other 
public companies. Directors who sit on multiple NZSX boards can act as a conduit to provide 
more, newer, and potentially more valuable information from outside the company. Because 
NZX directors are not obliged to be members of the Institute of Directors or to attend any 
formal training or seminars, this passing of ideas between boards may play a significant role in 
influencing the behaviour and expectations of all NZX directors; it may also create some 
homogeneity between directors.   
As will be shown in section 6.1, directors frequently recruit many of their fellow 
directors. By examining these director links between boards it is possible to gain some insights 
into the attributes that directors value in their peers. Figure 6 maps all of the director links 
between NZSX companies as at December 2013. The squares represent individual companies 
and are identified by their ticker symbol; the lines between the companies represent the director 
links between the companies. Unlinked companies appear at the left-hand margin of the figure. 
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Figure 6  
 
Map of board linkages between NZSX companies 
 
Note: codes are NZSX ticker abbreviations for company names. 
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An analysis of these links shows the following: 
 Links are seldom between complementary businesses. For example, there are few 
manufacturer–distributor linkages. This suggests that the prime reason for the links is not to 
build financial or trading relationship between companies. This is in contrast to the German 
governance model, where financiers are frequently represented on company boards 
(Larcker & Tayan, 2011, p. 45). 
 Links are seldom within the same industry. A large number of links between companies 
in the same industry would suggest that boards valued directors with unique industry-
specific knowledge. Because few such links exist, there is unlikely to be a shortage of 
directors with an appropriate level of industry-specific knowledge. 
 Shared directors maybe enhance the human and social capital of boards. The human 
capital of a board can be enhanced by shared directors’ expertise in governance and their 
ability to share ideas from other boards (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2008). Social capital may 
likewise be enhanced as shared directors can be seen as a source of prestige for companies 
(Kim & Cannella, 2008).   
 
4.4 New Zealand Shareholders 
This section provides an overview of investors in the New Zealand share market. To assist with the 
analysis the investors have been segmented into four groups, each with unique characteristics that, 
as will be shown, can influence their relationship with boards and directors. The groups are private 
investors, institutional investors, foreign investors and public investors. A second segmentation is 
also conducted which examines block shareholders. Block shareholders comprise any shareholder 
that holds 5% or more of the shares in any NZSX company.  
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4.4.1 New Zealand private investors  
The author is not aware of any research that directly addresses the role and behaviour of private 
investors in New Zealand. ‘Private investor’ is another of those governance terms that are in such 
common use that they are seldom defined. Farrar (2008, p. 179) defines such investors simply as 
‘individuals’.  In the context of this research, private investors are considered to be any individuals 
who have chosen to invest either personally or via a trust or a company structure, but not as a part 
of a managed fund or superannuation fund, directly in instruments listed on the NZSX.  
The New Zealand public, from whom private investors are drawn, have a range of 
investment options. Table 12 shows an estimate of the average NZ household’s assets and the 
distribution of these assets among major investment categories. This table should be viewed as an 
estimate only, as making an accurate assessment of these assets is problematic (Briggs, 2012).  
 
Table 12  
 
New Zealand household assets 
Average NZ Household Assets 
  Value ($) Share (%) 
Property         452,535  79 
Kiwi Saver/superannuation           52,000  9 
Term deposit/term investment           40,000  7 
Shares           16,000  3 
Unit trust/managed fund             9,000  2 
Total          569,535  100 
 
Sources: Quotable Value (2014); Colmar Brunton (2013). 
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The table shows that New Zealanders choose to invest the vast majority of their funds in property. 
Direct investment in the equities accounted for just 3% of total household assets.  
Table 13 shows an estimate of the proportion of NZ adults aged 18 or over who invest in 
NZX-listed equities. 
 
Table 13  
 
Trend in share of adult New Zealanders owning NZ equities 
Share of NZ adult population owning NZ equities 
 2005 2009 2013 
Shares (%) 21 22 16 
Bonds (%) – – 13 
Unit trust/managed fund (%) 15 11 9 
Sample size 856 850 852 
 
Source: Colmar Brunton (2013). 
 
Combining date from tables 12 and 13 suggests that the average New Zealander who invests in the 
share market has a portfolio valued at approximately $100,000.6 As Table 13 shows, the number of 
private investors who directly participate in the stock market is declining. Colmar Brunton (2013) 
attributes the decline in share ownership between 2009 and 2013 to a change in the wording of the 
survey question that they asked in their 2013 survey of investors. However, it should also be noted 
that a similar decline has been observed in Australia, where direct share ownership has dropped 
from 39% in 2010 to 34% in 2012 (ASX, 2012). When viewed collectively, tables 12 and 13 show 
                                                 
6 The average investment in shares is $16,000 (Table 12, p.112), and 16% of the population hold shares (Table 13, p. 
113), so the average shareholding is $16,000/0.16 = $100,000. 
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that direct investment in shares is not a principal repository of wealth for the vast majority of New 
Zealanders and that it may be becoming still less important. This suggests that there is little 
financial incentive for most New Zealanders to actively participate in any corporate governance 
activity. 
Figure 7 shows that NZ private investors have consistently favoured direct investment over 
indirect investment by a ratio of 2:1. The graph also gives an indication of elasticity of investment 
in the NZ share market, as well as investors’ willingness to exit the market when the economy turns 
down and re-enter when it turns up (2008 and 2009 were years when equity prices slumped).  
 
Figure 7  
 
Private investment in New Zealand equities 
 
Source: Reserve Bank (2014). 
 
Very little has been published on the profile of New Zealand private investors. Statistics published 
by the Financial Literacy and Retirement Commission show that share owners are most likely to 
have high finance knowledge and share many of the following attributes: they own their own home 
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in a trust, have personal income of greater than $100,000, have a net worth of more than $600,000, 
are tertiary educated, are over 45 years old, and are twice as likely to be male than female (Colmar 
Brunton, 2013). These are broadly similar characteristics to Australian private investors. In 
Australia share ownership is most common among the tertiary-educated higher income households, 
with share ownership peaking among males in the 65–74 age bracket (ASX, 2011). 
The ASX (2011) has analysed the behaviour of Australian private investors and has 
segmented them into four roughly equal categories based on their behaviour. While caution should 
be taken in extrapolating the Australian experience to New Zealand, the ASX research nonetheless 
provides a useful framework for considering private investor behaviour. The four categories are:  
•   Self-reliant dabblers (22% of current direct shareholding owners). Those within this 
segment have limited knowledge of the share market, and while they are keen to ﬁnd out 
more, they note that shares would never be a major part of their investment portfolio. They 
believe that share market success is more about luck in timing and enjoy managing their 
investments.  
•   Informed diligents (22% of current direct shareholding owners). These investors are 
knowledgeable and reasonably skilled in the share market. They enjoy managing their 
investments, but they also rely on expert advice to shape their decisions and are highly 
disciplined. They share a level of excitement about the share market challenge. 
•   Conﬁdent traders (25% of current direct shareholding owners). Like the informed 
diligents, those within this segment are the most knowledgeable, skilled and confident 
investors, tending to buy/sell shares independently. They enjoy managing their investments 
and are the segment most excited about the share market challenge. Conﬁdent traders are 
fairly disciplined and are mostly self-directed, relying on their own gut feel. 
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•   Unsure delegators (31% of current direct shareholding owners). Categorised by their lack 
of knowledge of the share market, unsure delegators rely on the advice of experts for 
investment decisions. Of all the segments, they are the ones most likely to find the share 
market confusing and do not ﬁnd the share market an exciting challenge. This is now the 
largest of the current direct private investor segments. 
This segmentation suggests that a significant proportion of private investors may lack the 
confidence or motivation to participate in the governance process. It also suggests that there is a 
group of shareholders who simply trade shares and who are unlikely under normal circumstances to 
have any interest in actively engaging in the governance processes of the companies in which they 
hold shares. 
  
4.4.2 Institutional investors 
The term ‘institutional investor’ is largely undefined in the New Zealand context. Farrar (2008), 
who approaches governance primarily from a legal perspective, defines it as a broad term that 
‘encompasses pension and superannuation funds, investment companies, mutual funds and unit 
trusts, insurance companies, banks and charitable foundations. It also includes funds managers who 
are professionals managing investments on behalf of other institutional investors.’ (Farrar, 2008, p. 
179.) Although banks and charitable foundations do from time to time perform functions more 
commonly associated with institutional investors, Farrar’s definition is potentially misleading as it 
creates ambiguity around the role of banks and investment companies in the governance process. 
Therefore for the purpose of this research, institutional investors are defined as those professional 
organisations that manage life insurance policyholders’ funds, superannuation funds, unit trusts, 
group investment funds and all other funds on their own and their clients’ behalf, and invest a 
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proportion of those funds in equities listed on the NZSX. This definition is broadly in line with the 
segmentation used by the Reserve Bank (2014). 
In June 2011, it was estimated that fund managers controlled 47.5% of the shares in the New 
Zealand equity market (Doyle & Cheong, 2011). Because of their size, geographic location and 
knowledge, New Zealand institutional investors can play a unique and active role in the corporate 
governance process. However, their position can create conflicts of interest. The conflicts arise 
because institutions are effectively caught between the interests of their own investors – who 
typically require short-term capital gain – and the interests of the companies in which they invest. 
The companies they invest in mostly view short-term capital gain as unsustainable and detrimental 
to their business in the long run. An argument has been made that because of this conflict of 
interest, institutions are unable to effectively participate in the governance process to the extent 
required to effectively monitor and enforce governance standards (Ingley & Van der Walt, 2004; 
Tan & Keeper, 2008). In practice most institutions appear to be reasonably pragmatic in their 
approach to governance; using their own research and their informal networks with directors they 
tend to form their own opinions on governance practices, and use these opinions to make their 
decisions, which may include actively participating in governance processes of individual 
companies should they consider it necessary (Chiu & Monin, 2003). The major ways an institution 
can influence governance processes are as follows:  
 
• Institution as a board participant. Occasionally an institution will take a block holding in 
a company and appoint a nominee director to the board who will actively participate in the 
governance process on behalf of the institution.7  However, in general this is not the 
preferred approach as most institutional investors believe that having nominees on boards 
                                                 
7 Brian Gaynor of Milford Asset Management was on the board of Turners’ Car Auctions until 2014, for example.  
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creates a conflict of interest. Many also consider that governing companies is not their core 
skill, and that their core business is making investment decisions, not running companies 
(Chiu & Monin, 2003). 
• Block shareholder. Institutions frequently hold stakes of greater than 5% of total company 
equity. In the sample of 40 companies previously discussed, 24 (60%) had a NZ institution 
holding a stake of 5% or more. Stakes of this size are harder to accumulate or sell than 
smaller stakes and are presumably more important than smaller stakes for the institutions 
concerned. As a result those institutions with block holdings have a strong incentive to 
monitor the quality of governance. This may explain why firms with such shareholders 
have superior financial performance relative to firms with other block shareholders (Boone 
et al., 2011). 
• Active trader. Many institutions actively manage funds either on their own account or on 
behalf of their clients. It is also probable that the majority of trades on the NZX are 
computer-driven ‘algorithmic trades’ initiated by institutional investors. While this topic 
has not been discussed in the New Zealand literature, institutional investors approached by 
the author acknowledged that this trading occurs, but refused to discuss the details. Further 
evidence of such trading has been found in an analysis of trading volumes shown in 
Appendix C. Through these trades institutions can influence short-term share prices, 
although the degree and scope of influence are unknown. However, there is some 
suggestion that this trading has been used to manipulate share prices (New Zealand Super 
Fund, 2015).  
• Broker. Many of the institutions that provide share-broking services also provide much of 
the advice that private investors use to make their investment decisions (Colmar Brunton, 
2013). One method of providing this advice is through research brochures that institutions 
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publish. These brochures provide an analysis of the company’s recent performance, future 
prospects, and a recommendation to investors to buy, sell or hold the shares. 
• Lobbyist. Institutional investors have unique access to CEOs, chairmen, and other key 
players in the governance process (Chiu & Monin, 2003). CEOs, senior management and 
directors generally meet formally with a number of institutions several times a year. In 
addition it is not uncommon for these parties to meet informally at social events. So 
institutions have ample opportunity to make their views known to directors and 
management if they so choose. Equally there is evidence that directors informally ‘sound 
out’ key institutions before they raise potentially controversial issues with the shareholders 
as a whole (Chiu & Monin, 2003). This is in contrast to the majority of private investors, 
who generally do not have the opportunity to communicate personally with either 
management or directors. 
• Index-linked investor. Many institutional investors sell investment products to their 
customers which are tied to certain market indices. As a result, institutional investment 
decisions are made by following the market, rather than the performance of individual 
companies. In these circumstances institutional investors would appear to have little 
incentive to act as owners and participate in governance (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). 
The institutional investment community in New Zealand is quite small; most of the key 
players know each other and meet regularly at events such as company briefings. Institutions 
occasionally work together to lobby boards when they wish to influence the governance process 
(Chiu & Monin, 2003). 
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4.4.3 Foreign investors 
Foreign ownership is a feature of share markets in all developed countries. As Figure 8 shows, 
foreign ownership in the NZ market is at a moderate level relative to some other developed 
countries.   
 
Figure 8  
 
Share of equities owned by foreign investors 
 
Source: Doyle & Cheong (2011).  
 
The foreign-owned share of the New Zealand equities market has been declining steadily. In 1997 
approximately 60% of the NZ equities market was owned by foreign investors, and by 2011 this 
had dropped to 36% (Doyle & Cheong, 2011). Precise data on the level and nature of foreign 
ownership are difficult to derive because companies are not obliged to track or report on levels of 
foreign ownership. Overseas-based institutional investors make up the vast majority of foreign 
investment in the NZX (Doyle & Cheong, 2011). From the statutory shareholder information 
published in annual reports it is possible to identify foreign owners with a greater than 5% share of 
a company. An analysis of the sample 40 companies identified 11 companies where overseas 
investors held a strategic stake of at least 10%. Of these investments nine were held by institutional 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
US Japan NZ Australia UK
126 
 
investors and two by private investors. None of the institutional investors held a stake greater than 
19.9% of the total equity. Table 14 shows New Zealand companies with foreign block shareholders. 
 
Table 14  
 
Companies with foreign block shareholders 
 Company 
 Market cap 
($000)  
Shares on 
issue   
Shares traded 
in July ’13 
Percentage of 
total shares 
traded in July ’13 
DNZ Property 455,376   293,791,135  155,675,168  53% 
Ebos 1,363,920   147,610,382  39,997,650  27% 
Fisher and Paykel Healthcare 1,979,848   546,838,267  590,283,078  108% 
Fletcher Building 6,410,807   687,854,788  884,001,558  129% 
Kiwi Income Property Trust 1,111,800  1,006,153,978  399,218,930  40% 
Metlifecare 958,206     210,594,691  73,754,362  35% 
Nuplex 665,703   198,125,827  197,893,080  100% 
Sealegs 53,342  1,481,733,227  9,928,270  1% 
Telecom 4,104,209  1,822,303,137   3,124,057,288  171% 
Tenon 85,398        65,690,681   2,627,240  4% 
Xero 4,208,608   127,523,561  29,924,422  23% 
Market average 680,704 299,357,039   500,669,186  167% 
Median 227902 153,997,286   155,675,168  101% 
Note: Companies with foreign private block holders are shown in italics; all other companies have 
foreign institutional investors.  
 
Several researchers have observed that in other jurisdictions foreign institutional investors tend to 
take minority stakes in companies that are actively traded (Douma, George and Kabir 2006; 
Dahlquist & Robertsson, 2001; Ferreira & Matos, 2008). Table 14 also shows the shares traded in 
these companies in July 2013. Although representing only a one-month snapshot, these data are 
broadly consistent with observations by Douma et al., (2006) and suggest that, in general, foreign 
institutions may adopt a similar strategy when investing in New Zealand public companies as they 
do elsewhere in the world. However, no research appears to have been specifically conducted into 
the aspirations and behaviours of overseas-based equity investors.   
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From a governance perspective foreign investors can be seen as a catalyst for introducing 
international practices to New Zealand governance. For example, the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) were adopted primarily because Australia (the biggest foreign investor 
in NZ) made the decision to adopt this standard (Bradbury & Van Zijl, 2006). 
 
4.4.4 Public investors 
Public investors are shareholders who are ultimately controlled by either local or national 
government. There are some behaviours frequently observed within the group that suggest that they 
are different to other block holders in the way they approach corporate governance. For example, 
they tend to be very long-term investors and any decision to sell their holdings is generally signalled 
publically well in advance of the actual sale (Huang, Watson & Chen, 2013). It is also argued that 
government is a poor block shareholder because of its preference for social and political goals as 
opposed to profit maximisation, and because it uses its influence to appoint directors and senior 
managers based on political affiliations rather than commercial ability (Boone et al., 2011). Others, 
however, have found that in cases where companies are partially privatised and the government 
remains a substantial shareholder (as has happened recently with electricity companies in New 
Zealand), there has been a positive impact on the efficiency and profitability of the companies 
concerned (Gupta, 2005). 
 
4.4.5 Block investors 
Block holders have been identified as playing a key role in the internal governance process (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1996). Block holders are defined as entities that hold a 5% or greater stake in an NZX-
listed company (Securities Markets Act 1988). As shareholding size increases, the ability to 
influence the board of the company increases (Maume & Walker, 2012) and, because of the small 
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size of the NZ market, the ability to quickly sell the shareholding and exit the company decreases. 
This factor may give block holders stronger incentives to monitor and influence governance 
processes. Therefore the size and number of block shareholders have the potential to influence 
shareholder and director expectations of boards.   
With regard to the influence that a block shareholder can have over a firm, shareholding 
thresholds of 10% and 20% are considered significant. A 10% shareholding is given to be the 
minimum threshold for a strategic stake in a firm. This is the approximate level of shareholding that 
an individual shareholder must have in order to influence the board. A 20% shareholding is widely 
considered to be a sufficient shareholding to control a public company (Maume & Walker, 2012). A 
controlling shareholder has the ability to appoint or replace directors and so may be more inclined 
to direct a board, whereas a shareholder with a strategic stake lacks this ability and must adopt other 
strategies to influence a board. The presence of a controlling shareholder has been found to be 
associated with higher shareholder valuations (Yeh, 2005). In New Zealand, Bhabra (2007) has 
found evidence that the relationship between company performance and insider ownership is non-
linear, with a negative relationship for block holdings of between 14% and 40% and a positive 
relationship outside of these ranges. 
Block holders can be further segmented into investor groups discussed previously in this 
chapter, i.e. private investors, institutional investors and public entities. It is likely that investors in 
each of these groups have common interests and motivations which differ from those of the other 
groups (Boone et al., 2011). However, precisely what these interests and motivations are has yet to 
be fully established.  
Table 15, based on a survey of 40 companies, segments block shareholders by the size of 
their shareholding, their investor type (private, institutional, or public) and their location (NZ based 
or international). 
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Table 15  
 
Distribution of NZSX block holding shareholders 2013 
 NZ International 
Block size Private 
investors 
Institutional 
investors 
Public 
investors 
Private 
investors 
Institutional 
investors 
Public 
investors 
5–9.9% 30% 48% 3% 5% 15% 0% 
10–19.9% 13% 18% 3% 3% 18% 0% 
20%+ 15% 5% 8% 5% 3% 0% 
Totals 58% 71% 14% 13% 35% 0% 
 
Sample size: 40 companies. 
 
The table highlights some structural aspects of the NZ market that may influence shareholder and 
directors expectations of boards. Thirty-six per cent of companies reviewed have a controlling 
shareholder, so it is difficult to make any generalisations about the influence of shareholders across 
the NZSX market. Seventy per cent of companies reviewed have at least one New Zealand 
institution on their register holding at least 5% of the available shares. Unlike private block holders, 
who often appear to be long-term holders, these shareholders are likely to trade their shareholdings. 
This places institutions in a hugely influential position because by increasing or decreasing their 
shareholding they can influence the share price and hence the cost of the company’s capital. 
Therefore how they engage with companies has a major influence on governance in New Zealand 
and on shareholders’ and directors’ expectations of boards. 
 
4.5 New Zealand Company Directors 
The question of what are the appropriate attributes and qualifications for directors has been debated 
long and hard. Adam Smith raises the subject in his classic The Wealth of Nations (1776), and the 
specific issue that he raised (director–shareholder alignment) is still debated today. Both the 
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government, through the Companies Act 1993, and NZX, through its listing rules, have set 
minimum qualifications for directors (NZX, 2013). The Institute of Directors also has a desire to set 
higher minimum standards and certification for directors (which could only be achieved by 
attending their courses and paying the requisite fees).  
The qualifications and attributes of NZ directors constitute an area that has been researched 
extensively in the past (Boyle & Ji, 1995; Orr, Emanuel & Wong, 2005). The research has generally 
focused on specific measurable attributes, such as director independence, tenure, gender, and 
workload. This section updates some of the previous research in order to show trends from 1995 
through to 2013. In addition to updating previous research, some new research has been conducted 
that examines directors’ human capital contribution to boards and their country of residence. The 
research into human capital is included because it has been identified as a key element enabling 
boards to perform their functions, yet has been little researched (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2008). The 
country of residence research is included because there is general debate around the globalisation of 
NZ business and this research presents an opportunity to lead the debate in an area not previously 
researched. 
 
4.5.1 Executive directors 
In New Zealand the number of executives who sit on boards is declining. Table 16 shows the 
percentage of companies with the CEO on the board and the percentage of all NZSX-listed 
company board seats occupied by all executives (including CEOs). 
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Table 16  
 
Share of executive directors on NZSX-listed company boards 
Executive Directors 
Year 1995 2010 2013 
Companies with CEO on board  64% 67% 63% 
Executive share of total directors  22% 17% 12% 
Sample size 86        117 112 
 
Source: 1995 and 2010 data from Boyle & Ji (2011). 2013 data sourced from NZX company 
website. 
 
Approximately two-thirds of NZSX companies have appointed the CEO to the board; this ratio has 
remained relatively constant since 1995. However, over the same period the total number of 
executives on boards has declined by almost half, showing that executives other than CEOs have 
become less common on boards. In 2013 there were 10 executives on boards who were not the CEO 
of their respective company, and of these 10, nine were either substantial shareholders in their own 
right or had close ties with a substantial shareholder. It would appear, then, that executives other 
than CEOs can no longer hold a seat on the board by virtue of their position within the company. 
This is a significant trend as it suggests that the gap between management and governance is 
continuing to widen and that management is likely to be having less influence over the governance 
process. This change has occurred without any significant public debate, which suggests that the 
change has been driven by directors themselves. Given that almost all directors are appointed with 
an endorsement from the existing board, it may also suggest that independent directors are exerting 
more control over boards (with Table 16 showing that they are occupying a larger proportion of the 
available board seats). 
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There are no longer any NZSX-listed companies with a CEO who also holds the position of 
chairman of the board. This conforms to the Security Commission (2011) best practice guidelines. 
However, it contrasts with the situation in the US, where it is not uncommon for an individual to fill 
the roles of both CEO and chairman – which highlights another example of how governance 
practices can differ between Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions (Larcker & Tayan, 2011, p. 132).   
 
4.5.2 Independent directors 
The NZX defines an independent director as a director who is not an executive of the company and 
who does not have any direct or indirect interest or relationship that could reasonably influence, in a 
material way, the director’s decisions in relation to the company (NZX, rule 3.3.1c, 2013). Directors 
who do not meet this requirement are referred to as inside directors. In New Zealand the debate 
around the value and role of independent directors reached its zenith in 2003, when the NZX 
introduced a requirement that a company appoint a minimum of two independent directors, or, if 
there are eight or more directors, one-third must be independent (NZX, rule 3.3.1c, 2013). This 
change seemed to satisfy shareholders as the debate in the popular press abated shortly after this 
decision. However, subsequent research shows that in New Zealand large numbers of independent 
directors on boards are detrimental to company performance (Goldfinch, 2004; Orr et al., 2005; 
Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad, 2012). 
Table 17 shows that the overall percentage of independent directors on NZSX-listed 
company boards jumped between 1995 and 2010; this was probably a consequence of the NZX rule 
change. While the overall number of independent directors has remained constant since 2010 the 
percentage of boards that have a majority of independent directors has continued to increase. At the 
extreme there are now six companies which have completely independent boards. This trend shows 
that boards are increasingly weakening or breaking their direct ties with major shareholders. It is a 
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significant trend, because as these ties break, the gap between shareholders and the business widens 
and many of the issues first identified in the US by Berle & Means (1932) become more apparent. 
 
Table 17  
 
Share of independent directors on NZSX-listed company boards 
Independent Directors 
Year 1995 2010 2013 
Independent directors  55% 62% 62% 
Independent majority 46% 63% 75% 
Sample size 59 115 112 
 
Source: 1995 and 2010 data from Boyle & Ji (2011), 2013 data is from NZX website December 
2013.   
 
4.5.3 Tenure 
The length of time directors serve on a board is an issue that is of concern to directors and 
shareholders alike (Mitchell et al., 2013). NZX listing rules require that directors other than the 
managing director must present themselves for re-election every three years; however, neither 
company law nor the NZX places a limit on the number of times a director can stand for re-election. 
A review of the constitutions and board charters of the sample 40 NZX companies previously 
discussed did not identify any company that limited opportunities for re-election. Table 18 shows 
the distribution of tenure of all NZSX directors as at November 2013.  
Table 18  
 
NZSX-listed company director tenure 
Years since appointment 
Years served <3 3–7 8–12 13–17 18–21 >22 
Number of directors 251 227 124 23 43 3 
Share 37% 34% 18% 3% 6% 0% 
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Across all NZX-listed companies, the sitting directors have served on their current company boards 
for an average of 6.0 years, with the median term served 4.1 years. 
Australian companies with independent directors who have served for more than five years 
have been shown to have a superior ROE compared to those boards with less experienced directors, 
according to Mitchell et al., (2013), who suggest this could indicate that corporate memory and 
experience can enhance returns. Table 19 shows the trend in director tenure since 1995. 
 
Table 19  
 
Trend in share of NZSX-listed company directors who have served more than 5 years 
  1995 2010 2013 
Number of directors (% share) 34 56 43 
Sample size (companies) 86 117 112 
 
Source: 1995 and 2010 data from Boyle & Ji (2011). 
 
As Table 19 shows, the share of long-serving directors has declined between 2010 and 2013. One 
possible, although unsubstantiated, explanation for this decline is that it is related to the GFC and 
the hardened regulatory environment, along with the ensuing negative publicity that public 
company directors received. Experienced directors may simply have decided the risk of remaining a 
public company director outweighed the benefits. 
 
4.5.4 Gender diversity 
Gender diversity is currently one of the most discussed aspects of New Zealand corporate 
governance. Articles on the subject regularly appear in the popular press; organisations have been 
established specifically to promote women on boards (The 25% Group and Women on Boards NZ), 
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and the government has adopted an affirmative policy (Ministry of Women, 2014). NZX has 
recently mandated that companies report on the number of women on their board (NZX 2013). A 
number of public company directors have publicly stated their support for increasing the number of 
women on boards and, as will be shown, the issue is regularly raised by shareholders at company 
ASMs. Almost all of the public discussion on the topic supports appointing more women to boards. 
Researchers have, however, found scant evidence to suggest that gender mix has a material 
influence on the performance of New Zealand boards (Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003; Van der, Walt 
Ingley, Shergill & Townsend, 2006). In fact Fauzi & Locke (2012) found that in the companies they 
reviewed, those with a higher proportion of women on boards had a poorer financial performance 
than those with fewer or no women. These findings arguably reflect as much on the methodology 
employed as on the performance of the boards themselves, given that the research uses a traditional 
black box style methodology and is therefore subject to the limitations outlined by Aguilera and 
Jackson (2003) and Finkelstein and Mooney (2003). 
In 2013, 87 (13%) of New Zealand’s public company directors were women. As Table 20 
shows, the number of boards with at least one female director has been progressively increasing 
over the period from 1995 to 2013.  
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Table 20  
 
Trend in share of female directors of NZSX-listed companies 
  1995 2010 2013 
Boards with at least one female 
director 10 40 59 
Share (%) 11.6 34.2 52.7 
Sample size 86 117 112 
 
Source: 1995 and 2010 data from Boyle & Ji (2011).   
 
The mean size of an all-male board is 5.5 (Std. Dev. 1.49) members, and the mean size of boards 
that include female directors is 6.4 (Std. Dev. 1.66). An ANOVA test shows that this difference is 
statistically significant (t-statistic = 5.003). One possible explanation for this larger size is that some 
boards are responding to external pressure by increasing the size of their board to facilitate a female 
director.  
 
4.5.5 Domicile 
An issue that does not yet feature in the literature on New Zealand governance, but is starting to be 
discussed in the popular press, is the potential benefit to companies of having directors based 
overseas (Gaynor, 2011; Rural News, 2011). The argument in favour of overseas directors is that 
they bring a different perspective to business, and they potentially have networks that can assist the 
company in specific international markets (Adams et al., 2010). Research from other jurisdictions 
suggests that there may also be downsides to companies hiring overseas directors; these include 
poor board meeting attendance records, a tendency to over-remunerate CEOs, and a higher 
likelihood of financial misreporting (Masulis, Wang & Xie, 2012). Table 21 shows where New 
Zealand’s public company directors are based.  
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Table 21  
 
Domicile of directors of NZSX-listed companies 2013 
  Directors Share 
New Zealand 535 80% 
Australia 81 12% 
Other offshore locations  56 8% 
Total 672 100% 
Sample size  112  
 
 
As Table 21 shows, approximately 20% of New Zealand’s company directors are based overseas, 
with the majority being located in Australia. These overseas-based directors are widely distributed 
throughout NZ listed companies and, as Table 22 shows, over half (54%) of all NZSX-listed 
companies now have at least one director based overseas. However, it should also be noted that not 
all of the international directors are recruited for their offshore experience, as a significant number 
appear to be appointed primarily as nominees of substantial offshore block shareholders. 
 
Table 22  
 
Share of NZSX-listed companies with an overseas based director (2013) 
  Companies % of NZSX 
Any international director 61 54 
Australian directors 45 40 
Other international directors 29 26 
Sample size 112  
 
Note: some companies have both Australian and other international directors.   
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Ten companies (9% of the total) have a majority of their directors based offshore – a review of their 
board charters does not suggest any systemic differences in their governance practices relative to 
companies with New Zealand–based shareholders.  
 
4.5.6 Busy directors 
Directors who sit on multiple boards can provide valuable experience and prestige to companies, 
but their workload can also result in less rigorous monitoring and control (Boyle & Ji, 2011). In 
New Zealand, 568 directors fill the 672 board seats of NZSX-listed company boards, with 71 
directors (13%) sitting on two or more boards. By comparison the US has some 29,000 public 
company directors, 17% of whom sit on two or more boards (Larcker & Tayan, 2013, pp. 151–154). 
This suggests that New Zealand directors are not overly busy relative to their US counterparts – a 
sentiment confirmed by Boyle & Ji (2011). However, some New Zealand directors also sit on 
private company boards, so in practice they may be busier than these statistics suggest. Table 23 
shows how many NZSX-listed company boards NZSX directors sit on. 
 
Table 23  
 
Summary of NZSX directors who sit on multiple boards (2013) 
Number of boards 1 2 3 4 5 
Directors 496 46 17 7 1 
Share (%) 87 8 3 1 0 
Sample size 567     
 
Source: NZ Companies Office Database 
 
4.5.7 Director human capital 
The human capital that individual directors contribute to the board appears to be an important factor 
in determining shareholder and director expectations of boards. This may be because directors’ 
human capital has been shown to affect company performance (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). 
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The issue is discussed in the New Zealand literature, where the importance of director human 
capital is acknowledged and concerns are raised regarding the availability of suitably qualified 
directors (Goldfinch, 2004; Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). Furthermore, most companies choose to 
publish director biographies in their annual reports, an action which suggests that both shareholders 
and directors value the human capital directors contribute to the board. To the author’s knowledge 
comprehensive research into the background of NZSX directors has not previously been conducted. 
To examine the human capital that directors contribute to boards, the backgrounds of all 
directors appointed to NZX main board companies in 2013 were examined. The directors were 
identified from data on the Companies Office director database. Data were compiled from the 
following public sources: company annual reports, NZX notifications, the Companies Office 
website, company websites, and the social networking site Linkedin. All data was taken ‘at face 
value’ and was not cross-checked with other sources to confirm its veracity. The variables selected 
were based on a taxonomy used by Singh et al., (2008). The following attributes were selected for 
analysis: 
 Academic qualifications. These were drawn from the data on academic 
qualifications that directors chose to share publicly. 
 Commercial experience. This is based on the most senior commercial position the 
directors claim to have held. Partners in law or accountancy firms have been 
included in the general manager category, given the blend of commercial and 
professional expertise required by these roles. 
 Professional experience. This includes any experience in the commercial profession 
in which the director claims to have practised. Financial professional experience 
includes accounting, auditing and investment banking. Legal experience has also 
been defined quite broadly and is not confined to commercial law; so this category 
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includes any director who claims to have any type of legal practice in their 
background. 
 International experience. This is categorised as having had senior management 
experience based outside of New Zealand. 
 Prior public board experience. This can include experience as a director of a 
company listed on any bourse. 
 Celebrity status. Celebrity directors command a degree of public fascination in the 
mainstream media and some may have been appointed to the position of director 
primarily for this reason rather than for their commercial prowess and experience; 
ex-politicians have featured in this category in the past.  
 Industry experience. This comprises senior management experience based outside 
of New Zealand. 
 Domicile. This is based on the home addresses of directors as recorded in the NZ 
Companies Office database.  
Two segmentation analyses were performed on the data, one comparing the characteristics of inside 
directors with independent directors and the other comparing male directors with female directors. 
As will be shown, these segmentation analyses provide further insights into the expectations that 
directors and shareholders have of boards. 
The 2013 directors 
In 2013 a total of 79 directors were appointed to NZSX boards. Three of these new 
appointments resigned within the year and have been omitted from the analysis. Another director 
has chosen not to reveal anything of his background other than that he is an investor, so he too has 
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been omitted from the analysis. The remaining 75 board appointments have all been analysed. 
Collectively these directors fill 11% of the total NZSX board seats.   
It is important to appreciate that data were only collected from directors who were appointed 
in 2013. These directors have been appointed after a period where there has been widespread 
concern over the actions and behaviours of some directors (Cardow & Wilson, 2015) and some 
substantial change in the regulatory environment (see section 4.1). When the US share markets went 
through a similar phase, board composition changed (Linck, Netter & Yang, 2008). It is therefore 
possible that a change has occurred in the composition of New Zealand boards, so some caution 
must be applied when drawing conclusions about the entire population of directors from these data. 
However, what can be determined from the data is some insights into the attributes that directors 
currently value in their peers.   
Results 
Table 24 summarises the findings. 
Table 24  
 
2013 board appointments: directors’ human capital attributes 
Academic qualifications Commercial experience Professional experience  
   CEO 42 56% Finance 36 48% 
Postgraduate 28 37% GM 9 12% Legal 13 17% 
Bachelor 17 23% Senior executive 23 31% Other 26 35% 
No information 30 40% No information 1 1% No information 0 0% 
Total 75 100% Total 75 100% Total 75 100% 
         
International experience Prior public board experience Celebrity director 
Yes 48 64% Yes 30 40% Yes 0 0% 
No Information 27 36% No Information 45 60% No 75 100% 
Total 75 100% Total 75 100% Total 75 100% 
         
Industry experience Based overseas    
Yes 47 63% Yes 13 17%    
No 28 37% No 62 83%    
Total 75 100% Total 75 100%    
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The directors appointed in 2013 were very highly qualified, with 37% claiming postgraduate 
qualifications. Overall 60% of directors claimed a university qualification compared to 20.8% of the 
general population (Statistics NZ, 2013). While it is difficult to infer much from these statistics 
directly, as will be shown in subsequent sections, when the sample is segmented significant 
differences appear in the qualifications of some segments. These directors had extensive 
commercial experience, with over half claiming a prior CEO position. No current CEOs of NZSX 
companies were appointed to the boards of other listed companies that year. In the US CEOs are 
regularly appointed to the boards of other companies; this is because of the certification effect that 
CEOs bring to the appointing firm (Fahlenbrach et al., 2010) and their ability to increase growth 
(Fich, 2005). No celebrity directors were appointed in 2013. One event in particular may have had a 
strong influence on this outcome: the high-profile court case involving two former justice ministers 
turned company directors (Cardow & Wilson, 2015), and the ensuing publicity, may have led 
boards to conclude that political celebrities no longer add credibility to companies. International 
experience appears to be highly regarded by boards, with 64% of the directors asserting 
international experience at a senior management level, making it the most prevalent feature 
analysed. International experience also features prominently in directors’ résumés and in press 
releases regarding directorial appointments, which suggests that it is considered prestigious and 
adds to directors’ reputations. Sixty-three per cent of directors surveyed had prior experience in the 
same industry, suggesting that directors also place a high value on prior industry experience.  
Inside and independent director comparison 
Inside directors were identified either by being reported as such in their company annual 
reports or in notices filed on the NZX website (NZX.com). There is evidence to suggest that 
independent directors are usually nominated by the CEO and fellow board members (Shivdasani & 
Yermack, 1999; Westphal & Zajac, 1995), while inside directors are generally nominated by one or 
more substantial shareholders. So by comparing the attributes of inside and independent directors 
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insights could be gleaned into the relative importance that major shareholders and directors place on 
these attributes. Table 25 show this comparison; chi-square tests were performed to test the 
significance of any differences between the segments. Where the difference between the two groups 
is considered significant (p < 0.05), the chi-square result is highlighted in bold. 
Table 25  
 
Comparison between the expertise of inside and independent directors of NZSX-listed companies 
  Inside Independent  Inside 
(%) 
Independent 
(%) 
Chi test 
(p) 
Academic qualifications      
 Postgraduate 12 16  57% 30% 0.027 
 Bachelor 3 14  14% 26% 0.007 
 No information 6 24  29% 44%  
 Total 21 54  100% 100%  
Commercial experience      
 CEO 12 30  57% 56% 0.901 
 GM 3 6  14% 11% 0.704 
Senior executive 6 17  29% 31% 0.806 
 No information 0 1  0% 2%  
 Total 21 54  100% 100%  
Professional experience       
 Finance 9 27  43% 50% 0.578 
 Legal 3 10  14% 19% 0.664 
 Other 9 17  43% 31%  
 Total 21 54  100% 100%  
Previous public board experience     
 Yes 6 24  29% 44% 0.208 
 No Information 15 30  71% 56%  
 Total 21 54  100% 100%  
International experience      
 Yes 17 31  81% 57% 0.056 
 No Information 4 23  19% 43%  
 Total 21 54  100% 100%  
Based overseas      
 Yes 7 6  33% 11% 0.022 
 No 14 48  67% 89%  
 Total 21 54  100% 100%  
Industry experience 
 Yes 17 30  77% 52% 0.004 
 No 4 24  33% 48%  
 Total 21 54  100% 100%  
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Table 25 suggests that there are significant differences between independent and inside directors in 
terms of their academic qualifications, location, and previous industry experience. Inside directors 
tend to be higher qualified than internal directors. Fifty-seven per cent of the inside directors 
sampled hold postgraduate qualifications compared to 30% of independent directors. Inside 
directors also appear to have stronger international links than independent directors. Thirty-three 
per cent of internal directors surveyed are based overseas compared to 11% of independent 
directors. A possible explanation for this is that many overseas-based investors prefer to have a 
representative on the board of companies in which they hold a significant investment. Inside 
directors are also more likely to have industry experience. There does not appear to be any 
significant difference between inside and independent directors in terms of their commercial and 
professional experience or their previous board experience. This suggests that both major 
shareholders and directors place similar value on these attributes. 
Gender comparison 
As discussed in section 4.5.4 the appointment of female directors to boards is a regularly 
debated corporate governance topic. Comparing the attributes of male and female directors will 
show if boards have chosen to compromise on any of these attributes in order to recruit women 
directors. This comparison therefore provides evidence that will either support or refute the claim 
that there is a shortage of suitably qualified women (Whittaker, 2012). Table 26 compares gender 
attributes of directors. 
 
145 
 
Table 26  
 
Comparison of the expertise of male and female directors of NZSX-listed companies 
  Male Female  Male  Female  Chi Test (p) 
Academic qualifications      
 Postgraduate 20 8  34% 47% 0.346 
 Bachelor 13 4  22% 24% 0.923 
 No information 25 5  43% 29%  
 Total 58 17  100% 100%  
Commercial experience      
 CEO 33 9  57% 53% 0.059 
 GM 7 2  12% 12% 0.972 
Senior executive 17 6  29% 35% 0.638 
 No information 1 0  2% 0%  
 Total 58 17  100% 100%  
Professional experience       
 Finance 33 3  57% 18% 0.004 
 Legal 8 5  14% 29% 0.135 
 Other 17 9  29% 53%  
 Total 58 17  100% 100%  
Previous public board experience     
 Yes 21 9  36% 53% 0.216 
 No information 37 8  64% 47%  
 Total 58 17  100% 100%  
International experience      
 Yes 38 10  66% 59% 0.613 
 No information 20 7  34% 41%  
 Total 58 17  100% 100%  
Based overseas       
 Yes 10 3  17% 18% 0.969 
 No 48 14  83% 82%  
 Total 58 17  100% 100%  
Director status       
Inside 18 1  31% 6% 0.036 
Independent 40 16  69% 94%  
total 58 17  100% 100%  
 
The table shows that, overall, the women who were appointed to boards in 2013 were as qualified 
and experienced as their male counterparts. This is similar to the findings of Singh et al., (2008), 
who conducted like research in the UK. There are two areas where there is a statistically significant 
difference between the attributes of male and female directors. First, 57% of male directors have a 
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finance background, versus 18% of women directors. This is a curious finding given that women 
hold 28% of the CFO positions in NZ (Grant Thornton, 2012), so it can be reasonably assumed 
there is a large pool of prospective candidates with this experience from which directors could be 
drawn. The second area where there is a significant difference is in the appointment of independent 
directors: women comprised 30% of independent directors but only 5% of inside directors. As 
discussed previously there is evidence to suggest that CEOs and directors influence the appointment 
of independent directors (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999; Westphal & Zajac, 1995), while inside 
directors are generally nominated by one or more substantial shareholders, so this suggests a 
significant difference in the actions of these two groups. This in turn may suggest that directors and 
major shareholders have different expectations with respect to the role of women on boards.  
Discussion  
Most directors appointed in 2013 had either a finance background or were former CEOs; 
most had international experience or lived offshore; and postgraduate degrees are also common. 
Men outnumber women about four to one and almost all female directors are independent. The 
cohort also has extensive commercial experience. 
That over half the directors appointed stated that they had previously held a CEO position is 
significant. The CEO–board relationship is considered key to the overall success of the governance 
process (Kakabadse, Kakabadse & Barratt, 2006). So having board members who have previously 
served as CEOs could be considered an advantage by other directors, as not only will these board 
members be able to empathise and advise the CEO from a position of experience but, as ‘poachers 
turned game keepers’, they are well positioned to control any managerial opportunism that may 
arise (Shen, 2003). And from a shareholder perspective, having former CEOs on boards could also 
be seen as significant because many former CEOs have a public reputation linked to the companies 
they formerly managed, so they can be seen as endorsing the company’s future prospects (Fich, 
2005; Ong & Wan, 2008). 
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Forty per cent of directors surveyed stated that they had previous listed company board 
experience. From this data it is unclear if boards specifically recruit for directors with this 
experience or if previous board experience is an incidental factor in general recruitment. However, a 
compelling reason for boards to appoint directors with strong public company governance 
experience is that the costs associated with being penalised if they do not comply with some 
governance regulations is substantial. This is a significant risk for directors as both the New 
Zealand Market Disciplinary Tribunal (2013) and the Financial Markets Authority (2014) reported 
an increasing number of compliance-related cases. Of the 28 directors lacking industry experience, 
all but one has prior experience as a public company director. Given that the other attributes that 
these directors possess (such as financial market experience) are not in short supply, this is 
circumstantial evidence that directors specifically appoint directors with previous board experience.     
While the attributes discussed in this section undoubtedly influence director selection, it is 
quite probable that they are not the only criteria; and indeed other factors, such as the personal 
networks that directors bring and their relationships with existing board members, may also 
influence appointments (Stevenson & Radin, 2009).   
 
4.6 Summary 
Overall there is a trend for boards to be more independent from both management and shareholders.  
In most companies management is now represented by a single director, the CEO, and a full 75% of 
NZSX boards are controlled by independent directors. Shareholder influence is also limited because 
in many companies shareholdings are fragmented, and institutions that are usually among the 
largest shareholders are reluctant to get involved in day-to-day governance matters (Chui & Monin, 
2003). So overall many companies are operating in an environment where the traditional influence 
of shareholders and management, two of the key stakeholder groups, has declined. Boards therefore 
are less accountable and have the potential to become self-perpetuating in that board members 
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frequently appoint their successors, a trend that has been observed elsewhere (Berle & Means, 
1932; Cadbury, 2002, p. 68). While this trend may benefit the company in terms of maintaining 
company values (see 5.1.1), it also has some disadvantages, as the board can become disconnected 
from the realities of the business (NYX, 2010).  
Boards are also tending towards the best practice guidelines proposed by the OECD (2004) 
and the Securities Commission (2011), among others. However, it is important to note that these 
changes in and of themselves do not imply any particular shift in behaviour from boards. For 
example, there is an expectation that the chairman will oversee the process of hiring, firing, 
evaluating, and compensating the CEO (Jensen, 1993). Quite how effective an independent 
chairman would be in performing this function on a board that includes, say, the company’s founder 
or principle shareholder is a matter for conjecture. In addition there is no conclusive evidence to 
suggest that these factors influence overall company performance (Leblanc, 2004). Nonetheless, 
from the perspective of this research the findings are important as they are issues that can influence 
both shareholders’ and directors’ perceptions of boards.  
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5 PRELIMINARY FOCUS GROUP RESEARCH  
Before commencing detailed field research two small focus group exercises were conducted. Their 
objective was twofold: first, to ensure that the subsequent research focused on the appropriate 
issues; and second, to ensure that the subsequent research initiatives were best positioned in terms 
of the topics covered, the language used and the depth to which issues were probed. Because only 
two focus groups were conducted and because of the exploratory nature of this phase of the 
research, insufficient data was collected from which to extrapolate the findings to the broader NZX 
governance environment, nonetheless the two focus groups are sufficient to meet the objectives 
specified and to provide the contextualised insights required at this phase of the research. 
 
5.1 Focus Group Demographics 
Table 27 summarises the demographics of the two focus group participants. 
 
Table 27  
 
Focus group demographics 
 Participants Gender Experience Comments 
Director 
Focus Group 
5 All male All 25 years + All directors have board experience with multiple 
NZX-listed companies and 4 have chaired NZX10 
companies 
Shareholder 
Focus Group 
6 4 x male    
2 x female 
5–35 years The experience of the group ranged from new to 
the market and making small investments to very 
experienced and using their investments as their 
prime source of income. 
 
As discussed in section 3.5.2, an objective for the director focus group was to invite directors who 
were exceptionally well experienced and who were approaching the end of their careers to 
participate. It was considered that such directors would be more inclined to discuss issues candidly 
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than their more junior colleagues. This objective was met, as the directors who participated had all 
directed or chaired some of New Zealand’s largest firms including banks, insurance companies, 
property companies, and an airline.  An objective of the shareholder focus group was to invite 
shareholders with a broad range of experience. The shareholder focus group consisted of six 
members, five of whom were experienced shareholders with 20 or more years of experience in 
investing in NZX-listed companies. The sixth member had invested in NZX companies for five 
years. One focus group member was also a member of the Shareholders’ Association board and 
another was a high net worth individual, who stated that his primary source of income was his NZX 
share investments. Two of the focus group members were women. The focus group therefore 
achieved its demographic objective of drawing on investors with a diverse range of skills and 
experience that are broadly representative of the wider private investor population and that 
approximated the shareholder segments identified by ASX (2011) as discussed in 4.4.1. Both focus 
groups were conducted in a relaxed environment over lunch in July and August 2014. The 
following sections discuss the findings from each of the focus group.  
 
5.2 Director Focus Group 
Directors are generally reluctant to discuss the details of boardroom activity (Leblanc & Schwartz, 
2007), and so it proved with these focus group interviews. The interviewer quickly established 
rapport with the interviewees and the focus group was conducted in a congenial atmosphere with no 
shortage of discussion. However, the researcher found that maintaining control over the discussion 
and getting direct answers to probing questions proved challenging. This was attributed to the 
experience of the interviewees, who all proved to be adept at politely steering conversation away 
from potentially controversial subjects. The result was that although the three hours of interview 
and discussion provided less formal data than had been anticipated, some interesting and important 
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themes that I had not previously been considered were identified. Most significant amongst these 
themes was the importance and influence of government shareholders. 
One of the key themes that underpinned all of the discussion was that the fundamental 
approach to governance varies between companies and this makes it difficult to generalise about 
many aspects of corporate governance. For example. when considering the role of governance one 
director stated ‘there is a difference between companies that are 51% [owned] by one shareholder, 
and other companies’ (Director 1). When considering the role of shareholders another director 
considered that, ‘I have in my head the desire to treat all shareholders equally and I strictly adhere 
to that, but there are times when that changes, like in capital raisings’ (Director 2). Approaches to 
governance practices also vary as the following two examples illustrate: when considering board 
self-assessment one director noted; ‘the models that you can see, some have a lot of variation in 
them, some have peer assessment . . . but a lot of boards hate it with a passion’ (Director 3), and on 
reporting, another director stated; ‘reporting is quite variable and it’s difficult to say that an average 
company reports well or not’ (Director 4).  These differences, in both the approach to governance 
and governance practices between companies, are consistent with the views of Huse and others who 
found similar variations, which they attribute to the impact of environmental factors (Huse, 2005; 
Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). 
The focus group discussion was based around three major themes: the role of the board, the 
relationship of the board with shareholders, and the directors’ views on director qualifications and 
attributes. 
 
5.2.1 Role of the board 
There was agreement between all focus group members that the role of the board is primarily to 
focus on activities that advance the long-term interests of the company. The directors were of the 
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opinion that, to a large extent, they were the only group who had the long-term interests of the 
company at heart, given that management and most shareholders have short-term objectives. The 
following quote summarises their views on management:  
‘Executive staff are interested only in the short term and the board will decide best practice 
for the company long term’ (Director 3).  
The directors were of the opinion that analysts from institutional investors encourage this 
thinking in management.  
‘There is too much reporting going on and it interferes with shareholder relationships and 
executive pay; [too much] “short-term-ism” – they all want a good quarterly result and it 
may be terribly against the interest of the company,’ opined Director 4.   
Another said that ‘shareholders and the analysts changed executive behaviours and that’s 
what led to the GFC’ (Director 1). Maintaining this long-term perspective, the directors noted, 
brought them into conflict with both management and shareholders from time to time.  
‘Management, my colleagues, they pay homage to analysts, try to get them to talk about 
other things, they come back to analysts all the time,’ said Director 1. 
And from director 3: 
 ‘At an AGM a hand goes up and says, “Can’t you increase dividends?” And that places you 
in a difficult position when you have a 51% shareholder looking for growth who is prepared 
to forgo short-term dividends’ (Director 3). 
 As with most other points raised there was an acknowledgement that the role and priorities 
of a board can change from company to company and that over time, as the following quote 
153 
 
illustrates, ‘shareholders are important, but they may, at some stages, be a bit less important than 
customers’ (Director 1). 
The focus group directors made statements that supported a stakeholder theory rather than 
shareholder theory approach to governance as the following example illustrates:  
‘Treat your staff and customers as shareholders. If you only go after shareholder value it will 
wreck the company’ (Director 2).  
The directors all acknowledged that not all New Zealand company directors shared their 
views, and they each cited some examples of boards that were seen to have adopted a shareholder-
centric approach to governance. A strongly shareholder-centric approach to governance, the 
directors all agreed, often resulted increasing the short-term share price, albeit potentially at the cost 
of the underlying long-term value of the firm. 
The directors interviewed all consider that the role of the board includes setting and 
upholding the companies’ values, a function they consider to be absolutely fundamental to the long-
term success of the company, as the following quote illustrates:  
‘A company that values the brand and staff can actually make it, they are a company’ 
(Director 2);  
and from another director:  
‘The thing about values is you never, ever get offside with a customer, you treat them like 
one of the family, so suddenly you get productivity, you get people wanting to work for you, 
and it’s interesting.’ (Director 3).  
Recent examples of finance company failures and product recalls were cited as examples of 
boards and companies failing to adhere to their core values. This emphasis on the role of the board 
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in establishing the company culture is a feature of governance that is not identified as a primary 
responsibility of the board in any of the definitions summarised in Table 2 (p. 30).   
The financial metric that most directors considered to be the key measure of company 
progress and success was a progressive increase in dividend, rather than increases in share price or 
any accounting metric. However, this view was not universally accepted by all directors. As one 
said,  
‘If you haven’t got the cash to start with you certainly don’t want to start borrowing to pay 
dividends, so I don’t see that it comes down to those sort of discrete measures’ (Director 1) 
However, as none of the directors advocated using either traditional accounting measures or 
share price as yardsticks to measure company success their comments support the arguments 
outlined in section 2.5.1, i.e. that there is a disconnect between the measures that boards and 
academics use to measure company performance.  
 
5.2.2 The relationship of the board with shareholders 
The directors interviewed do not consider shareholders to be owners of the company in anything 
other than a legal or abstract way, as the following discussion shows: 
‘Well are they [shareholders] owners? This is a big debate.’ (Director 4) 
 ‘Well, legally they own the shares – that’s a philosophical answer.’ (Director 1) 
 ‘Thinking about who owns a company doesn’t get us very far.’ (Director 1) 
From a practical perspective the directors considered shareholders to be one of a number of 
stakeholder groups who, along with customers, employees, and debt funders, have certain rights and 
obligations that need to be satisfied while the board pursues its ultimate goal of maintaining the best 
interests of the company. The Director focus group participants’ perspective is therefore very much 
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in line with the objectives of the 1993 Companies Act. There was, however, an acknowledgement 
that the relationship between shareholders and the board is dynamic, and that it changes over time 
depending on factors such as the environment that a company is facing and the blend of 
shareholders and debt providers. For example, when considering technology start-up companies, 
which are characterised by high growth and high risk, one director suggested that ‘shareholders 
should simply be considered unsecured creditors’ (Director 2). Another director, however, was less 
dismissive of shareholders in these companies, arguing ‘priorities may shift from time to time, but I 
reckon the shareholders are important’.  
 It was apparent from the discussion that the directors interviewed do not consider all 
shareholders to be equal, and that they notionally segment shareholders into separate groups and 
adopt different strategies for interacting with each group. The groups identified were private or 
retail shareholders, institutional shareholders, government, and majority shareholders. There was 
universal agreement that on occasion the different segments will have different goals and objectives 
creating challenges for boards. This is amply illustrated by the earlier quote about shareholders 
petitioning for an increase in dividends; and, in a discussion about a company where the 
government holds the majority of the shares: ‘The retail shareholders, they really don’t count in the 
big scheme of things; you might think that they do but they don’t act on the information they are 
getting. The AGMs seem to be farcical, because [the shareholders] come along and don’t ask that 
many penetrative questions’ (Director 4).  
Capital raising is an activity where the focus group directors believe boards sometimes treat 
shareholders differently – mainly by giving preference to large or institutional shareholders. 
Favouring large shareholders in these circumstance was seen as expedient, but the practice did not 
meet with the full approval of the focus group members, mainly because of the potential to damage 
other shareholder relationships. To quote one director,  
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‘One classic was Singapore Airlines holding in Air New Zealand; historically, that’s quite a 
good case study where a particular shareholder demanded a better deal than the others were 
going to get, and that led to a lot of unease and distrust and the culture of the company really 
suffered as a consequence’ (Director 3).  
Another director commented:  
‘A company that I chaired had a deeply discounted offering to our shareholders and ninety 
per cent was taken up, the ten per cent was taken by the broker, who then exposed those 
shares, which affected the market, and I . . . feel unhappy about it. Directors get influenced 
by easy money and maybe don’t keep shareholders at the top of their minds’ (Director 1). 
 
5.2.3 Qualifications and attributes of directors 
The directors who participated in the focus group all had firm opinions regarding the overall 
composition of the board and the skills and attributes that individual directors require. When 
considering overall board composition, issues such as loyalty to the company, professionalism and 
an understanding of the legal obligations of a director were simply ‘taken as read’ and did not 
warrant discussion. The element that was considered most worthy of discussion was diversity of 
thinking and approach. To quote one director,  
‘The whole reason for having a board is to get a wide range of perspectives and then to get a 
collective view. If you didn’t need a collective view then you would only need one person’ 
(Director 1).  
A potential diversity of views was seen as an important feature of modern boards. To 
provoke a debate regarding diversity I proffered  a provocative statement:  ‘the best people to 
appoint new directors are the existing directors?’ This elicited the following responses: 
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 ‘I disagree.’ (Director 1) 
 ‘I disagree.’  (Director 3) 
 ‘I don’t agree. I don’t think that’s what it takes to get diversity, and diversity is 
something boards need; you don’t want everyone looking the same, or being from 
an accounting background . . .’ (Director 2) 
 ‘Go to a reputable searcher and give them the criteria and then get a whole lot of 
sensible recommendations. Instead of saying – oh gosh, he is a nice chap.’ 
(Director 1) 
This suggests that these directors consider diversity to be a key attribute of boards and that 
they are prepared to recruit outside of their immediate social circles in order to obtain this diversity.   
The second most important consideration was ensuring that directors actively participated in 
all board activities. To quote one director, ‘People that don’t contribute are an absolute nightmare’ 
(Director 1). The focus group directors had all sat on boards with directors who would only 
participate in discussions related to their specialist subject and all of them expressed their frustration 
with such directors. As one director stated,  
‘That’s why I emphasise diversity; I mean, if you want an expert on something, you hire 
them’ (Director 1).  
However, there wasn’t a complete consensus, as the following interchange illustrates.   
 ‘I find ex-CEOs the worst . . . they want to report on everything – a report on that and 
a report on the other thing, just taking up bloody time, and they want to manage the 
company.’ (Director 2) 
 ‘That’s right, but by the same token, having been a CEO is, I think a really helpful 
piece of background in some of this work – well, a lot of this work.’ (Director 1) 
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When considering the personal attributes of directors, emphasis was placed on general skills, 
such as being a team player, having proven experience and general commercial acumen, rather than 
on specific professional skills. It was also agreed that directors need to engage with the businesses 
they are governing and to understand them in some detail, something that they felt was lacking with 
many New Zealand directors. To quote one interviewee,  
‘I am a firm believer that with directors they need to understand the business, they can’t just 
turn up every month and sit in a helicopter unless they know what the business is all about’ 
(Director 4).   
It was agreed by all the directors that specialist directors who did not have these broad 
‘commercial’ skills did not benefit boards. As one director stated, ‘If you need specialist expertise 
you can hire it for the job in hand’ (Director 1). And from another director:  
‘If you are stuck with a director who is a lawyer or accountant they feel obliged to use their 
expert knowledge and that goes against them contributing a wider perspective’ (Director 4).  
The directors interviewed were acutely aware of their personal reputations and the value that 
these reputations bring to the companies they are associated with. Given that two of the participants 
had knighthoods, this is perhaps unsurprising; nonetheless all of the participants were of the opinion 
that the personal reputation of directors is one of the strongest influences in shaping director 
behaviour. In response to the interviewer’s question ‘What makes directors care about the 
companies they govern given that the financial incentives aren’t significant?’ one director replied: 
‘All directors value their reputation, and that’s where the care naturally comes in’ (Director 1). 
 
159 
 
5.3 Shareholder Focus Group 
The shareholder focus group session was divided into two parts: the first consisted of a series of 
prepared questions which were delivered in a semi-structured manner,  and the second involved an 
open discussion across a wide range of governance issues. The key topics discussed were: the 
importance of the board to shareholders, the relationship between the board and shareholders, and 
the qualifications and attributes of board members. It was apparent from early on in the focus group 
that some of the members had quite different expectations of boards, as can be inferred from some 
of the quotes following. 
  
5.3.1 The importance of the board to shareholders 
The focus group members were asked how important they considered the board to be, and to what 
degree the board featured in their decision to invest in particular companies. When making 
investment decisions none of the focus group members placed governance or anything related to the 
board in their top three criteria. While there were differences of opinion between focus group 
members over the criteria they use to select companies to invest in, there was unanimous agreement 
that management, financial strength, product and brand were all more important than the quality of 
the board. In fact for several focus group members the board did not feature at all in their 
investment criteria. As one said:  
‘I’m thinking about a board for the first time, which is kind of embarrassing because I’ve 
been investing in public companies for twenty years or more’ (Shareholder 1). 
 Another focus group member was equally dismissive of boards:  
‘They are not really driving the company and they are not working for the company, they 
are almost peripheral’ (Shareholder 4).  
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Others were, however, more aware of boards and their function:  
‘I want to know whether the board just meets once a month or once a quarter. I am quite 
interested in whether they have subcommittees and I am also quite interested in what the 
backgrounds are of the board members and whether their various relationships can be used 
to leverage the company that they are a board member of’ (Shareholder 3).  
 
5.3.2 The shareholder–board relationship 
The relationship that shareholders have with companies and their boards was explored. The focus 
group members approached the relationships that they have with the companies they hold shares in 
from the perspectives of either company owners, passive investors or speculators. The following 
quote is indicative of those shareholders who consider themselves company owners:   
‘I will email a company and say, I like the way you do such and such’ (Shareholder 3),  
and the following is indicative of those who consider themselves passive investors;  
‘I have no influence in a large company I buy shares in, so I can’t see myself as an owner; I 
see myself as an investor who is free to come and go. If I am an owner I am not free to come 
and go and that is a different mind-set’ (Shareholder 4).  
While the focus group members acknowledged that they primarily considered themselves to 
be either owners or passive investors, they also acknowledged that from time to time they also 
consider themselves to be speculators;  
‘She made quite a lot of money on these . . . shares [but] didn’t even know what the name of 
the company was, [she was] just doing day trading’ (Shareholder 4). 
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There was acknowledgement that shareholders sometimes change their strategy from 
company to company – for example, a shareholder may consider themselves as an owner of one 
company but as a speculator in another – and it is possible their expectations of company boards 
may change as a result.  
None of the shareholders interviewed appeared to have a clear expectations regarding the 
role of the board is, as the following quotes illustrate. 
‘The expectation is that the directors must work in the interests of company; it’s just a 
conflict of interest that shareholders can hire and fire them’ (Shareholder 5). 
‘They have a sort of oversight role and I can imagine it being almost peripheral to the 
company because how you really control a company is by [appointing] somebody to run the 
company’ (Shareholder 3). 
‘I want to think that your board are thinking into the future and I am not convinced that they 
are’ (Shareholder 6). 
‘Do you actually need a board? Never actually having thought much about them . . . I was 
thinking . . . are they just a sort of a thing that exists through some kind of inertia and that 
you have to have a board but they don’t actually do very much, and how about we just get 
rid of boards?’ (Shareholder 1) 
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The focus group members’ responses show that they do not consider the board to be a core 
function essential to the operation of the company. For example, they did not raise the issue of the 
role of the board in strategy formation; their consensus was that the CEO and management ‘drive’ 
the company, as the following quotes illustrate: 
 ‘The value creation side is in management’(Shareholder 4). 
‘Management of the company matters, in my mind; I don’t actually pay a lot of attention to 
the board’ (Shareholder 2). 
‘These directors, they get their $50,000 for attending a few meetings, they’re not really 
driving the company, and they are not working for the company’ (Shareholder 3).   
The role of the board in capital raising led to a debate regarding the role of directors in the 
recent finance company failures. The focus group members all attributed these finance company 
failures to failure of governance rather than of management:  
‘With the finance companies, the directors . . . forgot that they actually represented investors 
– they went off into their own little bubble (Shareholder 1).’  
was a typical comment. It was apparent from the discussion that the focus group 
shareholders consider that the success of the company can be attributed to the CEO and the 
management team, but any failure is the responsibility of the board. This view is consistent with 
that of the directors interviewed, one of whom stated, 
‘Shareholders don’t worry about boards until something goes wrong and then when it does 
[go wrong] these days they look to the board to blame and to sue’ (Director 1). 
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5.3.3 Qualifications and attributes of directors 
When considering the qualifications and attributes of directors, focus group members placed 
importance on the public profile of the directors, the number of boards they sit on, gender diversity, 
and the depth of their personal networks. Academic and professional qualifications were not 
discussed.  
Opinions were divided regarding the value that high profile directors bring to boards, as 
these quotes illustrate: 
‘Follow the investors [i.e. directors] is absolutely valid; if you want to coat-tail on what he is 
doing then that is fine.’ (Shareholder 4). 
 
NZ [is] such a small country, you can select the people that you have something against but 
I, I generally don’t, it’s not a criterion for me, I am more of a quantitative analysis 
person.’(Shareholder 5). 
‘I think there [are a few] old school people running around and the way that people do 
business has moved; a lot of these people are still stuck in the eighties and the nineties’ 
(Shareholder 6). 
 
There was similar disagreement over the merits of directors sitting on multiple boards. Some argued 
that this was beneficial in that ‘New Zealand is a small country and we need to spread it around’, 
and others argued that those directors who sit on multiple boards spread themselves too thinly: 
‘There are some people like [name], who is on every single board, and . . . I have said, well I 
am not buying that because how can you possibly be on the board of twenty different 
companies?’ (Shareholder 3) 
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Diversity was considered an important issue. However, for most of the focus group 
members the term appeared to be shorthand for ‘gender diversity’, as this was the only form of 
diversity discussed.  
‘The arguments used for women on the boards is they have such different networks and such 
a different way of looking at things that you actually bring something very different to the 
board, which may at times be unpleasant because it makes you think in another way’ 
(Shareholder 5).  
‘If you read all the research that has been done about [women on boards], the benefit is 
much better-performing boards. And it was something like 11% – it was definitely 
significant, and . . . measured by dollars and cents’ (Shareholder 3) 
During this conversation, body language changed (arms were crossed) and the tone of 
conversation became more formal. It quickly became apparent that this was a controversial and 
divisive subject that generated a strong emotional response from some focus group members, so the 
topic was dropped.  
The value of directors’ personal networks were considered, with some focus group members 
seeing these as a potential source of business and a competitive advantage for the company. Others 
were less confident, believing that directors simply networked between themselves and were not 
especially ‘in touch’ with customers or suppliers. The following quotes are indicative of the views 
expressed: 
 ‘Networks are quite important often in business and I think a board can play a role in 
facilitating business’ (Shareholder 6). 
 ‘Using networks is pertinent and it’s one of the things that I would hope that the board 
would bring to the table, individual directors would bring to the table’ (Shareholder 4). 
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 ‘These directors all belong to a similar network, not lots of networks,’ (Shareholder 6).  
‘At the annual meeting last year we were saying goodbye to the other director and he said 
they lived next door to each other, well come on, where is the breadth of networks?’ 
(Shareholder 3). 
Independence was not an attribute that was specifically raised by any of the focus group 
members. They did, however, categorise directors as either good or bad, and the following quote 
went unchallenged: ‘the media, show us the baddies but the baddies we know, people like [name] 
did not read his papers [and so] he shouldn’t be a director.’  
Some of the focus group members were concerned about the role of institutional investors, 
who they viewed as breaking the communication between boards and shareholders, to the detriment 
of individual shareholders. The following quote sums up the sentiment:  
‘There is a cold hand going through the market over the last couple of decades, it’s because 
we have seen the growth of the institutional investor. If you step through a fund manager and 
then you step down to someone who is invested in funds, you have got a breakage in the line 
of communication.’(Shareholder 4).  
Not all focus group members shared this view and some stated that they had not previously 
considered the role of institutional investors in the market. 
 
5.4 Summary 
The focus group research achieved its objective of identifying key issues that likely influence 
directors and shareholders expectations of governance and providing direction for the positioning of 
the subsequent research. Specifically the research provides an indication of: the overall 
understanding that experienced shareholders and directors have of corporate governance, how they 
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approach the subject, the issues that they consider to be most important and topical, and the areas 
where differences in expectations may exist between shareholders and directors. 
The results further suggest that directors and shareholders have quite different opinions on 
the role of corporate governance in general and they also appear to have different expectations of 
both boards and directors. The directors interviewed all considered that their role involves focusing 
on strategic issues and ensuring the long-term positioning of the company, and is central to its 
overall success. These views are broadly consistent with previous NZ research in this area 
(Northcott & Smith, 2011; Ingley & Van der Walt, 2005). The shareholder focus group members, 
on the other hand, all consider that boards are largely peripheral to the success of the company and 
that their role is primarily to ensure that the CEO and management stay on target. Both groups agree 
that in the event of a corporate failure board members will be called to account.  
The directors interviewed exhibited views and opinions that were broadly consistent with a 
stakeholder-centric approach to governance. For example, they were unequivocal in their view that 
the role of the board was primarily to look after the interests of the company (and by implication all 
stakeholders) rather than just the interests of shareholders, although they also acknowledged that not 
all NZ directors share their views. The shareholders were less definitive in their views and opinions, 
and appeared to fluctuate between holding a shareholder-centric view of governance and a 
stakeholder-centric view depending on the issue being discussed. While most of the shareholders 
stated that they believed the primary role of the board was to represent shareholders, there was also 
a pragmatic acceptance that this did not always occur and that on occasion directors prioritised the 
needs of other parties (such as their own).  
There was no discussion in either focus group which suggested a real or implied 
principle/agent arrangement between shareholders and directors that is required as a prerequisite for 
the application of agency theory. For example, the shareholders’ relationship with boards was 
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portrayed as largely passive and reactive, which is not consistent with the behaviours expected of a 
principal in a principal–agent relationship. Rather than considering the board to be their agent, 
shareholders for the most part appeared to view it as though it is an appendage to the body of the 
company with a somewhat unclear role. This perspective does not appear to easily reconcile with 
any of the governance theories outlined in section 2.3. 
Both directors and shareholders hold clear views on who should be appointed to boards.  
Given the different relationships that directors and shareholders have with boards, it was to be 
expected that the two groups would value different attributes, and this proved to be the case. 
Directors, who must work with each other, understandably value attributes such as teamwork and 
individual participation, and because most board activity is not visible to shareholders these are not 
attributes that shareholders would naturally consider. For their part, shareholders focused on the 
public profile of directors and the issue of diversity within the board. Diversity is in fact an 
important consideration for both shareholders and directors. The directors defined it as ‘diversity of 
thought’ and considered this to be an important attribute that could be achieved by appointing 
directors from differing backgrounds and different experience outside the existing directors’ social 
circles. The shareholders interviewed were more inclined to consider diversity from a purely gender 
perspective.   
The directors interviewed acknowledged that they treat some groups of shareholders 
differently, large shareholders can receive preferential treatment over small shareholders in capital 
raisings for example. Directors and some shareholders appeared to be concerned about the role of 
institutional shareholders and their potential influence on companies which may lead to this group 
of shareholders receiving different treatment from boards. The directors were concerned, too, about 
the influence of analysts; in particular they felt analysts encouraged management to focus on short-
term objectives and the company share prices, possibly to the long-term detriment of the company.  
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Some shareholders were concerned that institutional investors acted as a barrier between 
shareholders and the companies in which they were investing.  
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6  ANALYSIS OF ANNUAL SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING MINUTES 
Once a year directors are required by law to hold an annual shareholder meeting (ASM) to discuss 
the affairs of the company (Companies Act 1993, section 120). It is the only time the board is 
legally obliged to meet shareholders. These meetings have been a feature of public companies since 
their inception (Joint Stock Companies Act Schedule A, 1844). At ASMs directors are appointed, 
annual reports are tabled and directors are authorised to appoint auditors and set their remuneration.  
The meetings are also used by the board to report to shareholders on the company’s performance, 
outline their future plans and gain approval from shareholders on various matters. For most 
shareholders these meetings are also the only opportunity they have to directly engage with their 
board. Because shareholders are the only stakeholder group with a legal right to participate in 
ASMs, they are therefore the only group with a guaranteed opportunity to express its views directly 
to the board. This places them in a unique position relative to other stakeholders as it is likely that 
the feedback that the board receives at these meetings can somewhat influence director behaviour.  
Analysing the minutes of these meetings, and in particular the questions raised by 
shareholders, therefore provides unique insights into not only the concerns and motivations of 
shareholders but also the relationship between the board and shareholders. While the analysis of 
company annual reports has been previously conducted (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999), to the best of the 
author’s knowledge no analysis of ASM minutes has previously been published in New Zealand. 
Although the meetings themselves are for the most part public and it is not uncommon for the press 
and members of the Shareholders’ Association to be in attendance, some companies were very 
reluctant to disclose their minutes. This is entirely within their rights, as there is no legal obligation 
for companies to disclose the minutes of these meetings to anyone other than shareholders. 
However, given that the NZX’s continuous disclosure requirements obligate companies to disclose 
anything of a material nature (NZX, 2013, section 10), the minutes themselves cannot contain 
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confidential information that is material to the company share price, so it is difficult to understand 
the desire to keep these minutes confidential. 
 
6.1 Responses 
As discussed in 3.5.3 a written request was sent to the company secretaries of all 112 listed 
companies for copies of the minutes from their last three ASMs. While a few companies publish 
their ASM minutes on their websites many companies would only release their minutes after a 
lengthy dialogue over precisely how the information would be used and after verifying the 
researcher’s credentials. Even after these discussions five companies simply refused to release their 
minutes. Table 28 summarises company responses. 
 
Table 28  
 
Summary of responses to ASM minutes survey 
  Companies Share  
Provided minutes 30 27% 
Declined to participate 5 4% 
No response received 77 69% 
Total 112 100% 
 
To determine if the companies who provided their minutes were indicative of the overall market 
some comparisons were made between the companies who responded and a reference sample of 30 
companies that was selected from the companies discussed in section 3.4.2. Table 29 summarises 
the attributes that were compared and the results of this comparison.  
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Table 29  
 
ASM minutes survey respondents compared to a reference sample of companies 
  
  
Survey 
respondents 
Reference 
sample  
T-test (p) 
Board size    
Number of respondents 30 112  
Average board size 6.0 6.6 1.718 
Number of shareholders    
Number of respondents 29 40  
Average shareholders 14,768 10,971 0.157 
Market capitalisation    
Number of respondents 30 112  
Average market cap. $277M $229M 1.5338 
Size of largest shareholding   
 
 
 
< 10% 8 10 0.875 
>10%,
<20% 13 17 0.944 
>20% 10 13 0.824 
 
This table shows that no statistically significant differences exist (at a 5% threshold) between the 
survey respondents and those of the reference sample with respect to the size of their company 
boards, their market capitalisation and the size of their largest shareholder; this suggests that the 
data received from the respondents is likely to be indicative of the market as a whole.  
From these minutes, details of the results of the votes cast and questions asked by 
shareholders have been analysed. Voting has been summarised by the originator of the resolution 
(shareholder or board), the outcome (successful or unsuccessful) and, in the cases where the details 
                                                 
8 Note: Market capitalisation data has been normalised using a natural logarithmic scale. 
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of the votes cast were published, the percentage of votes for and against. Questions asked by 
shareholders have been grouped by topic and summarised.   
The 30 companies that responded contributed a total of 65 sets of minutes for meetings held 
between 2010 and 2013.   
Based on the shareholder attendance figures published in the ASM minutes, attendance 
levels at the ASMs analysed was less than 4% of the total shareholders. Given that the average 
shareholding is valued at approximately $5,300 (4.3.1), this finding supports Berle and Means’ 
(1932) observations regarding the rational of shareholder apathy: it may not be an effective use of 
shareholders’ time to attend such meetings. 
 
6.2 Resolutions Tabled at ASMs 
A summary of the resolutions proposed at these 65 ASMs shows that: 
 All resolutions proposed by the board were passed. Voting was either by a show of hands or 
by a poll. Where a poll was called, all board-proposed resolutions were passed with a 
majority of at least 86% of the votes cast. 
 All resolutions proposed by shareholders failed. There were just four resolutions proposed 
by shareholders and all four were for the nomination of directors. 
 All directors nominated by the board were appointed. In most cases these directors were 
elected by a simple show of hands. In 18 cases, however, a poll was conducted and the 
results published; in these cases the directors were typically elected with a majority in 
excess of 99%, with the lowest majority being 96.2%.   
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 Share options or other equity incentive schemes for CEOs are the most controversial 
resolutions. Although all such resolutions put at these ASMs were passed, when polls were 
taken and the results published, the votes in favour dropped to as low as 86%. 
 Resolutions concerning the appointment of auditors and setting their remuneration were 
always approved and there was no instance of an auditor being challenged or their 
reappointment. 
These findings show that directors are firmly in control of the proceedings, given that, 
regardless of the discussion, their position on issues was always adopted. This suggests that 
shareholders who strongly dissent may simply sell their shares and exit the company ahead of 
ASMs as suggested by Thompson, Edelman & Paul ( 2009) . 
 
6.3 Shareholder Questions 
The questions raised by shareholders at ASMs and recorded in the minutes were analysed to 
identify common themes and issues. The level of detail recorded in the minutes varied considerably 
from company to company. Five companies (who collectively contributed 10 sets of minutes) have 
adopted a practice of not recording shareholders’ questions in their minutes. This practice is 
acceptable as neither the Companies Act nor the NZX has any specific requirements regarding the 
level of detail that should be recorded in the minutes. Furthermore, there is no record in any of the 
minutes of any shareholder challenging this practice, so it seems likely that both directors and 
shareholders accept it. A review of those companies did not find any common theme either within 
their annual reports or in the media that would explain such a practice, so it may simply be 
company policy or a practice that has become established over time. At a further five ASMs no 
questions were raised – again for no obvious reason.  
174 
 
Research on ASMs is sparse (Catasús & Johed, 2007) and the author is unaware of any other 
research that has analysed questions asked at ASMs so it was necessary to develop a classification 
scheme. This was achieved by multiple readings of the minutes and determining logical categories 
from the content itself.  Full readings of the minutes were necessary because the context in which 
questions were asked sometimes influenced the category to which the questions were assigned. The 
50 sets of minutes where shareholders’ questions were recorded contained a total of 309 questions. 
Once analysed the questions were grouped into twelve categories. Figure 9 summarises these 
results. 
Figure 9  
 
Summary of questions asked at ASMs 
 
A definition of each of the categories follows: 
1. Strategy: questions relating to the companies’ underlying business model and potential 
changes to it. Questions about potential acquisitions and divestments and the degree of 
focus on the core business operations are included in this category.  
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Strategy
Reporting
Risk
Operations
Remuneration
Other
Historic performance
Director nominations
Future performance
Dividend
Commercial environment
Board diversity
Number of questions
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2. Reporting: questions arising from information presented in the annual report or other 
company communications. The majority of these questions concerned clarifying 
information presented in the financial section of the annual reports. 
 
3. Risk: factors external to the company that may affect future earnings, such as earthquakes 
or exchange rate variations. Many of these questions were centred on earthquake 
preparedness. 
 
4. Operations: any issues around the day-to-day performance and operation of the company, 
including production, sales, marketing and quality. Some of these questions were couched 
in financial terms, such as ‘why are admin expenses rising faster than sales?’, while other 
questions focused on a specific aspect of the business, such as ‘what is the real benefit of 
the new logo?’  
 
5. Historic performance: these were questions requiring explanations for the company’s 
overall historic performance or explanations for specific actions that the company has 
taken. Common themes included shareholders requesting an explanation for a decline in 
their company’s share price, and questions surrounding the performance of specific assets 
or individual business units. 
 
6. Commercial environment: the general economic environment and the overall performance 
of the industry sector and markets in which the company operates. 
 
7. Director nominations: questions relating to the backgrounds of board nominees, and 
questions around the director nomination process. 
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8. Remuneration: these questions focused on director, CEO and senior executive 
remuneration; no questions were asked relating to general employee remuneration levels. 
Shareholders appear very keen to link director and executive remuneration to either share 
performance or overall company performance, and when a company’s performance was 
poor, shareholders frequently raised objections to proposed increases in directors’ fees. 
Shareholders also frequently questioned payments made to directors other than their 
standard director’s fees. 
 
9. Board diversity: these questions related to the appointment of women to either the board 
or senior executive positions. 
 
10. Future performance: these questions related to the expected future performance of the 
company or the share price.  
 
11. Dividend: questions around either the sustainability of the current dividend policy or the 
likelihood that the dividend will be increased. 
 
12. Other: this category covers miscellaneous questions on a wide range of topics, including 
meeting process issues, the intentions of other shareholders, and oddities such as ‘should we 
erect a memorial to Sir Keith Park?’ 
 
6.4 Summary 
ASMs are intended to have three principal functions, informing shareholders about financial 
performance, gaining consent for certain decisions outside of management discretion and acting as a 
forum for discussion between shareholders and the board (Strätling, 2003). The analysis of these 
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minutes suggests that most ASMs, superficially at least, meet these objectives.  However the low 
shareholder participation and the lack of probing questions asked at these meetings also point to the 
ritual nature of these meetings that has been noted by Catasús and Johed (2006) and others.  
The minutes show that boards are firmly in control and that directors consider it their 
responsibility to inform shareholders rather than seek direction from them; shareholders, for their 
part, are generally content. That the board is firmly in control is reinforced by the finding that all 
resolutions proposed by the board were passed with substantial majorities, and the question 
analysis, which showed that very few hostile questions were raised at any meeting – even at the 
meetings of companies that were underperforming and were probably not meeting most 
shareholders’ expectations. The overall impression of contentment among shareholders may be 
attributed to two factors. Firstly, small investors who are unhappy with the performance of either 
the company or the directors may have simply followed the ‘Wall Street rule’ (Thompson, Edelman 
& Paul, 2009) and sold their shares ahead of the ASM; and secondly, an accord on any 
controversial issues is most likely reached between the board and major shareholders before the 
meeting agenda is set (Chiu & Monin, 2003; Strätling 2003). These agreements are probably made 
because it is not in the interests of major shareholders or directors for influential shareholders to 
express negative opinions regarding the company in public. Such comments have the potential to 
adversely affect the share price.  
A close relationship between major shareholders and the board can also be inferred from the 
director nomination process. In the minutes of the meetings analysed, all of the non-executive inside 
directors nominated by boards were appointed. These directors, by definition, have an association 
with a substantial shareholder, so it is reasonable to conclude that some dialogue occurred between 
these shareholders and the board before the nominations were made. Independent directors 
nominated by the board were also appointed, and conversely all shareholder-nominated directors 
were rejected. This suggests that boards have a strong influence over the appointment process and 
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lends support to the observation that boards can become self-perpetuating, in that existing directors 
appoint their successors (Cadbury, 2002). 
What is also apparent from these minutes is that there is no evidence to suggest that 
shareholders are interested in anything other than the financial aspects of their investment. For 
example, no questions were asked regarding issues such as corporate social responsibility, company 
environmental policies, employee welfare, the company’s role in the wider community, or triple 
bottom lines – topics which all feature in the corporate governance literature. Whether this is truly 
indicative of shareholder sentiment is open to conjecture, as it is possible that given the limited time 
available for questions and the formality of the proceedings shareholders may feel obliged to restrict 
their questions to issues related to the economic performance of the company.   
The area that is most likely to generate negative comments from shareholders is executive 
and director remuneration and incentive payments, even though in most cases the dollar amounts 
involved were quite small relative to the profits generated by the companies concerned. The 
following quote recorded in a company’s ASM minutes is indicative of shareholder sentiment 
‘[name] stated that he supported the resolution and looked forward to an increase in dividends of the 
same proportion as the increase in directors’ fees.’ Although resolutions regarding remuneration 
were all passed, in the cases where polls were taken the majorities were always lower than for any 
of the other resolutions passed.  
For the most part the questions raised by shareholders appear considered and demonstrate a 
reasonable degree of understanding of the company, with the exception being companies with a 
mass-market retail aspect to their business: in these cases a number of questions are raised that 
would be more appropriately directed at a store manager.   
Communications with shareholders is considered to be one of the key functions of the board 
(OECD, 2004; Higgs, 2003). These minutes suggest that those shareholders who attend ASMs are 
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generally happy with the quality of the communication that they receive from the company via the 
ASM and annual reports, although one in five of the questions raised were around reporting. In the 
majority of cases these questions touched on financial matters and could have been answered by a 
close reading of the company’s annual report.  
One stream of corporate governance literature (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Nicholson & Kiel, 
2007; Aguilera, 2005) considers that the role of the board includes setting the direction of the 
company, controlling management, and reporting to shareholders; analysis of these minutes 
suggests that boards perform all of these functions. That all resolutions regarding executive 
remuneration were passed with substantial majorities suggests that NZ boards do exert a reasonable 
level of control over management. A critical reading of chairmans’ speeches that were included 
within the ASM minutes demonstrated that these chairmen (or whoever wrote their speeches) have 
a good understanding of their company’s strategy and direction. However, this analysis did not give 
insights into how companies develop their strategy or the role of the board in this process.   
Agency theory considers that the primary role of the board is to control management on 
behalf of the shareholders. While the minutes indicate that the boards do exert some control over 
management, they do not per se provide firm evidence to support the assumption that the board is 
working on behalf of shareholders. While an argument could be made that the high level of 
acceptance of all of the resolutions proposed by the boards suggests that boards are working on 
behalf of shareholders, other equally plausible explanations for this outcome could be made, such as 
Berle and Means’ shareholder rational apathy argument (1932, p. 74). In this respect it should also 
be noted that shareholder-proposed resolutions were rejected, while all of those proposed by the 
board were passed with very substantial majorities. The analysis does not provide any information 
that suggests that either directors or shareholders favour stakeholder theory or shareholder theory. 
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In summary, this analysis of company ASM minutes suggests that companies are meeting 
both their obligations to shareholders as required under the 1993 Companies Act and, in general 
they are also meeting shareholder expectations. Where they are not meeting shareholder 
expectations the problems are confined to specific company-related issues and are not indicative of 
systemic problems with governance. The minutes suggest that directors have an expectation that 
they control the firm and that their task is to inform shareholders, not to receive guidance and 
direction from them. The analysis therefore calls into question one of the fundamental assumptions 
underpinning agency theory, specifically that directors are agents for shareholders. The significant 
apparent influence that directors have over the appointment of new directors is apparent from the 
review of directors appointment resolutions. This finding lends support to Cadbury’s (2002) 
observation that boards can become self-perpetuating. Overall the analysis of the ASM minutes has 
supported many of the comments from the shareholders and directors focus groups. So ASMs, 
appear to be a mechanism which reinforces rather than defines directors’, and shareholders’, 
expectations of boards.  
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7  DIRECTOR AND SHAREHOLDER SURVEY 
This chapter discusses the results of the two postal surveys that were conducted, one with directors 
and the other with private shareholders. The objective was to obtain a broad cross-section of these 
stakeholder groups’ views and expectations of NZX-listed company boards. Surveys were selected 
as the mechanism to collect the data because they have the advantage of being able to obtain the 
opinions of a large segment of the population in a consistent and structured manner (O’Leary, 
2010). Data were collected on the profiles of shareholders and directors, their opinions of each 
other, and their views regarding the roles and responsibilities of the board.  
A comprehensive survey of a sample of all New Zealand directors was conducted by Van 
der Walt and Ingley (2005) in 2003. That survey investigated the tasks that a board should perform, 
the board’s influence on corporate activity, and the perceived competence of non-executive 
directors. This survey revisits some of these themes to obtain a more up-to-date view of directors’ 
opinions and attitudes and extends the research in some important new directions. Specifically it 
examines the views and opinions of shareholders, and it investigates how expectations of the board 
change in response to a change in the environment.   
The chapter firstly examines the survey responses and shareholder and director 
demographics. The opinions that directors and shareholders hold of their opposite party are then 
outlined and this is followed by an examination of both shareholders and directors opinions 
regarding key aspects of corporate governance. This includes their expectations regarding: the role 
of the board; board activity, board shareholder communication, and board composition.  
7.1 Survey Responses 
The survey was conducted over a two-month period from June 2014. Table 30 shows the size of the 
surveys and the responses. 
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Table 30  
 
Written survey responses 
 Director Shareholder 
Number of surveys sent out 400 1083 
Less  
Returned to sender or not filled in 11 35 
Net sent out 389 1049 
Surveys returned and analysed 130 374 
Surveys returned after analysis 12 8 
   
Response rate 37% 36% 
 
To encourage directors to respond, any questions that might identify respondents were excluded 
from the questionnaire. This approach may have contributed to the high (37%) response rate, which 
compares favourably to the 17% that was achieved in the 2003 director survey (Ingley & Van der 
Walt, 2005).   
 
7.2 Shareholder Demographics 
Some basic demographic data were collected on shareholders in order to gain insights into their 
approach to the share market and their experience investing in NZX-listed companies, as these 
factors were considered likely to influence their expectations of boards. The areas investigated 
were: years investing in NZX shares, investment approach and strategy, and size of portfolio.  
 
7.2.1 Shareholder investment experience 
Shareholders were asked to disclose the number of years they have invested in the NZ share market; 
Table 31 summarises their responses. 
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Table 31  
 
Number of years that shareholders have invested in NZX shares 
Years 1–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 41–50 50+ 
Shareholders 52 89 93 64 56 17 
Percentage  14% 24% 25% 17% 15% 5% 
 
Total responses: 371. 
 
The average time that respondents have invested in the share market is 28.8 years. As the table 
shows, a number of investors have participated in the market for over 50 years. One respondent 
noted that he had spent a pleasant couple of hours answering the survey together with his 
shareholding father, who is 100. While centenarians were clearly the exception, this profile does 
suggest that investors who invest directly in shares tend to be older people, many of whom have 
likely retired from full-time employment. This suggests that they may have more time, and 
incentive (due to their greater dependence on passive income), to devote to their investments and 
potentially to the affairs of the businesses that they own shares in, should they so choose.   
 
7.2.2 Approach to share market  
Shareholders were asked to assess their investment approach on a scale that was broadly in line with 
the behavioural categorisations used by the ASX in their analysis of Australian retail shareholders 
(ASX, 2011). The results are summarised in Table 32. 
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Table 32  
 
Shareholder investment approach 
 Responses Percentage 
I don’t take the share market too seriously – I invest 
occasionally and for fun. 9 2% 
I am not experienced, I rely on brokers or other experts to 
select almost all my shares for me. 41 11% 
I am reasonably knowledgeable and I often rely on advice 
from brokers or other experts. 245 67% 
I know what I am doing and I buy and sell shares regularly. 73 20% 
Total 368 100% 
 
 
In addition, the survey results do not show any significant correlation between years investing and 
investment approach (Pearson’s r = 0.02). This suggests that shareholders do not necessarily start 
by having a ‘dabble’ and then progress to using a broker, and then on to making their own 
investment decisions. It also highlights the influence that institutions have with private investors, as 
67% of investors surveyed state that they often rely on the advice of brokers or other experts. 
 
7.2.3 Investment strategy 
The possibility that a shareholder’s investment strategy influences their approach to governance and 
their expectations of boards was considered. For example, it was postulated that investors who plan 
to hold shares for a long period of time may be more inclined to participate in the governance 
process than shareholders who trade shares frequently and hold them for only a short period. Table 
33 shows the investment intentions of shareholders surveyed. 
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Table 33  
 
Shareholder investment intentions 
 Responses Share 
To hold shares less than a year 5 1% 
Own shares more than a year 308 83% 
No set plan 59 16% 
Totals 372 100% 
 
Table 33 shows that only 1% of the shareholders responding claimed to adopt short-term trading 
strategies, limiting the inferences that can be made regarding their participation in the governance 
process.  
 
7.2.4 Portfolio size 
The number of companies in which an investor holds shares may be a significant metric when 
considering shareholder expectations of boards. This is because the larger the portfolio, the less 
time the shareholder is likely to have to devote to the affairs of each company. Table 34 summarises 
the number of individual company shares that the respondents reported holding in their portfolio.  
 
Table 34  
 
Number of companies in a shareholder’s portfolio 
Companies 1–10 11–20 21–30 31–40 40+ 
Investors 94 164 68 30 11 
Share 26% 45% 19% 8% 3% 
 
Total responses: 371. 
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The average number of companies in which respondents held shares is 19. Given that the average 
share portfolio is valued at $100,000 (4.4.1), this implies that the average value of a shareholding in 
an individual company is around $5,300 – a small percentage of most investors’ total net worth. If 
shareholders are to participate in the governance process and exercise their votes in a thoughtful 
manner, then a certain amount of research into the affairs of the company will be required on the 
‘shareholders’ part’. It is possible therefore that the large number of companies that many 
shareholders invest in, and the small value of the average shareholding, contribute jointly to the 
relatively low turnout at most ASMs and the low participation in governance matters generally. As 
stated earlier, it may simply not be an economically attractive use of many shareholders’ time. This 
may therefore influence their expectations of boards and also lead to rational apathy. Given that 
most investors do not actively participate in the governance process, many presumably rely on 
major shareholders and institutions to participate in the governance process on their behalf, a tactic 
sometimes referred to as freeloading (Rock, 1990).   
An analysis of trading volumes of all NZSX companies in August 2013 showed that the 
average length of time a share was held was 39 days.9 This is in sharp contrast to the findings of this 
research, which suggests that most individual shareholders plan to hold their shares for a year or 
longer. It implies that the majority of the trading is not initiated by individual shareholders but 
rather can most likely be attributed to algorithmic trading by institutional investors. This is 
potentially a significant difference in behaviour between institutional and individual investors, and 
has the potential to influence their attitudes to governance. 
                                                 
9 Trading volumes for each company were provided by NZX. Average holding time was derived by dividing shares 
issues by volume traded. 
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7.3 Director Demographics 
Directors were asked how long they had been a director of an NZX-listed company. Table 35 
summarises the responses. 
 
Table 35 
 
Years employed as an NZX-listed company director 
Years 1–5 6–10 11–15 16–20 21–25 25+ 
Directors 36 38 18 23 4 8 
Share 28% 30% 14% 18% 3% 6% 
 
Total responses: 127. 
 
Of those directors who responded to the survey, the average time they had served on an NZX 
company board was 11.4 years. Given that the average NZX director has sat on his/her current 
board for 6.0 years (Table 18 p.133), this suggests that many directors have careers that span 
multiple companies. It also shows that on average the directors who responded to the survey are 
very experienced. 
 
7.4 Directors and Shareholders’ Opinions of Each Other 
In order to develop an insight into the overall relationship between shareholders and boards, both 
directors and shareholders were asked a series of questions regarding their opinions of each other.  
Shareholders were asked to rate overall board performance and directors’ behaviour when a 
company is in crisis, and to share their views on director remuneration. Directors were asked if 
shareholders’ expectations of returns from their NZX investments were reasonable. 
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7.4.1 Shareholders’ views of boards 
Shareholders were asked how they viewed the overall performance of NZX-listed company boards 
in general; their responses are summarised in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10  
 
Shareholders’ view of board performance 
 
Total responses: 372. 
 
Figure 10 shows that overall shareholders think that boards perform well. Although shareholders are 
generally happy with board performance, 10% of those who responded indicated that they did not 
know if boards performed well; some of these respondents noted that the variability between 
boards’ performance made it impossible to generalise across the entire market. 
 
7.4.2 Shareholders’ view of directors’ performance in crisis 
Shareholders were also asked about director behaviour when a company is in financial crisis; table 
36 shows the results. 
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Table 36  
 
Shareholder opinions regarding director behaviour during a financial crisis 
When a company is in financial crisis whose interests 
do directors put first? 
Their own 95 27% 
The company’s 148 43% 
All shareholders 62 18% 
Institutional shareholders 19 5% 
Employees 4 1% 
Other 4 1% 
Don’t know 14 4% 
Total 346 100% 
 
 
Fewer than half (43%) of shareholder respondents considered that the board would follow the 
Companies Act (1993) and place the company’s interests first. Over one-quarter of shareholders 
surveyed believed that in time of financial crisis, directors put their own interests above those of the 
company and shareholders. Many shareholders are clearly not happy with this situation and the 
following quote from one survey respondent sums up this sentiment: ‘Board members should be 
held accountable in failing companies. Feltex directors, etc., get a cosy life as if nothing had 
happened. They should be stripped of all their assets – even those in their wives’ names.’ Other 
shareholders are more pragmatic: as another survey respondent observed, ‘some go up, some go 
down, some directors are untruthful, and that’s business’. A further 5% consider that institutional 
shareholders’ interests will be placed to the fore. This, together with the 27% of shareholders who 
consider that directors will place their own interests first, suggests a high degree of cynicism 
amongst the shareholder respondents. Only 18% of respondents considered that the company would 
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put shareholders’ interests first – this suggests that most respondents don’t expect boards to act in a 
shareholder-centric way and it calls into question the applicability of some of the definitions of 
corporate governance in the New Zealand environment. For example, it is difficult to reconcile this 
finding with Armstrong, Guay and Weber’s definition of corporate governance as ‘the subset of a 
firm’s contracts that help align the actions and choices of managers with the interests of 
shareholders’ (2010, p. 181), or with the view of Shleifer and Vishny (1996), Monks (2001) and 
Macey (2008) that the primary board responsibility is to be the shareholders’ advocate. 
 
7.4.3 Directors’ views of shareholders 
Directors were asked if, in their opinion, NZX-listed companies delivered fair risk-adjusted returns. 
They were also asked if they considered that shareholders’ expectations of returns from NZX-listed 
companies were realistic. Comparing the answers to these two questions gives an indication of how 
demanding directors believe shareholders are. Figure 11 summarises their responses. 
Figure 11  
 
Director expectations of company performance 
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Figure 11 shows that the directors surveyed believe their expectations of company performance 
closely aligns with shareholders’ expectations. Eighty-seven per cent of directors surveyed believe 
that NZX company financial returns meet or exceed expectations. These directors are also of the 
opinion that these returns meet or exceed 91% of shareholders’ expectations. A single-factor 
ANOVA confirms that the difference between directors’ expectations of company performance and 
what they believe shareholders expect is not significant (p = 0.263). The chart therefore suggests 
that in general, directors believe most companies deliver adequate financial performance and this is 
what shareholders expect.  
Some have argued that it is pressure from shareholders to produce ever-increasing returns 
that has encouraged many overseas boards to adopt short-term shareholder value maximisation 
strategies and arguably to adopt a culture of excessive risk taking (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; 
Gamble & Kelly, 2001). This finding suggests that NZ directors believe that they are meeting 
shareholders’ expectations, which suggests that NZ directors are not subject to the same shareholder 
pressure as many of their counterparts in the US and the UK. This is potentially a significant 
difference between New Zealand shareholders’ and directors’ expectations of boards and their UK 
and US counterparts. It is also likely to influence director behaviour, and hence both directors’ and 
shareholders’ expectations of boards. 
 
7.4.4 Shareholder and director views on director remuneration 
Shareholders have access to director remuneration data via the statutory disclosures in annual 
reports, and, as will be shown in 7.7.1, many of the directors surveyed also have clear views on the 
roles and responsibilities of directors (and hence on the workloads of boards). As Figure 11 shows, 
there is a distinct difference of opinion between directors and shareholders regarding the 
appropriate level of director remuneration.  
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Figure 12  
 
Shareholder and director views on director remuneration 
 
 
Most directors surveyed (54%) considered they are under-remunerated, but just 2% of shareholders 
surveyed share this sentiment. Conversely, 94% of shareholders consider that directors are overpaid 
while just 8% of directors consider that they are over-remunerated (T statistic = 14.03).   
 
7.5 To Whom Is the Board Responsible? 
Most of the definitions of corporate governance that are shown in Table 1 imply that boards are 
responsible to shareholders, to the company, or to all stakeholders. In order to determine which of 
these parties New Zealand shareholders and directors favour, the survey asked the following 
question: ‘In your opinion, in practice, to whom is the board responsible?’ Figure 13 summarises 
the results. 
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Figure 13  
 
To whom is the board responsible? 
 
 
 Just over half of shareholders and directors surveyed believe that the board is primarily responsible 
to shareholders and about a third of respondents considered that the board is responsible to all 
stakeholders. There is a small but statistically significant difference between the views of 
shareholders and directors surveyed at a 5% threshold (p = 0.052). That the opinions of both 
directors and shareholders are split in this way suggests a split between a shareholder-centric 
approach to governance and a stakeholder-centric approach. Such a split is not unique to New 
Zealand, as similar debates regarding the merits of these two approaches are occurring in many 
countries (Vinten, 2001). 
A significant minority of the directors surveyed (16%) and the shareholders surveyed (8%) 
believe that the board is responsible to the company. This cohort of respondents is maybe 
influenced by the Companies Act, which mandates that directors must act in the best interests of the 
company (1993, section 131). Further, the low figure for directors suggests the majority of directors 
hold personal views that are at odds with the law in this respect.  
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7.6 The Role of the Board 
Before examining the tasks a board should perform, both directors and shareholders were asked to 
consider the overall role of the board. The options selected were distilled from the literature 
discussed in section 2.2 and from the focus group discussions. Figure 14 summarises the responses. 
Figure 14  
 
Opinions on the role of the board 
 
 
Figure 14 shows that there is no clear consensus on the role of the board. This lack of agreement has 
not gone unnoticed by survey respondents, and the following quote from a director is indicative of 
their sentiments: ‘The role of public company directors and the extent of their responsibilities is not 
well understood by the public, including many shareholders. This gives rise to dissatisfactions in 
some quarters, with matters such as director remuneration.’ This lack of a consensus on the role of 
the board reflects the different definitions of the role of the board outlined in the literature and as 
detailed in Table 2 (p.30). Figure 14 also shows that there is no statistically significant difference (at 
a 5% threshold) between the responses of directors and shareholders (Chi-square test p = 0.005).  
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Set strategy and
lead the
company
Hire and fire
the CEO
Look after the
interests of all
stakeholders
Increase the
value of the
company
Keep the
company out of
trouble
Ensure
management
keeps its
promises to
shareholders
S
h
ar
e 
o
f 
re
p
o
n
se
s
Directors Shareholders
195 
 
7.7 Board Activity 
What boards choose to do and how they choose to act is likely to influence directors’ and 
shareholders’ perceptions of boards. From time to time differences of opinion arise between 
shareholders and directors over which tasks are the responsibility of the board and which are the 
responsibility of management. On occasion these differences have become the central issue in high-
profile court cases (e.g. R vs Graham, 2012). 
The survey asked respondents to consider which tasks a board should perform and which 
tasks should be delegated to management. They were presented with two scenarios: one in which a 
company was trading normally, and a second when the company was under financial stress. Two 
scenarios were considered because a body of literature suggests that governance practices change in 
response to environmental factors (Huse, 2005; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003), and financial stress was 
considered a simple environmental change that was sure to gain board attention.  
 
7.7.1 Tasks the board should perform when a company is trading profitably 
The shareholders and directors surveyed were presented with a range of tasks and were asked to 
indicate who they believed should be responsible for performing them when a company was trading 
profitably. The options were: the board, management, joint board and management, don’t know, 
and no preference. Figure 15 shows the share of respondents who consider that either directors on 
their own, or directors in conjunction with management, should be responsible for performing the 
range of tasks. Table 41 in Appendix C (p. 292) summarises the full results. 
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Figure 15  
 
Views on board responsibilities when a company is trading normally 
 
 
Both shareholders and directors have definite views on who should be performing all of these tasks. 
None of the directors answered ‘don’t know’ to any of the questions and in only 1% of their answers 
did they check the ‘no preference’ option. Overall, shareholders answered ‘don’t know’ to 4% of the 
questions and in just 1% of their answers they indicated no preference. However, a number of the 
shareholders who answered this question also noted in the survey margin that it was not an area 
they felt qualified to comment on, or that it was not something they had previously considered. This 
may, in part, account for the statistically significant differences between the views of shareholders 
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and those of directors. Chi-square tests (at a 5% confidence level) indicate significant differences 
between the views of shareholders and directors regarding who should perform all but one of these 
tasks (Table 41, p. 292). The exception is replacing the CEO (chi-square p = 0.556): most 
shareholders and directors agree that is a task for the board. 
Figure 15 shows there are some tasks that most directors agree should be performed by the 
board and there are other tasks that most directors consider should be performed by management. 
Seventy per cent or more of the directors surveyed consider that the board should perform the 
following tasks:  
 when necessary replace the CEO, 
 approve related party transactions, 
 approve major capital expenditure,  
 review and guide risk policy, 
 report to shareholders. 
Seventy per cent or more of directors surveyed agree that management should perform the 
following tasks: 
 communicate with external stakeholder, 
 
 replace senior executives. 
 
 
All of these tasks fit within the boundaries of the definitions of governance and the role of 
the board outlined in Table 1 and Table 2.  Figure 15 also shows a number of tasks where directors 
are divided as to who should perform them. Between 30% and 70% of directors believe that 
directors should perform the following: 
 set company performance objectives, 
 ensure that a company meets its financial obligations, 
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 ensure that the company meets its legal obligations, 
 set annual budgets, 
 ensure that there are clear lines of responsibility throughout the organisation. 
Taken as a group, these tasks have two features in common: all concern the day-to-day 
operation of the business, and all have comparatively short-term time frames. This has implications 
for directors’ expectations of boards as it suggests that some directors believe that the board should 
have a more hands-on and short-term focus, while other directors appear to favour the board 
adopting a longer-term focus, perhaps with a greater emphasis on control and monitoring. 
 
7.7.2 Tasks the board should perform when a company is under financial stress 
How boards behave, and how directors and shareholders expect them to behave, when a company is 
under financial stress is important because it is under these circumstances that boards are under 
most scrutiny and their actions are likely to have the most significant impact. Comparing the normal 
and stressful scenarios also provides some insights into how boards may respond to environmental 
changes.   
The shareholders and directors surveyed were presented with a range of tasks and were 
asked to indicate who they believed should be responsible for performing them when a company 
was trading under financial stress. The options were: the board, management, joint board and 
management responsibility, don’t know, and no preference. Figure 16 shows the share of 
respondents who considered that either directors on their own, or directors in conjunction with 
management, should be responsible for performing these tasks. Table 43 (p.293) shows the 
complete results for all options.  
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Figure 16  
 
Views on board responsibilities when a company is under financial stress 
 
 
Once again a number of shareholders remarked in the margin of the survey that either they did not 
feel qualified to answer this question or that it was a topic that they had not previously considered. 
In addition, 6% of shareholders ‘skipped’ this question. Although there are statistically significant 
differences between the expectations of shareholders and directors for all but two of the tasks 
(replacing the CEO and approving major investments), it seems likely that many of the tasks 
outlined do not generally influence most shareholders’ expectations of boards.  
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Figure 16 also shows that when a company is under financial stress there are still differences 
of opinion among directors regarding many of the tasks the board should perform. The four tasks 
that directors were most divided over were: 
 overseeing the work of auditors, 
 approving related party transactions, 
 setting OSH policy, 
 ensuring clear lines of accountability throughout the organisation. 
Overseeing the work of auditors and approving related party transactions are both activities 
that the NZX listing rules require boards to perform (NZX, 2013), so this finding was unexpected. 
Similarly there are significant consequences for directors should OSH policies be found wanting. 
 
7.7.3 Changes in stakeholder expectations that occur when a company is under financial stress  
Overall when a company is under financial stress directors expect boards to reduce the 
number of tasks that they delegate to management and increase the number of tasks they perform 
directly. Table 37 shows how directors’ expectations change (Table 44, p.294 shows the detailed 
results).  
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Table 37  
Directors’ views on how board responsibilities change in a financial crisis 
  Normal Stressed Change 
Communicating with external stakeholders 13% 55% 43% 
Communicating with the public 29% 60% 31% 
Where necessary replacing senior executives 12% 37% 25% 
Ensuring the company meets its financial obligations 63% 85% 22% 
Ensuring the company complies with its legal obligations 65% 82% 17% 
Ensuring clear lines of accountability throughout the 
organisation 41% 59% 17% 
Setting annual budgets 54% 67% 13% 
Setting company performance objectives 80% 93% 13% 
Reviewing and guiding risk policy 89% 95% 6% 
Overseeing the work of the auditors 79% 85% 6% 
Approving major investment expenditure 93% 96% 3% 
Approving related party transactions 94% 97% 2% 
Setting company strategy 91% 93% 2% 
Reporting to shareholders 91% 93% 2% 
Where necessary replace CEO 98% 98% 0% 
Setting occupational health and safety policy 77% 76% -2% 
 
Table 37 shows that an overall increase in the involvement of boards in these tasks is likely to occur 
when a company is under financial stress. Communicating with external stakeholders is the activity 
that shows the biggest change. It has been argued that when a company is under financial stress its 
external communications are far more important than under normal circumstances (Coombs, 2007), 
and this may account for the change. There may, however, be an alternative explanation. When a 
company is under financial stress directors’ personal reputations are also most at risk, and given that 
reputation is considered by some to be the most valuable commodity that directors possess (Ong & 
Wan, 2008), a desire to protect it may be the motivation behind this change.   
The other significant increases in director involvement occur in replacing senior executives, 
ensuring a company meets its financial and legal obligations, ensuring accountability, and setting 
budgets and objectives. These changes suggest that in time of financial crisis some directors believe 
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that they should become more involved in day-to-day management of the company and that they 
should focus more on short-term activities. Given that for a company in financial crisis the 
probability of having a long term is greatly reduced, this appears to be a rational reaction. Overall 
these changes support the views of Huse and others that the role of the board is contingent on the 
circumstance in which a company finds itself (Huse, 2005; Long, 2006).   
 
7.8 Board Shareholder Communication 
The ability of the board to communicate effectively with shareholders is considered by many to be 
one of its key functions and is included in many corporate governance codes (OECD, 2004; General 
Motors, 2010). Boards must formally report on the status of their company twice a year and in the 
intervening periods they must report to shareholders on any events that are likely to have a material 
impact on the value of the enterprise (Securities Markets Act, 1998; Companies Act 1993; NZX, 
2014). Effective communication has been shown to aid capital formation by providing investor 
confidence (Karp & Axford, 2011). By improving access to capital, the quality of communication 
between a company and its stakeholders increases company value and for this reason is important to 
both shareholders and directors. Shareholders and directors were asked their opinion on the overall 
quality of communication between boards and shareholders. Figure 17 summarises their views.  
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Figure 17  
 
Views on quality of communication with shareholders 
 
 
Figure 17 suggests that there is no significant difference of opinion between directors and 
shareholders regarding the overall quality of communications between boards and shareholders (t-
statistic = 0.927).   
 
7.9 Board Composition 
As discussed in section 2.5 and reinforced by the comments of the focus group participants 
(5.2.3,5.3.3), the composition of the board is a key element in determining both director and 
shareholder expectations of boards. This section examines two elements of board composition: 
director independence and the role of women. 
 
7.9.1 Director independence 
Both directors and shareholders were asked what they considered was the appropriate number of 
independent directors on a board; Figure 18 summarises the responses.  
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Figure 18  
 
Views on the number of independent directors on a board 
 
 
Figure 18 suggests that directors and shareholders hold significantly different opinions regarding 
the need for independent directors on NZX company boards (chi-square p < 0.001).  Some 77% of 
shareholders believe that the number of independent directors on a board is not important, while just 
14% of directors appear to share this view.  
 
7.9.2 Women on boards 
The level of participation of women on boards is currently a topical subject with both shareholders 
and directors (wob.org.nz, Fauzi & Locke, 2012). The subject is regularly raised by shareholders at 
ASMs (6.3) and is also frequently raised in the popular press (Meier, 2014; Narimu, 2012). Survey 
participants were asked what level of female participation on the board would most benefit public 
companies. Figure 19 summarises the results. 
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Figure 19  
 
Views on the role of women directors 
 
 
As Figure 19 shows, the majority of directors and shareholders believe that all board seats should be 
filled solely on merit. The differences in the views of directors and shareholders are not statistically 
significant (chi-square p = 0.216). A separate analysis of the data also shows that male and female 
shareholders share similar views on this issue, as a comparison of female and male shareholder 
responses showed no statistical significant difference in their responses (chi-square p = 0.395).   
In the popular press a number of pro-woman advocates and academics have been calling for 
quotas that ensure a minimum number of women on boards (Business Day, 2015). Directors were 
asked if they believed that a minimum quota of board seats should be allocated to women. Ninety-
four per cent of those who responded said no. This view appears to be quite strongly held, 
regardless of directors’ views on the merits of women directors, as indicated by one of the 
respondents: ‘I am a mentor for diversity within the IoD but still consider directors should be 
selected on “value to company” with a desire to be as diverse as the communities they represent.’   
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Majority women At least one
women
Recruit on merit Don't know
Sh
ar
e 
o
f 
re
sp
o
n
se
s
Directors
Shareholders
206 
 
 
7.10  Summary  
The objective of the surveys was to obtain opinions from a range of directors and private investors 
on their expectations of boards. This objective was met with some 374 completed surveys being 
returned – a 36% response rate. The data contained in these surveys has highlighted some of the 
elements that influence shareholder and director expectations of boards, and it has also provided 
insights into how directors and shareholders view each other, the homogeneity between these two 
groups, and the heterogeneity that exists within these groups, all of which contributes to an 
understanding of their expectations of boards.  
The survey suggests that private investors tend to be experienced, long-term participants in 
the market. The shareholders who responded to the survey have been investing in NZX equities for 
28.8 years, and consider themselves to be reasonably knowledgeable about the market. Most of 
these shareholders rely on the advice of brokers or other experts when making share purchases, 
which highlights the influence that institutional investors have over the market. On average they 
hold more than 10 stocks and have an investment horizon of more than one year. The large number 
of companies in which shareholders hold shares, coupled with the low average value of each 
holding (around $5,300), suggests that shareholdings in individual companies are not a substantial 
portion of most shareholders’ net worth, which may influence their approach to governance and 
their expectations of boards. Directors, on average, are very experienced, and of those who 
responded to the survey their average tenure as a director of NZX-listed companies was 11.4 years. 
Overall, shareholders were happy with the performance of NZX company boards, although 
some shareholders commented that in their opinion there was a wide variance in the quality of 
governance across the NZX, which was possibly also reflected in the relatively large number of 
respondents (10%) who answered ‘don’t know’ to this question. Not all shareholders appear 
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satisfied with the performance of individual directors. When asked whose interests shareholders 
believed that directors would put first during a financial crisis, 27% of respondents considered that 
directors would put their own interests first. In addition 94% of shareholders considered that 
directors were overpaid, possibly suggesting that shareholders do not consider most directors to be 
‘value for money’. 
The survey suggests that directors generally believe that NZX companies are meeting 
shareholder expectations. In this respect NZX directors likely differ from their US and UK 
counterparts, who often feel under pressure from shareholders to deliver ever-increasing returns 
(Gamble & Kelly, 2001). It can therefore be argued that NZ directors are under less compulsion to 
adopt shareholder value maximisation strategies. Both the shareholders and directors surveyed were 
divided on board responsibility; approximately half considered boards were responsible to 
shareholders, and most of the remainder were divided between responsibility to all stakeholders and 
responsibility to the company. Legally, boards are considered responsible to the company 
(Companies Act 1993), so clearly the majority of shareholders’ and directors’ expectations are at 
variance with the law.  
Most of the directors and shareholders surveyed appear to have firm views regarding the 
tasks that boards should perform, with the two groups broadly in alignment. Most respondents agree 
that the board should perform tasks associated with monitoring and reporting and, when necessary, 
replace the CEO. Respondents were, however, divided on who should perform tasks with either an 
operational focus or a short-term focus. These tasks include setting annual budgets and setting 
company performance objectives. Should a company be in a financial crisis, some directors believe 
they should change their behaviour and increase their involvement with a number of tactical tasks, 
such as communicating with external stakeholders and the public and replacing senior executives 
when required. This suggests that some directors consider that the tasks a board should perform are 
contingent upon the environment in which a company operates. 
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Respondents were canvassed on two aspects of board composition: their views on director 
gender and their views on independent directors. Over 75% of both directors and shareholders 
believe that directors should be appointed on merit. Views on independent directors were more 
divided, with 77% of shareholders considering that the number of independent directors is 
unimportant – a view shared by just 14% of directors.   
A deeper analysis of the data collected in this survey failed to reveal any patterns or 
common characteristics which would allow either directors or shareholders to be segmented into 
unique groups. For example, directors who share a common view on the role of the board do not 
appear to share similar views on which tasks boards should perform. So overall the survey shows 
that both shareholders and directors hold a diverse range of views on most governance topics. 
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8 DISCUSSING THE FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY 
This chapter examines the findings of the research presented in chapters 4 to 7 in order to address 
the primary research question: what do New Zealand’s shareholders and company directors expect 
from New Zealand’s public company boards? It also addresses the two supplementary questions, 
which are: (1) how heterogeneous are the shareholders and directors in their expectations of NZ 
boards, and (2) as groups, how homogeneous are shareholders in their expectations of boards and 
how homogeneous are directors in theirs?  
The chapter first considers the author’s likely influence on the research. It then considers the 
research related to the environment in which corporate governance is practised, the aim being to 
identify some of the key environmental factors capable of influencing shareholders’ and directors’ 
expectations of boards; this will draw largely on the research regarding the NZ environment that is 
outlined in chapter 4. The chapter then addresses those expectations, by drawing on the data 
collected in the research initiatives detailed in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
8.1 The author’s influence on the research 
The research has been approached from a relativist ontological perspective which assumes 
that the researcher is not independent of the environment. Therefore it is useful to discuss the 
author’s likely impact on the collection of the data, the presentation and interpretation of the 
findings before proceeding to a detailed discussion of the findings.  
The key personal factor that has potential to influence the research in my perspective is my 
25 year experience as a company director. Having experienced many of the circumstances raised in 
the research, such as governing companies in financial difficulties, I could provide a greater insight 
into the issues and could make connections between data sets that would have otherwise have been 
the case. As will be discussed, my background also created limitations for the research and I have 
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an inherent bias towards directors. For this reason I have remained mindful of my background 
throughout the research process. 
The research into the New Zealand environment (4.0) drew on data from secondary sources 
and the process of collecting and presenting the data was mechanistic in nature. Because of the 
relatively unambiguous nature of these data I suspect my background did not significantly influence 
the conclusions drawn directly from them. 
The focus group research has undoubtedly been influenced by my background. The 
members of the director focus group were some of New Zealand’s most experienced public 
company chairmen and it is unlikely that they would participate in such an event had I not been able 
to use my personal network to attract them. My experience as a director, the topics I raised, and the 
language I used during the focus group along with my empathy for their views are all likely to have 
influenced the interview. My sense is that my background allowed me to very quickly establish 
rapport. The nature of the discussion was such that I was considered very much a peer and my 
perception is that this probably resulted in a more open an honest discussion than might have 
occurred had I not been a professional director. The shareholder focus group also benefited from my 
personal network in that I was able to attract shareholders from a wide range of backgrounds who 
might otherwise have been reluctant to attend such an event. Many of the questions I asked in order 
to prompt discussion were based on my experience interacting with shareholders while working as a 
Managing Director. Significantly most of these questions were not readily apparent from the 
governance literature – however they were of interest to shareholders. Although the interview was 
conducted on ‘neutral ground’, the focus group members were well aware that I was the managing 
director of a publicly-listed company and that on occasion their comments were prefixed with 
statements such as “not that you do this David but…” However, given the relaxed nature of the 
interview, the free flowing discussion, and the fact that focus group members frequently debated the 
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questions amongst themselves with no reference to me, I do not believe that my presence inhibited 
or in any way restrained the focus group members in their comments.   
The analysis of ASM minutes (6.0) was also influenced by my background. A number of 
companies were reluctant to release their minutes for analysis until they discovered my background 
at which point they agreed to release them. This substantially increased the amount of raw data that 
I was able to obtain and hence increase my confidence in the findings. While much of the analysis 
was qualitative and again largely mechanistic the analysis of shareholder questions was open to 
some interpretation as there was a subjective element involved in categorisation of shareholder 
questions and assigning specific questions to these categories. My background and experience at 
ASMs assisted me with this process.  
The director and shareholder surveys were likely also influenced by my background. Using 
my network gave me access to a database of shareholder names and addresses that would otherwise 
have been difficult to obtain. My public reputation was considered when drafting the director 
survey. Because I was known to some of the directors surveyed, particular attention was placed on 
ensuring the surveys were anonymous and so no company specific data were collected. The content 
of both surveys was also influenced by my background. While the questions included in the survey 
were derived from the literature review and the focus group interviews, the language used and the 
slightly informal tone of the survey were both influenced by my experience working with directors 
and shareholders. This may have made the survey more accessible to the respondents and 
contributed to the relatively high response rates.  
On balance I consider that my experience as a managing director has enhanced this research 
more so than it served to bias the results. While the opportunity to collect certain data was forgone, 
the key benefits were being my ability to access people and data that would not generally be 
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available to researchers, as well as my personal experience providing insights into many of the 
issues discussed outweighed these limitations. 
 
 
8.2 NZ Public Company Boards and the Environment in Which They Operate 
The corporate governance literature makes it clear that governance models and practices vary from 
country to country, and it also highlights the areas where variations between countries are most 
likely to occur (Davies & Schlitzer, 2008; Agarwal et al., 2007). However, the literature has neither 
systematically nor comprehensively assessed the New Zealand corporate governance environment. 
It was necessary to address this shortfall in order to identify the specific environmental factors that 
can have a material influence on NZ directors’ and shareholders’ expectations of NZ boards. This 
research has identified several environmental factors that have potential to influence directors’ and 
shareholders’ expectations of boards. These factors include: the underlying approach to corporate 
governance in New Zealand, the legal environment, and company, shareholder and director 
demographics. These factors are discussed in the following sections. 
 
8.2.1 The New Zealand approach to corporate governance 
NZ has adopted a variant of the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance (4.1). This research 
has identified some elements of the model that may potentially influence the expectations that NZ 
shareholders and directors have of NZ public company boards. These elements are: 
 The roles of chairman and CEO are separated. It is neither a legal nor an NZX listing rule 
requirement to separate the roles of chairman and CEO. However, in NZ it is considered 
best practice, and so all current public companies on the NZSX have separated these 
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functions (4.5.1). This influences the relative power of the board and management, which 
may, in turn, influence the expectations of directors in respect of tasks that they consider 
should be performed by the board and the tasks which should be performed by management.  
 Shareholders are able to table resolutions at ASMs. While the ability to table resolutions at 
ASMs may contribute to creating the sense of ownership that some small shareholders 
express towards the companies they hold shares in (5.3), in practice shareholder resolutions 
are seldom tabled at ASMs and are rarely, if ever, adopted (6.2). This suggests that the 
perception of ownership, which entails power or control of an asset, may be more imagined 
than real. 
 The majority of directors are independent. As is shown in Table 17 (p.133), approximately 
three-quarters of NZSX-listed companies have boards with a majority of independent 
directors. Independent directors are those who do not have strong financial ties to the 
companies they govern and so their motivations may well be different to those of inside 
directors, who have stronger financial ties. This will be discussed further in section 8.3.1. 
 Light-handed regulatory approach. New Zealand lacks both the ‘comply and explain’ 
approach of the UK (2.4.1) and the prescriptive rules–based approach employed in the US 
(2.4.2), having instead adopted a light-handed middle ground. The implications of this on 
directors’ and shareholders’ expectations of boards will be discussed in detail in the 
following section.  
 
8.2.2 Legal environment 
While there are numerous laws that can potentially influence both director and shareholder 
expectations of boards, this research has focused primarily on the Companies Act 1993, NZ 
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Securities legislation and the NZX listing rules. These laws and regulations were selected for 
consideration because they all include clauses that are specifically directed at company directors 
and so, in the author’s opinion, have the most influence on board behaviour. Overall, the regulatory 
environment surrounding NZ governance appears to be light-handed relative to many other 
jurisdictions. By comparison, the US, through mechanisms such as the Sarbanes–Oxley (2002) and 
Dodd-Frank (2010) Acts, has adopted a highly prescriptive and regulatory-intense version of the 
Anglo-Saxon governance model. The UK, on the other hand, has adopted a governance model that 
is less regulatory-intense, yet relies more heavily on corporate governance codes and Cadbury’s 
‘comply or explain’ doctrine (Cadbury, 1992). New Zealand’s corporate governance model is 
relatively light on both regulation and corporate governance codes, and this in turn may provide NZ 
boards with more latitude and freedom than their UK or US counterparts (4.1).  
The legal environment also places a number of hurdles in front of any entity that considers 
making a hostile takeover of an NZX-listed company. Many of these hurdles are contained within 
the 1993 Takeovers Act. However, other factors, such as directors’ appointments being staggered 
(which makes it difficult to replace all board members in timely manner), also impedes takeovers. 
The net result is that hostile takeovers of NZX companies are rare and so directors are unlikely to be 
concerned about them (4.3.3.). This suggests that they face less pressure than their UK or US 
counterparts to pursue short-term shareholder value maximisation strategies, as there is little threat 
of losing their positions due to perceived underperformance of their company and a subsequent 
hostile takeover. 
Notwithstanding New Zealand’s light-handed regulatory approach, a trend has been 
identified that shows this is slowly changing, as in recent years regulators have increased the 
penalties in much of the legislation targeted at directors and are making corporate governance more 
prescriptive and rules-based. For example, the Financial Markets Conduct Act (2013) and the 
proposed Health and Safety Reform Bill (Bridges, 2015) are both relatively prescriptive. There is 
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also an increasing willingness by regulators to enforce these penalties, which include substantial 
fines and, in extreme circumstances, incarceration (4.1). This, therefore, is a trend that is likely to 
influence both directors’ and shareholders’ expectations of boards and director behaviour. 
 
8.2.3 NZ public companies 
Berle and Means (1932) observed that the relationship between directors and shareholders is 
influenced by the degree to which share ownership is dispersed and shareholder control is 
centralised. These parameters are not presently well understood for New Zealand public companies, 
so a sample of the 40 companies was analysed to determine the current situation (4.3.2). Of the 
companies reviewed the total number of shareholders ranged from 846 to 49,646, with an average 
of 10,971; 10% of companies had fewer than 1000 shareholders and 38% had fewer than 5000 
shareholders. Because many companies have few shareholders, their shares are infrequently traded 
and their stocks are considered to be relatively illiquid. This lack of liquidity is a factor that may 
influence block shareholders’ expectations of boards. If a shareholder cannot easily exit a firm then 
they may consider themselves an owner, rather than an investor, and may therefore be more 
inclined to actively participate in the governance of the company. 
Ownership concentration in New Zealand is generally high: in 38 of the 40 companies 
analysed just 2% of shareholders held 50% or more of the shares. While this is a high concentration 
of ownership, the statistic is not as significant as it may first appear, given that 2% of the average 
company’s shareholding equates to some 219 shareholders. Therefore, 2% of shareholders in most 
companies still represents a sizable group from which to obtain a consensus should an individual 
shareholder wish to exert a high degree of control over the company. From a practical perspective, a 
shareholding of 20% or more is often considered sufficient to control a public company (Maume & 
Walker, 2012). Using this definition of control, just 33% of the companies surveyed had a single 
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controlling shareholder. This relative lack of direct shareholder control affords directors of most NZ 
companies a considerable degree of freedom, which undoubtedly influences both their behaviour 
and their expectations of boards – and it may also have a corresponding flow-on effect to 
shareholders’ expectations.  
These company ownership statistics also highlight the challenges in making assumptions 
that apply to the entire market, as it is likely that controlling shareholders and the directors of 
companies with controlling shareholders have different expectations to other directors and 
shareholders where the shareholdings are more dispersed. For example, shareholders may choose to 
become more engaged with the governance process than would have been the case if they had 
invested less in the firm. Furthermore, it is probable that all controlling shareholders, including 
company founders, government shareholders and institutional investors, may well have different 
goals and objectives from each other and may therefore not be homogeneous in their expectations 
of boards (Boone et al., 2011). 
 
8.2.4 Political and social influences: the appointment of women directors 
From time to time events and trends that are occurring in the broader commercial environment or in 
society at large spill over and influence the corporate governance of NZX-listed companies. 
Currently the most significant social influence is the widespread call for more women directors on 
public company boards (4.5.4). This research shows that, overall, boards have responded to this call 
by appointing increasing numbers of women to boards as independent directors (Table 20, p. 136).  
Both directors and shareholders are in general agreement in their views regarding the 
appointment of women directors, as over 75% of both groups surveyed believe that directors should 
be appointed on merit (Figure 19, p. 205). Their requirements in this regard are being met, as a 
review of the professional backgrounds of male and female directors appointed in 2013 showed that 
both men and women had similar academic qualifications and similar overseas experience, were 
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equally likely to have held either CEO or GM roles, and were equally likely to have a legal 
background (Table 26, p. 145). There are, however, two significant differences between male and 
female appointees that the review of newly appointed directors revealed, which suggest that male 
and female applicants for board positions are not always treated equally. Firstly, of the 16 women 
appointed to boards in 2013 only one was an inside director (Table 26, p. 145), suggesting that 
major shareholders and independent directors may have different views on the importance of female 
directors. Secondly, women who are appointed to boards are less likely to have a finance 
background than their male counterparts. Of the 36 directors appointed in 2013 with a finance 
background, only three were women. Given that 28% of CFO positions in New Zealand are held by 
women (Grant Thornton, 2012), it seems unlikely that there is a shortage of suitably qualified 
female candidates, so this finding appears at odds with the overall population. Nothing was 
identified from the data collected that would explain this anomaly. 
 
8.2.5 Shareholders 
The findings of this research suggest that shareholders are not a homogeneous group. They range 
from individuals with small personal shareholdings to large multinational organisations with multi-
billion dollar investments. Given this diversity in scale it is to be expected that their motivations and 
their expectations of boards will vary. To assist with understanding their underlying motivations 
and expectations of boards, shareholders have been classed in four segments: private investors, 
institutional investors, block shareholders and foreign investors. 
Private investors 
Numerically, private investors are the largest shareholder segment among New Zealand 
private investors. Approximately 16% of the NZ adult population invest directly in shares (Table 
13, p. 118). The survey found that, among the respondents, the average shareholder had been 
investing in shares for 28.8 years (7.2). Although most of these shareholders consider themselves to 
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be reasonably knowledgeable and confident in making investments, some 78% rely at least in part 
on the advice of brokers or other experts (Table 32, p. 184). This is an example of the influence that 
institutional investors who also act as share brokers can have in the market. 
Based on this research the value of the average private investor’s portfolio is estimated at 
approximately $100,000 and consists of an investment in 19 companies (4.3.1), implying an 
average investment of about $5,300 per company. This small average investment value and the 
large number of companies in which investors hold shares may partially explain why the analysis of 
company AGMs discussed in chapter 6 suggests that most shareholders do not appear to actively 
participate in the governance of the companies that they own shares in. Berle and Means (1932) 
identified a similar situation with US shareholders; they labelled the phenomenon ‘rational apathy’, 
while others have called it ‘freeloading’ (Rock, 1990). 
Most private investors surveyed appear happy with the performance of NZX company 
boards (Figure 10, p. 188), and the analysis of ASM minutes did not suggest that shareholders in 
general held any major or systemic concerns regarding the performance or operation of NZX 
company boards. This general contentment, alongside rational shareholder apathy (Berle & Means, 
1932), may also contribute to the low turnout observed at ASMs.  However, this general 
contentment does not lead to a uniformity of expectations of boards; as will be shown in section 
8.3.7 a degree of heterogeneity exists within this group.  
Institutional investors 
Institutional investors play a complex and influential role in the operation of the New 
Zealand share market (4.3.2). A limitation of this research is that the chief executives of some major 
financial institutions that are significant investors in the NZX markets, who were contacted in the 
course of this research, declined to be interviewed. This reluctance was likely also reflected in the 
attitudes of the senior directors who, when interviewed for this research, were also unwilling to 
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discuss the role of institutional investors in any detail (5.2). Nonetheless, by analysing institutional 
investors’ shareholdings and drawing on other research it has been possible to form a clearer picture 
of their influence on both boards and shareholders, and this provides some insights into their 
expectations of governance. Institutional investors likely influence the governance process in a 
number of ways, including their roles as block shareholders, active traders of shares, and brokers. 
As a block shareholder, they generally have direct access to the chairman and other key board 
members. As brokers, they publish research on NZX companies that, according to the survey 
results, influence private shareholders (Table 32, p. 184). There is evidence to suggest that 
institutional investors also influence the behaviour of boards through direct dialogue with directors 
(Chiu & Monin, 2003). The ability to influence both boards and shareholders, combined with their 
relationships with fellow institutions, places institutional investors in a unique position. A 
perception among many of the private shareholders and directors interviewed for this research is 
that institutions are focused on increasing short-term shareholder value (5.3.2). While this view is 
probably consistent with the mandates of many institutions, this research has found no evidence to 
directly support or refute the perception. 
Block shareholders 
For the most part, block shareholders can be categorised as either institutions, government, 
or company founders and their related parties, although there are situations where private individual 
shareholders with no ties to the company or its management have also amassed block shareholdings 
(4.4.5). The relative illiquidity of such blocks of shares, their high value, and the influence that 
voting these share parcels can have over the adoption of resolutions are incentives for block 
shareholders to actively participate in corporate governance matters. However, this incentive to 
become involved in corporate governance is possibly where the similarity between the different 
categories of block shareholders ends. While the precise nature and motivations of these 
institutions, government bodies or company founders is beyond the scope of this research, as 
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discussed in section 4.4, it is likely that there are differences in the attributes of each of these 
investor categories. For example, each category may have different investment horizons, or they 
may vary in their ability to provide additional capital and in their appetite for risk. These differences 
may lead to differing expectations of boards.  
Foreign investors  
This research suggests that foreign investment in NZSX-listed companies is mainly by 
institutions who usually hold non-controlling blocks of shares (Table 14, p. 126). In general, foreign 
institutional shareholders tend to make investments in larger companies whose shares are actively 
traded – although there are exceptions, as there are smaller companies that are majority owned by 
offshore investors. This finding is consistent with Ferreira and Matos (2008), who observed similar 
practices by offshore institutions in other markets.  
 
8.2.6 Directors 
The following table summarises the key demographic data regarding directors that has been 
compiled in this research.  
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Table 38  
Directors of NZSX boards summarised (2013) 
Year Number Share (%) Reference  
Seats held by independent directors 417 62% Table 18 
Seat held by non-executive inside directors 175 26%  
Directors who hold CEO position 70 10% 4.4.1 
Executive directors excluding CEO 10 1% 4.4.1 
Total number of board seats 672 100% Table 22 
    
Directors who sit on one NZSX board only 497 87% Table 23 
Directors who sit on two or more NZSX boards 71 13% Table 23 
Total number of directors 568 100% Table 23 
    
Seats held by directors based offshore 137 20% Table 21 
Women directors 87 13% 4.5.4 
Years directors held current role (average) 6.0  4.4.3 
Years as public company director (average) 11.4  7.2 
 
Executive directors 
Executive directors are company employees who sit on their companys’ board. Table 38 
shows that in 2013, executives filled 11% of all board seats. This was a substantial (45%) decline 
from 1995, when 22% of board seats were filled by executives (Table 16, p. 131). Of the executives 
who held board seats in 2013 the majority were CEOs. However, overall CEOs only sat on 63% of 
the boards (4.5.1). In 2013 only 1.5% of all board seats were held by executives who were not 
CEOs. A close examination of the background of these executives reveals that most were either 
substantial shareholders in their own right or were affiliated with a substantial shareholder; thus this 
research suggests that CFOs and other second-tier executives cannot expect board roles by virtue of 
their position within the company. None of the CEOs held the position of chairman. Overall, this 
suggests that boards are becoming more independent of management. The analysis of the questions 
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raised at the ASMs (6.3) did not show any suggestion that shareholders had any specific issues or 
concerns with respect to executive director board appointments or lack thereof.   
Independent directors 
Once again Table 38 highlights the significant role that independent directors play in the 
governance of public companies, in that they hold 62% of New Zealand public company board 
seats. The proportion of boards with a majority of independent directors grew from almost a half in 
1995 to three-quarters in 2013 (Table 16, p. 131). There is no apparent legislative or environmental 
explanation to explain this trend. A similar trend has been observed in the US, again with little 
explanation (Gordon, 2007). One possible explanation for this increase is that it is simply a function 
of companies maturing and the reluctance of institutional investors to be involved in corporate 
governance. Over time company founders retire, lose influence and stand down from boards, while 
most institutional investors choose not to be appointed to boards (Ingley & Van der Walt, 2004), so 
it is likely that the most eligible and available candidates left may be independent directors.  
This trend of an increasing number of boards being dominated by independent directors may 
have implications for the expectations that directors and shareholders have of boards. Analysis of 
director appointments (6.2) suggests that the incumbent board members influence the appointment 
of new directors. This in turn suggests that the phenomenon of directors appointing their successors 
and boards becoming self-perpetuating may be occurring in New Zealand (Cadbury, 2002). Another 
consequence of this trend is that boards are weakening or breaking their direct ties with major 
shareholders and, in so doing, becoming more autonomous. This is a significant trend from both a 
director and a shareholder perspective as it raises many of the issues first identified in the US by 
Berle and Means (1932) where, as a result of such rational shareholder apathy, shareholders cede 
their influence over their investment. While Berle and Means were concerned about ceding power 
to influential and potentially exploitative managers, in the New Zealand case it would appear that 
power could be being ceded to increasingly independent boards.  
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The increasing number of independent directors and the low number of executive directors 
on boards may influence boards’ ability to perform certain tasks. For example, it is sometimes 
argued that boards with a majority of independent directors are more objective in their monitoring 
of company performance (Kosnik, 1987). Conversely, the NYX sees a potential risk when boards 
have just one executive. NYX’s concern is that boards with one or no executive directors may lack 
the required in-depth knowledge of the company to adequately perform their tasks (NYX, 2010).  
 
8.3 Director and Shareholder Expectations of Boards 
In this section shareholders’ and directors’ expectations of boards are considered from the following 
aspects: board appointments, whom the board should serve, the role of the board, the tasks the 
boards should perform, and external board communications. The homogeneity and heterogeneity of 
both shareholders’ and directors’ expectations are also evaluated and the contingent and dynamic 
nature of their expectations is also discussed. 
 
8.3.1 Board appointments 
Precisely who is appointed to company boards is a topic of keen interest to both directors and 
shareholders (Chapter 5). However, both groups have very different expectations regarding these 
appointments, and these differences may be influenced by the disparate relationships the two 
stakeholder groups have with boards. The focus group interviews suggested that directors are more 
interested in how the skills and personalities of prospective directors could contribute to the 
operation of the board team (5.1.3), while shareholders appear to be more concerned with the public 
profile and the gender of prospective board members (5.2.3). This could be because less tangible 
aspects of directors’ profiles are more difficult for shareholders to assess in the context of the tasks 
that they are required to perform. 
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For shareholders, board appointments can, at times, be a contentious issue. This is best 
illustrated by the results of the analysis of the ASM minutes (Chapter 6); across the 50 meetings 
whose minutes were analysed a total of just four motions were tabled by shareholders and all of 
these motions related to shareholders nominating directors (6.2). Furthermore, as Figure 9 (p. 174) 
shows, 10% of the questions raised at ASMs related either directly to director appointments or to 
the lack of female representation on the boards. This suggest that private shareholders (who ask the 
vast majority of questions at ASMs) are not always completely happy with the candidates that 
directors nominate. Regardless, all of the directors nominated by the board were appointed and all 
of the directors nominated by shareholders failed to be appointed. In the cases where the results of 
the voting were recorded in the minutes, those directors nominated by the board were elected with a 
majority of at least 96% of the votes cast. However, it cannot be assumed that the high number of 
votes cast in favour of board-appointed directors implies a correspondingly high level of 
shareholder approval, as factors such as shareholder apathy, proxy voting by directors, and the 
impact of block shareholders can all influence this statistic.  
The analysis of ASM minutes shows that directors nominated by the current board were 
always appointed; therefore directors have a significant influence over the board appointment 
process. Analysis of the backgrounds of recent board appointments can yield an insight into the 
attributes that directors value when making board nominations. Such an analysis was conducted and 
is detailed in section 4.5.7; in summary it concludes that the most common attributes found in 
recent director appointments are a background either in the finance profession or as CEOs, and that 
most new directors also have international experience and a postgraduate degree.  
One limitation of the research was its inability to analyse either the social ties between 
directors or any of their behavioural traits. This is unfortunate, given that the focus group interviews 
with both directors and shareholders identified both of these factors as significant criteria in director 
appointments (5.2.3). The directors interviewed considered that strong personal networks and high-
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profile reputations were important and of value to a board, while shareholders interviewed had 
mixed views regarding the value of such networks and profiles (5.3.3.).  
Directors and shareholders appear to hold differing opinions regarding the importance of 
director independence (Figure 18, p. 204). Some 63% of the directors surveyed believe that boards 
should have a majority of independent directors, and 10% believe that boards should comprise only 
independent directors and the CEO, while 77% of those shareholders surveyed believe that the 
number of independent directors on a board is not important. Given that the major justification for 
having independent directors on a board is to protect shareholders’ interests (Orr et al., 2005; 
Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad, 2012), and that there is sometimes a trade-off between director 
independence and overall company performance (Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Hossain, et al.; 
Gordon, 2007), this is potentially a significant finding.   
So while one of the few areas where a significant difference of opinion between 
shareholders and directors was identified, in practice this difference does not appear to cause any 
significant problems. For example, the analysis of questions raised at ASM minutes suggests that in 
general shareholders are ambivalent towards director status, as the issue of director independence 
was not raised as an objection to the appointment of any director per se.  
 
8.3.2 Whom should the board serve?  
Even though an answer to this question is not apparent from the literature (2.2), assumptions 
regarding whom the board should serve are important; indeed, they underpin the significant theories 
in governance literature. For example, both stakeholder theory and shareholder theory are based on 
different assumptions over whom the board should serve. Shareholder advocates such as Friedman 
(1962), and more recently Macey (2008), are firmly of the view that the purpose of the board is to 
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serve the shareholders, while stakeholder advocates such as Cadbury (2002) hold the view that the 
board should serve the company, which in turn takes into account all stakeholder interests. 
The results of the survey suggest that both directors and shareholders are divided in their 
views on this question, with approximately half of each group believing that boards should be 
responsible to shareholders and half believing the board is responsible to either all stakeholders or 
to the company itself (Figure 13, p. 193). A possible explanation for this split is suggested by the 
contingent nature of corporate governance, as the nature and distribution of shareholders may 
influence both directors’ and shareholders’ views on the board’s responsibilities. For example, the 
shareholders and directors of a company with an active founder who is also the majority 
shareholder may well have a different view concerning who the board should serve, to the directors 
and shareholders of a company with no cornerstone shareholder. This contingent aspect to corporate 
governance will be discussed in more detail in section 8.3.7. 
 
8.3.3 The role of the board 
To determine the role of the board the directors and shareholders surveyed were asked to select 
from six possible roles (Figure 14, p. 194). Of the respondents, 54% of directors and 59% of 
shareholders considered that the role of the board is to set strategy and lead the company. The 
remainder of the shareholders and directors surveyed were divided among the remaining five roles. 
This diversity is reflected, in part, in the diversity of definitions of the responsibilities of the board 
outlined in Table 2 (p. 104). For example, ‘setting strategy’ and ‘leading the company’ are similar 
to the definitions proposed by Moltz (1985) and Cadbury (1992), and ‘ensuring management keeps 
its promises to shareholders’, another of the options, is advocated by Macey (2011).    
Shareholders and directors were also queried on the specific tasks they expected a board to 
perform, and from this data a more nuanced picture emerges. Almost all directors and shareholders 
227 
 
expect the board to perform the reactive tasks associated with monitoring and control, such as 
overseeing the work of auditors, replacing the CEO, and reviewing and guiding risk policy; and 
over 80% of directors believe that the board should set strategy. Where opinions are most divided is 
over the role the board should play in conducting more operationally oriented tasks, such as setting 
annual budgets, ensuring clear lines of accountability throughout the organisation, and replacing 
senior executives (Figure 15, p. 196). 
This analysis suggests that there is some broad agreement among directors and shareholders 
on the overall role of the board, although different emphases are placed on the various aspects of the 
board role. Some directors appear to adopt a proactive ‘hands on’ approach, emphasising strategy 
development, while others appear to prefer a hands-off approach that favours monitoring and 
control. It is also apparent that the ‘line’ between governance and management is blurred. It is 
possible that these differences of opinion are influenced by the environmental conditions of the 
companies they govern and hence by the contingent nature of corporate governance. For example, 
the role that directors expect a board to perform may be influenced by factors such as the influence 
exerted by large shareholders, the abilities or otherwise of the management team, and the financial 
circumstances in which the organisation happens to find itself at the time. 
 
8.3.4 The tasks a board should perform 
The directors and shareholders surveyed were asked whether management or the board should 
perform certain tasks; a summary of their responses is presented in Figure 15 (p. 196). The data 
collected suggest that directors and shareholders are divided in their views over who should set 
company performance objectives and annual budgets, and who should be responsible for ensuring 
that company financial and legal obligations are met.  
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The setting of goals and objectives is an important tool for achieving organisational control 
(Latham & Yukl, 1975), so differing opinions over responsibility suggest that directors have 
differing views on the degree to which the board should actively direct the company and the degree 
to which it should act as a monitor of management’s performance. Some definitions of governance 
imply that the board should actively direct the company (Cadbury, 1992; Ong & Wan, 2008), while 
others play down these aspects and encourage boards to be more reactive and emphasise monitoring 
management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1996; Monks, 2001; OECD, 2004; Macey, 2008). So it appears 
likely that the views of New Zealand shareholders and directors are equally diverse.  
The results of the survey also highlight the degree to which directors are prepared to 
delegate legal and financial responsibilities to management. Forty-four per cent of directors are 
prepared to delegate to management responsibility for their company meeting its financial 
obligations. This is consistent with the earlier findings of Ingley & Van der Walt (2004); they 
conducted their research before the GFC and the legislative changes that followed it (4.1), so it can 
be concluded that these events and the subsequent publicity have not substantially changed NZ 
public company directors’ behaviour in this respect. Fifty-two per cent of directors believe that they 
should delegate to management the task of ensuring a company meets its legal obligations. 
Directors have both statutory and NZX obligations to perform certain duties themselves. Given the 
potential impact on directors personally of a company failing to meet some of its financial or legal 
obligations, this finding may suggest that either these directors do not appreciate their legal 
obligations or that they have a high degree of confidence in management’s ability to perform these 
tasks.  
An attempt was made to segment directors based on their views of governance. The 
objective was to identify clusters of directors who shared broadly similar views regarding the major 
issues that the survey addressed – i.e. the role of the board, the tasks that a board should perform, 
and to whom the board is responsible. An analysis of the survey data failed to identify any 
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significant clusters. For example, the 54% of directors who believe that the role of the board is to 
set strategy and lead the company do not hold similar views regarding who should set annual 
budgets and performance targets, or to whom the board is responsible. This illustrates the diversity 
of views that exists within the directors surveyed – and the complex nature of this population. 
 
8.3.5 Boards’ communication to shareholders 
One of the few obligations enshrined in law is the requirement of the board to communicate with 
shareholders through annual reports and annual shareholder meetings. Directors and shareholders 
were surveyed on their opinions regarding how well companies communicate with shareholders. 
Figure 17 (p. 203) shows that over 88% of the directors and shareholders who responded are happy 
with the overall quality of communication. This result is slightly at odds with data from the ASM 
analysis, which suggests that private shareholders find some of the data contained within the 
financial statements to be overly complex or difficult to interpret. Twenty per cent of the questions 
asked by shareholders at ASMs were related to reporting (Figure 9, p.174) and the answers to 
almost all of these questions were contained within the company financial statements, which 
suggests that financial statements are not meeting all shareholders’ expectations. 
 
8.3.6 Director remuneration 
Director remuneration appears to be one of the areas where the gap between directors’ and 
shareholders’ expectations of boards is the greatest. As Figure 11 (p. 192) shows, most of the 
directors surveyed believe they are under-remunerated, but most shareholders surveyed disagree. 
This disagreement can sometimes manifest itself at company ASMs. Figure 9 (p.174) shows that 
8% of the questions asked at the ASMs whose minutes were analysed related to director 
remuneration. 
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A contributing factor to this gap may be the differing perceptions that directors and 
shareholders appear to hold regarding the workload of directors. Figure 15 (p.196) suggests overall 
that directors perform, or believe that they should perform, more governance tasks than 
shareholders assume they perform. That shareholders underestimate the workload of directors was 
also apparent in comments made by some shareholder focus group members – such as, ‘these 
directors, they get their $50,000 for attending a few meetings’. Another possible contributory factor 
is that directors may not believe they are being adequately compensated for the risk associated with 
the role, as discussed in section 4.1 – although there is a trend towards directors being held more 
accountable for their actions (Maume & Walker, 2013). However, this factor was not tested in the 
research. 
 
8.3.7 Director and shareholder heterogeneity 
This section examines degrees of heterogeneity in shareholders’ and directors’ expectations of 
boards. Overall, the more aligned the expectations are, the more efficiently corporate governance is 
likely to function.  
An indication of the degree of heterogeneity that exists within the director and shareholder 
populations can be determined by considering the degree of spread amongst the respondents’ 
answers to the survey questions discussed in Chapter 7.  Most of the data collected in the survey 
questions uses nominal data so in order to test the degree of diversity or spread within this data the 
Variation Ratio (𝑉𝑟) was calculated (Weisberg, 1992 pp. 46-77). The Variation Ratio is defined 
as 𝑉𝑟 = 1 − (
𝑓𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒
𝑁
) where 𝑓𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 is the count of the most popular response and 𝑁 is the total 
responses. Variation ratios range between 0 and 100%. A zero 𝑉𝑟 denotes complete homogeneity 
(all respondents gave the same answer), whereas higher values of 𝑉𝑟 indicate greater heterogeneity 
(Weisberg, 1992 pp. 46-77). Table 39 summarises the results. 
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Table 39  
 
Heterogeneity of directors’ and shareholders’ views 
Variation Ratio (𝑉𝑟)  
  Directors Shareholders 
Board appointments   
 Role of women 24% 20% 
 Independent directors 37% 23% 
Board goals   
 To whom is the board responsible? 48% 45% 
 Role of the board 46% 41% 
Board tasks   
 Setting company strategy 22% 24% 
 Setting company performance objectives 34% 47% 
 Setting annual budgets 59% 28% 
 Approving major investment expenditure 9% 10% 
 Ensuring clear lines of accountability throughout the organisation 67% 39% 
 Where necessary replace CEO 2% 6% 
 Where necessary replace senior executives 12% 38% 
 Setting occupational health and safety policy 34% 22% 
 Ensuring the company complies with its legal obligations 52% 53% 
 Ensuring the company meets its financial obligations 49% 49% 
 Overseeing the work of the auditors 23% 44% 
 Reviewing and guiding risk policy 17% 44% 
 Reporting to shareholders 20% 24% 
 Communicating with external stakeholders 13% 12% 
 Approving related party transactions 8% 32% 
 
Some of the data is based on an ordinal scale; in these cases standard deviations have been 
calculated to show the degree of diversity among shareholders’ and directors’ view. This is shown 
in the following table:  
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Table 40  
 
Heterogeneity of directors’ and shareholders’ views continued 
 Directors  Shareholders 
  mean std dev   Mean std dev 
How well do companies communicate with shareholders? 3.597 0.876  3.693 0.996 
Level of director remuneration 2.413 0.897  3.925 1.095 
 
Tables 39 and 40 suggest that among the group of directors who responded to the survey a moderate 
degree of heterogeneity exists regarding most of these aspects of governance. Among the directors 
surveyed, the areas with least heterogeneity are: for approving major capital expenditure, approving 
related party transactions, and replacing the CEO when required. The survey showed that among 
shareholders the only factors with equally low heterogeneity are: approving major capital 
expenditure, and replacing the CEO when required. On all other aspects of corporate governance 
the opinions of the directors and shareholders surveyed appear to be divided. 
Table 39 (p.231) also suggests that the greatest diversity in the views and expectations of 
directors concerns: setting annual budgets, ensuring companies meet their financial and legal 
obligations, and ensuring clear lines of accountability throughout the organisation. The extent to 
which these differences could impede the functioning of boards is likely to be determined by the 
degree of heterogeneity which exists within individual boards, but this has not been evaluated, 
given that (as stated in section 3.5.4) the decision was made not to ask directors about their 
company affiliations.  
One plausible explanation for this high degree of heterogeneity is that directors’ and 
shareholders’ expectations of boards may in part be influenced by environmental factors and the 
contingent nature of corporate governance; this issue will be discussed in the following section. 
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8.3.8 The dynamic nature of board and shareholder expectations 
While the contingent and dynamic nature of corporate governance has been identified in the 
literature (Huse, 2005; Long, 2006), it is not an aspect of governance that commands much 
attention, as Gabrielsson and Huse (2004) have noted. However, in the course of this research both 
the dynamism and the contingent nature of governance were recurring themes that, as has been 
shown, were raised unprompted in the shareholder and director focus groups, in the questions asked 
by shareholders at ASMs, and in comments made in the director and shareholder surveys.   
This research suggests that directors’ expectations of boards are dynamic and can be 
contingent on environmental factors. Two such environmental factors have specifically been 
identified: the financial state of the company, and political and social pressure from outside of the 
company. Table 37 (p.201) suggests that in response to a financial crisis, directors assume more 
responsibility for tactical activities, that they would at other times delegate to management, and 
that, in response to social and political pressures, directors appear to be influencing the appointing 
of more female independent directors (4.5.4).   
There are also suggestions that this dynamism and contingency may extend to other 
fundamental issues, such as whom the board should serve, and the nature of its purpose. A quote 
from the director focus group hints at this: ‘Shareholders are important but sometimes they are not 
as important as customers.’ (5.1) The research also hints that shareholders change their expectations 
of boards depending on circumstances. For example, shareholders at the focus group expressed the 
view that success is a function of management, but failure is the fault of governance (5.2.2). 
 
8.4 Summary 
The research has examined the expectations that New Zealand shareholders and directors have of 
New Zealand public company boards. The overarching theme to emerge from this examination is 
234 
 
that the opinions of both shareholders and directors are divided over many of the key aspects of 
corporate governance. There appears to be no broad consensus on whom the board is responsible to 
(7.5), the role of the board (7.6), the tasks a board should perform (7.7), and board composition 
(7.9). When comparing the views of directors to those of shareholders it appears that both groups 
are divided in their views along broadly similar lines. However, there are some differences between 
the two groups, and these groups may either cause friction between them, as is the case with their 
views on director remuneration (8.3.6), or potentially impair company performance, as is the case 
with their views on independent directors (8.2.6). Overall, however, the research suggests 
shareholders are generally happy with board performance (Figure 10, p. 188) and that directors 
believe their companies are performing well and meeting shareholder expectations (Figure 12, p. 
188).  
The research also suggests that New Zealand directors’ and shareholders’ expectations of 
boards are influenced by the environment in which corporate governance is practised. The New 
Zealand corporate governance environment is characterised by a light-handed legal framework 
(4.1), few hostile takeovers of public companies, and little shareholder activism (Bhabra, 2007); all 
of these factors afford New Zealand directors a degree of freedom that is not necessarily shared by 
their overseas counterparts. In many NZSX companies institutional investors are the largest 
shareholder (Figure 3, p. 110); however, these investors also appear to have less influence on boards 
than institutional investors elsewhere (Chui & Monin, 2003). Social issues may also influence 
director and shareholder expectations, and may account for the increasing participation of women 
on NZX-listed company boards (Figure 12, p. 190).  
Variations and fluctuations that occur across the governance environment may contribute to 
the heterogeneity identified in both directors’ and shareholders’ expectations of boards. For 
example, while institutional investors are seldom directly involved in corporate governance (Chiu & 
Monin, 2003), there are exceptions, and institutional investors have been appointed to boards 
235 
 
(4.4.2). It is possible this creates differing expectations between directors. Evidence was also found 
that company-specific environmental factors can also influence shareholders’ and directors’ 
expectations of boards. Data collected from the shareholder and director surveys suggests that some 
of their expectations change when a company is trading under financial stress (Table 45, p. 295).  In 
the following chapter the implications of these findings are examined. 
 
236 
 
9 SUMMARY AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This research has contributed the extant body of corporate governance knowledge by contributing 
to an understanding of the characteristics of New Zealand shareholders and directors and the 
diversity that exists in their expectations of boards and governance. It has also highlighted the 
influence of the environment on aspects of corporate governance in New Zealand. In this chapter 
these findings are summarised and their implications are discussed. The findings have implications 
for future research, in terms of research design and for the application of common corporate 
governance theories. The findings also have implications for policy, specifically regarding investor 
confidence, corporate governance best practices and the comply or explain doctrine.  The 
limitations of the research are also detailed in this chapter, as are some suggestions for future 
research.   
 
9.1 Key findings and their contribution to the extant literature 
The research informs the body of corporate governance knowledge by providing a more complete 
understanding of the characteristics and motivations of New Zealand shareholders and directors 
than has previously been discussed in the literature. It finds that within these groups there appears to 
be significant heterogeneity concerning many aspects of corporate governance. It also finds 
evidence which suggests that this heterogeneity may be influenced by certain environmental factors 
– and that, as these factors change, so, too, do directors’ and shareholders’ expectations and 
behaviours. This section will discuss these contributions. 
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9.1.1 Contribution to an understanding of the characteristics of New Zealand shareholders, 
directors and companies  
By drawing on data from multiple independent sources the research has developed a more 
comprehensive and up-to-date understanding of three of the key elements influencing corporate 
governance in New Zealand: shareholders, directors, and the companies they govern. Although 
private shareholders play an essential role in the overall governance process, to the author’s 
knowledge this is the only research that has explored New Zealand private shareholders from either 
an attitudinal or a demographic perspective. Directors have previously been the subject of much 
research, and in recent years this has included demographic research (Boyle & Ji, 2011) and some 
attitudinal research (Ingley & Van der Walt, 2005). However, much has changed in the New 
Zealand corporate governance environment since Boyle and Ji and Ingley and Van der Walt’s 
research studies were conducted including the global financial crisis and its subsequent fallout, the 
FMA has been established and the courts have started calling to account recalcitrant directors. This 
research updates much of this earlier work so that the impact of these and other recent events can be 
considered and long-term trends can be inferred.  
One such trend, which arguably influences the effectiveness of New Zealand’s public 
companies, is the apparent increase in the number of boards with a majority of independent 
directors. Equally importantly, this research also extends our understanding of directors by 
investigating previously unexplored characteristics including the human capital they contribute, 
their country of domicile, and ‘busy’ directors. The research shows that most directors have 
experience either in senior finance roles or as CEOs and that there is significant international 
influence with most New Zealand directors having international experience and a significant 
minority are domiciled overseas.  The relationship between New Zealand public company 
shareholders and directors is another area that, to the author’s knowledge, is researched for the first 
time in this thesis and the research highlights areas of potential conflict such as director 
remuneration. Not only does the research provide a more complete insight into the nature of New 
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Zealand shareholders and directors but it also highlights some important long-term trends in these 
groups.  
The degrees to which the control of companies is concentrated and overall shareholding is 
dispersed have long been acknowledged to influence corporate governance practices (Berle & 
Means, 1932). The NZSX is a dynamic market in which companies periodically enter and depart 
and company ownership profiles change; therefore any assumptions made about control of 
companies and ownership dispersion must be regularly reviewed to ensure any research based upon 
them remains current. This research provides a more comprehensive and up-to date snapshot of 
New Zealand companies and their ownership than has hitherto existed. Most significantly, it 
provides new insights into the control of New Zealand companies and the influence of major 
shareholders. Its findings suggest that control and ownership of major companies has dispersed 
since the 1990s when La Porta et al. (1999) conducted their seminal work in this area. This research 
suggests that although ownership of NZSX-listed companies appears highly concentrated, with 2% 
of shareholders owning 50% or more of the shares in most companies, control appears more widely 
dispersed. Using a 20% shareholding as a threshold for control, two-thirds of the companies 
analysed did not have a controlling shareholder. Given that a controlling shareholder can be a major 
influence over boards, this is a significant finding. 
It has long been acknowledged that country-specific environmental factors influence the 
practice of corporate governance (Davies & Schlitzer, 2008; Agarwal et al, 2007). However, the 
factors which influence the practice of corporate governance in New Zealand had not previously 
been identified or researched. This research makes a contribution to filling this gap by highlighting 
some environmental factors that appear to differentiate New Zealand governance practices. This 
includes elements of the legal environment, the relative influence of shareholders on boards, and the 
influence of independent directors, all of which have been shown to influence board behaviour 
particularly around their approach to risk (Koerniadi, Krishnamurti, & Tourani-Rad, 2014).  
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9.1.2 Acknowledgement of the diversity that exists in shareholders’ and directors’ expectations of 
boards and of governance 
The research suggests that most directors agree boards should perform some monitoring and 
reporting tasks. Beyond this somewhat limited scope there appears to be no broad consensus 
regarding other aspects of governance, including the tasks that a board should perform and the 
composition of the board. Shareholders, like directors, appear similarly divided in their opinions. 
This situation appears to reflect the current state of the corporate governance literature, which, in 
many respects, is also divided (Petrovic, 2008; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Because of the 
heterogeneity within stakeholder groups, the research did not find evidence that their views support 
any particular theory, philosophical approach to governance, or key governance definition. In this 
respect the findings support the observations of Huse (1998), Aguilera et al. (2008), Heracleous 
(2001) and others, that directors frequently take a contingent approach to corporate governance. 
This research also suggests that, to the extent that shareholders participate in corporate governance, 
they take an equally pragmatic approach. 
 
9.1.3 Highlighting the influence of environment on corporate governance 
The research suggests that corporate governance practices can be contingent on the broader 
environment in which a company is operating and that as this environment changes, so, too, can 
directors’ actions and expectations of boards. Both macro-environmental factors, such as economic 
conditions and social trends, which influence the entire market, as well as micro-economic factors 
such as share distribution, which influence individual companies, appear to influence director and 
shareholder expectations of boards. For example, the research found strong evidence to suggest that 
some directors’ expectations of the tasks a board should perform change when a company is in 
financial stress – essentially these directors believe that they should become more ‘hands-on’ . The 
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research also suggests that the trend for increasing numbers of women on boards is likely the result 
of external environmental factors such as interventions by external lobby groups. Other factors, 
such as the size and nature of large shareholders, may also influence board behaviour and hence 
both shareholders’ and directors’ expectations of boards. These findings support the framework 
proposed by Huse (2005), which incorporates external environmental factors alongside internal 
company-specific factors to explain board behaviour.  
 
9.2 Implications for Future Research 
The findings have implications for future research as they suggest enhancements that could be made 
to improve research design in future studies, and they also suggest that changes could be made to 
increase the validity of research incorporating some of the popular governance theories. These 
implications will be discussed in this section. 
 
9.2.1 Implications for research design 
There are many research initiatives that look to find a link between an aspect of corporate 
governance and overall company performance. A challenge with much of this research is that it fails 
to elicit repeatable results across multiple studies (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010). This lack of 
consistency and replicability has, in part, been attributed to limitations with the ‘black box’ style 
research methodology that is frequently applied to governance questions (Finkelstein & Mooney, 
2003; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). The limitation of the black box approach is further exacerbated 
in the New Zealand context because multiple research studies are seldom conducted on the same 
topic, meaning that meta-analysis of multiple studies, which could potentially overcome some of 
these limitations (Wolf, 1986), is not generally possible. Although the limitations of black-box 
research have been acknowledged for more than a decade, much of the corporate governance 
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research recently published using New Zealand data still relies heavily on this methodology, for 
example Boone et al. (2011), Fauzi & Locke (2012), and Reddy et al. (2015). This is possibly 
because the influence of external environmental factors on governance within the New Zealand 
environment have not been fully appreciated. For example, this research suggests that the increasing 
number of women appointed to boards can be attributed to broader environmental factors rather 
than to the aspirations of directors and shareholders. 
To help mitigate the limitations of the traditional methodology, this research adopted a 
methodology that enhanced the black-box model in two important ways. Firstly, it lifted the ‘lid’ on 
the black box by obtaining data directly from some of the principal proponents, and secondly it took 
cognizance of the broader economic environment in which corporate governance functions. While 
these enhancements added a degree of complexity to the research, the richness of the accrued data 
suggests that such an approach is worthy of consideration for future research. 
 
9.2.2 Reflections on popular corporate governance theories 
This section discusses how the insights gained in this research can assist with the application 
of the common corporate governance theories when applied in a New Zealand context. The theories 
discussed are agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and shareholder theory.  
Agency theory is the most frequently used empirical theory to explain corporate governance 
behaviours in the New Zealand context, for example Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad (2012) and Hossain, 
Prevost & Rao (2001). As discussed in section 2.2, agency theory assumes that a notional contract 
exists between directors and shareholders and that both groups are motivated by self-interest, 
bounded rationality and risk aversion (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Stewardship theory is based on 
the same underlying premise of a notional contract between shareholders and directors but it makes 
different assumptions regarding director and shareholder motivations (Davis, Schoorman & 
242 
 
Donaldson, 1977). The notional contracts between directors and shareholders are therefore an 
essential prerequisite for both of these theories so in situations where such explicit contracts don’t 
exist then the theory should be applied with caution.   
The heterogeneity that both directors and shareholders appear to exhibit suggests that, in 
many circumstances, the notional contracts that are central to agency theory and stewardship theory 
are unlikely to exist in many NZSX-listed companies. Evidence that supports this assertion is 
founded on the Companies Act requirement for directors to act in the best interests of the company 
(Companies Act 1993, p. 113). As has been shown in this research a company’s best interests may 
not always align with those of shareholders. When company and shareholder interests diverge a 
directors legal obligations would over-ride any notional director – shareholder contracts. The 
research also suggests that both directors and shareholders allegiances are divided between those 
who believe that a board’s primary obligation is to its shareholders and those who believe that the 
board’s primary obligation is to either the company or all stakeholders (Figure 13 p.193). If a board 
believes that it is obligated to all stakeholders then a notional contract that places shareholders in a 
principle position could not exist. There is also evidence which suggests that not all shareholders 
appear to consider that they have entered into a notional contract with directors. For example there 
is evidence of rationale apathy amongst shareholders (6.4) and a suggestion from the focus group 
interviews that some shareholders do not believe that they have a responsibility or obligation to the 
company (5.3), both of these factors effectively preclude any notional contracts between 
shareholders and boards. Collectively these findings suggest that neither agency theory nor 
stewardship theory can be used to analyse New Zealand governance without first establishing that a 
perceived notional contract exists between directors and shareholders.  
 
Turning now to shareholder theory and stakeholder theory, essentially these two theories 
describe different philosophical approaches to operating all aspects businesses including the 
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functions performed by boards. Stakeholder theory advocates argue that companies exist not only 
for the benefit of shareholders but for the benefit of all parties who have a stake in the organisation 
(Jensen, 2001). Shareholder theory assumes that the purpose of governance is to serve shareholders 
(Friedman 1962 p.112).  In many ways Shareholder theory is the reverse of stakeholder theory, so 
arguments that support Stakeholder theory can be arguments against Shareholder theory.  
The research suggests that both company directors and shareholders are divided between 
stakeholder advocates and shareholder advocates. When asked directly, the shareholders and 
directors surveyed appeared to be evenly split between the two camps (Figure 13 p.193).  Other 
evidence from this survey suggests that opinions may vary depending on the circumstances. For 
example, the survey respondents were asked if a company with excess cash would be more likely to 
increase dividends or invest in staff. Some 90% of directors and 77% of the shareholders surveyed 
indicated that they believed that a company would increase its dividends rather than invest in staff. 
Although this is a crude measure, it suggests that in this situation at least, most directors and 
shareholders expect companies adopt a shareholder centric model of governance. Conversely 
company law mandates that directors place the interests of the company itself at the fore 
(Companies Act 1993, p113) which implies that directors are legally obliged to consider a 
stakeholder focus. These conflicting influences suggest that the New Zealand environment is 
sufficiently complex and nuanced that neither theory can be universally applied across all NZX 
companies. 
One conclusion reached from this research then is that New Zealand shareholders and 
directors motivations are so diverse that they do not always meet the prerequisites required of each 
of the four corporate governance theories discussed. This raises particular problems when attempts 
are made to use these theories to make assumptions regarding all New Zealand companies. It does 
not however, preclude the use of these theories when considering companies or groups of 
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companies provided it can be established that the motivations of shareholders and directors are 
broadly aligned. 
In many circumstances it may be possible to infer a sufficient understanding of director and 
shareholder motivations to allow one or more of these corporate governance theories to be applied.  
To illustrate this point Table 41 shows four stylised companies, each with a different ownership 
structure. By considering this factor alone it is possible to make assumptions regarding the 
motivations of shareholders and directors. Such assumptions may well be sufficient to identify 
those corporate governance theories whose prerequisites are met and therefore could be more 
confidently applied. 
 
Table 41 
Matching corporate governance theory to ownership structure 
 Ownership 
Structure Implications 
Suggested 
Theory  
Private equity firm 
owns a 51% stake 
Directors and the shareholder will be aware of an implicit agency 
contract between them. The shareholder is likely to take a longer 
term pragmatic approach to the business and is likely to be 
actively involved in governance through the appointment of 
inside directors. 
Agency   
theory 
Long-standing MD     
with a small stake 
and no other 
dominant shareholder 
The MD is unlikely to be motivated by short term financial gain 
and is likely to put the company first. 
Stewardship 
theory 
Government entity    
with a majority stake 
Shareholders and directors are likely to follow the companies act 
and prioritise all stakeholders.  
Stakeholder 
theory 
Large financial 
institution with a 
minority stake. No 
other major investors 
The financial institution is likely to be focused on short/medium 
term shareholder value and the independent directors, mindful of 
the institution’s influence over their careers as directors are likely 
to follow the institutions example. 
Shareholder 
theory 
Of course the assumptions made regarding the behaviour of directors and shareholders may 
not apply to every company with these ownership structures – other factors, such as an impending 
takeover threat may sometimes over-ride these assumptions. The key points that the table further 
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illustrates is that the corporate governance theories discussed cannot be applied carte blanche but if 
consideration is given to environmental factors then it is likely that a corporate governance theory 
can be identified that can realistically be applied.  
The concept that corporate governance is context sensitive has been mooted by Aguilera et 
al (2008) and Huse (2005). However neither author has discussed the implication of this concept to 
the application of corporate governance theories.  Ingley, Mueller and Cocks (2011) have suggested 
that the heterogeneity found within New Zealand directors groups suggests that a multi-theoretical 
approach may often be required in order to adequately capture the complexity of corporate 
governance and the board’s role, this research supports this view and suggests how this might be 
applied in practice.  
 
9.3 Policy Implications 
The issues that the research informs from a policy perspective include investor confidence in capital 
markets, the underlying approach to regulation, and corporate governance best practices. The 
findings have potential implications for policy makers and educators associated with corporate 
governance. This a group which includes the NZX, the FMA, the NZIoD and the Shareholders’ 
Association as well as government.  
 
9.3.1 Improving investor confidence in boards 
When investors have trust and confidence in public companies they will arguably be more inclined 
to invest in the stock market. Given that a vibrant and dynamic stock market leads to a stronger 
economy, there is a strong incentive to ensure that potential investors, small and large, have 
sufficient trust and confidence to actively invest in equities (Gourevitch & Shinn, 2009). Boards, as 
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a perceived bridge between shareholders and companies, can play a key role in building this trust 
and confidence. 
This research suggests that although shareholder satisfaction with boards and their directors 
is reasonably high, some shareholders have concerns about directors and governance. Few 
shareholders appear to actively participate in the governance process and many do not consider 
directors to be ‘value for money’. Equally concerning was the survey result suggesting that in time 
of financial crisis some shareholders consider that directors will put their own interests above those 
of the company or shareholders. The FMA, with its mandate to ensure public confidence in 
financial markets, is responsible for addressing these shareholder concerns. There is also a role for 
organisations such as the NZIoD, the NZX and the Shareholders’ Association to increase their 
education programmes for directors. 
 
9.3.2 Maintaining a ‘comply or explain’ approach to regulation 
Overall, New Zealand directors appear to be a well-qualified and experienced group, as most appear 
to have extensive, relevant commercial experience prior to joining boards. That directors appear to 
adopt different views and approaches to most aspects of corporate governance strongly suggests 
that there is no perceived single ‘right way’ to approach corporate governance. This has significant 
implications for policy makers as it suggests that a highly prescriptive approach to rules and 
regulations may not always deliver the best possible outcomes from either a shareholders or a 
directors perspective. This is because a rules-based approach potentially limits the flexibility of 
boards. Cadbury (2002), reaching a similar conclusion when considering governance practices in 
the UK, recommended that governance regulation should be based on a ‘comply or explain’ 
doctrine wherever practicable, rather than a highly prescriptive rules-based approach. The NZX has 
largely adopted a comply or explain approach to regulation and the findings suggest that its 
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implementation is essentially ‘on-track’ – although some rules, such as NZX rule 3.3.1c, which 
mandates that a minimum of two independent directors be appointed to each board, are arguably 
unnecessarily prescriptive and could be reviewed in light of these findings. 
 
9.3.3 Corporate governance best practices 
The findings also call into question the application of ‘best practices’ in the NZX environment. 
Splitting the role of CEO and chairman and including independent directors on boards are regarded 
as best practices in New Zealand, but linking them to company performance is tenuous at best, 
according to many researchers. Supporters of these practices have dismissed criticism by pointing to 
limitations in the research (Dalton et al, 2003). However, the diversity identified in this research 
supports an argument proffered (but not substantiated) by Heracleous (2001), that the reason best 
practices are not seen to improve either governance or company performance is because different 
types of organisations require different practices. This research therefore suggests that shareholders, 
directors and lobby groups would all benefit from acknowledging that best practice prescriptions 
are best treated as guidelines and that it is not necessarily in every company’s best interests to 
blindingly implement all such recommendations.   
 
9.4 Limitations of the Study 
The key limitations of this research were a lack of access to institutional investors, limitations on 
the sample size of the public company research, an inability to associate companies with directors, a 
limit on the number of ASM minutes analysed and restrictions on the environmental factors 
investigated. 
Direct access to institutional investors was not achieved. The CEOs of some of New 
Zealand’s largest institutional investment firms were invited to participate in this research and all 
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declined. This limitation was addressed, in part, by analysing institutional investor behaviour and 
by drawing on the limited available literature. Given the unique position that institutional investors 
hold in the market their participation would add a useful additional perspective to any future 
research conducted in this area.  The data on company ownership distribution, control and other 
metrics were collected from 40 of the 112 NZSX companies. The sample was restricted to 40 
companies due to time constraints. While this analysis is sufficient to support the conclusions drawn 
in this study, an analysis of all 112 companies may have yielded further insights. 
An inability to associate surveyed directors with their companies also proved to be a lost 
opportunity with the research. Given company directors’ well-known reluctance to discuss their 
affairs (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007), the postal surveys were made as anonymous as possible. As a 
result, insufficient data was obtained to determine the degree of heterogeneity that exists within 
individual company boards. Had such data been forthcoming it would have provided deeper insights 
into the relationship between the environment and company behaviour, and could also have shed 
light on a number of related issues, such as the impact of shared directors on director homogeneity. 
This also provides an opportunity for future research, for example, by linking the directors to a 
particular company it would be possible to examine the impact of factors such as market conditions 
and size of largest shareholder on director expectations.  
A total of 65 sets of minutes were obtained from 30 companies. Company willingness to 
make these available and the time required to persuade companies who were initially reluctant to 
release their minutes limited the number of sets of minutes that could be collected. While there was 
sufficient data to obtain a general picture it is possible that more data would have led to a more 
detailed understanding of the relationship between directors and shareholders.   
There is also a limitation regarding the environmental analysis that was conducted. The 
research has highlighted some environment factors that have influenced shareholder and director 
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expectations of boards such as the influence of lobby groups on director selection. However, the 
research in this area was confined to a small number of environmental factors and it is probable that 
other factors that were not examined in this research could also influence shareholder and director 
expectations.  Future research in this area would provide a more complete picture of shareholder 
and director expectations of boards. 
 
9.5 Directions for Further Research 
The research has provided insights into the expectations of two of the key stakeholder groups 
associated with corporate governance. Another significant stakeholder group with potential to 
influence corporate governance is executive management. The opinions that executive managers 
hold of New Zealand boards and corporate governance have not previously been comprehensively 
canvassed. A research project that investigated their opinions and expectations of boards and used a 
similar structure to that adopted in this research would add to the overall picture of corporate 
governance within New Zealand.  
The topic of governance when a firm is in crisis – financial or otherwise – is not well 
researched, either internationally (Daily et al, 2003) or in New Zealand. Given the importance of 
governance to companies in times of crisis, this is an area that requires further research. This 
research has provided some evidence which suggests that when companies are in financial crisis, 
boards are expected to change their behaviour. It also identified a number of structural changes that 
are occurring with New Zealand boards, such as increasing numbers of independent directors, 
which have the potential to influence the way companies respond to crisis. Research in this area 
may yield important new insights.  
Further research directly into shareholder and director expectations is still warranted, as a 
better understanding could potentially address some of the key issues restraining corporate 
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governance research. For example a better understanding of the financial expectations that 
shareholders and directors have of their companies could alter the financial metrics that researchers 
use to evaluate company performance. A better understanding of the environmental factors which 
influence director and shareholder expectations of boards could lead to improved research design 
and a better understanding of the application of common corporate governance theories.  
9.6 Influence of the Research on the Researcher. 
Just as the researcher influences the research, so the research influences the researcher. In 
this section I briefly discuss the impact that this research has had on my personal views and 
expectations of corporate governance and beyond.   
When I commenced this research I was aware that the field of corporate governance is filled 
with dogma. However, I believed that underneath this dogma there were some central truths (maybe 
I was a positivist at heart). My task in part, I had decided, was to unearth these truths. During the 
course of the research I was shocked to discover that experienced, intelligent directors (and 
researchers) frequently held radically different opinions on almost every fundamental aspect of 
corporate governance. Surely some people were right while others were wrong – where were my 
fundamental truths? By the end of the research I had concluded that I was initially wrong, and there 
are few, if any, central truths. The different views held by directors, I’ve concluded, are likely a 
pragmatic response to the environment in which they have, at one stage or another, found 
themselves.  This revelation, has forced me to rethink my fundamental views, not only on corporate 
governance, but on business as a whole. Is the purpose of a company solely to make money for 
shareholders? Is the purpose of the board to ensure that management keeps its promises to 
shareholders?  My answer to these and related questions, is now very different to when I 
commenced this research. Companies’ objectives, I now believe, are more complex than I first 
thought, maximising returns to shareholders is not the single underlying objective, merely one 
objective amongst many other equals.  
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My views of directors has also changed. The days of ‘typical’ boards acting solely as 
monitors and score keepers and looking after the interests of shareholders are probably long gone. 
Today board are acting increasingly independent of both shareholders and management. Driven by 
directors’ egos and legislation that, for self-preservation reasons compels them to action, they have 
moved beyond being referees and scorekeepers and have become players in their own right. That 
many boards are dominated by independent directors, with little experience of the industry in which 
they are operating and with no significant financial investment in the companies they govern is one 
emerging feature that is forcing me to question my assumption that public companies are always the 
best vehicle to increase the economic well-being of those in our community. 
 
 
9.7 A Last Word 
Public company boards make important decisions. Their actions can influence the success or failure 
of public companies; they determine how the cash flows from these companies are distributed and, 
in so doing, influence the prosperity of many New Zealanders. Their collective success or failure 
influences the willingness of investors to invest in our capital markets. Therefore, who is appointed 
to boards, what objectives they set, which roles and tasks they perform and how they are viewed by 
shareholders are all important questions that, directly or indirectly, influence the prosperity of many 
in our society.  
This research suggests that, in general, New Zealand public company directors appear to be 
well-qualified and experienced. However, there also appears to be little consensus among these 
directors regarding many of the key aspects of corporate governance. Directors across all NZ 
companies are likely to be divided in their opinions on issues such as to whom the board is 
responsible, what the objectives of the board are, and what tasks it should perform. That 
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experienced directors would be divided on such fundamental questions may, at first glance, seem 
surprising. However, on closer examination it appears that directors are influenced by the 
environment in which they operate and their company circumstances, such that on occasion they 
may adjust their views on the most fundamental corporate governance tenets in order to match these 
contingencies. New Zealand’s public company shareholders, for the most part, choose not be 
actively involved in the governance of the companies in which they own shares. However, when 
questioned on matters of governance their opinions appear divided along broadly similar lines to 
those of directors, so their views may also be influenced by environmental and company factors.  
Now that we have some sense of what is expected from New Zealand’s public company boards – 
the next challenge is to work to improve them. 
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11 APPENDIX A.  AVERAGE TIME NZSX SHARES ARE HELD 
A summary of monthly share trading volumes on NZSX for July 2013 was obtained from NZX. 
The average number of days shares were held was obtained by dividing the total shares on issue by 
average daily trading volumes. Figure 20 shows the average number of days the 20 most traded 
stocks were held and the average number of trades on each day. Given that 83% of shareholders 
surveyed planned to hold shares they purchase for more than a year (Table 33, p.185), this suggests 
that institutional investors are actively trading shares. The large volume of trades each day may also 
suggest algorithmic or computer-generated trading. 
 
Figure 20  
 
The 20 most actively traded shares, July 2013 
  Security 
Code  
 Shares on issue   Shares traded 
in July 2013  
 Average 
days held  
Average 
daily trades 
1  TME     396,554,115    1,028,743,650  12 2,887 
2  ZEL     400,000,000 1,003,414,940  12 1,332 
3  AIA  1,322,754,089 2,483,186,156  17 5,562 
4  SKT     389,139,785     723,209,124 17 3,070 
5  TEL  1,822,303,137 3,124,057,288  18 7,376 
6  STU        88,444,240      146,719,848 19 553 
7  SKC      580,016,676      776,377,470 23 3,746 
8  KMD     200,215,894      267,554,122 23 567 
9  CNU     396,369,767         525,299,874 23 4,149 
10  FBU    687,854,788         884,001,558 24 6,102 
11  NZX    255,547,723         292,142,708 27 770 
12  WYN     102,567,777         115,563,514 28 903 
13  MOA       30,096,549            33,708,004  28 520 
14  FPH      546,838,267         590,283,078 29 3,276 
15  HNZ      392,554,579         404,362,332 30 349 
16  NPX      198,125,827         197,893,080 31 978 
17  MRP   1,396,972,447  1,247,455,748  35 4,395 
18  SKL    192,805,807    167,647,788 36 637 
19  ABA       20,410,760      17,226,286  37 203 
20  PPG         40,000,000     30,672,466  40 134 
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12 APPENDIX B DIRECTOR & SHAREHOLDER SURVEYS 
Postal surveys were conducted with a sample of 400 directors and 1083 shareholders to determine 
their opinions and expectations of New Zealand public company boards. This appendix contains a 
copy of both the director survey and the shareholder survey.   
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It’s all about 
Governance  
  1 In your opinion in practice who is the board ultimately responsible to: Please tick one 
   Shareholders 
The company 
All stakeholders including shareholders, staff and customers 
Other (please specify) ______________________________________ 
Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
  2 When considering the role of the board please rank the following six statements in order of importance  
       The most important should be ranked number 1 and the least important ranked number 6. 
  Ensure management keeps its promises to shareholders 
 
Keep the company out of trouble 
Look after the interests of all stakeholders 
 
Set the strategy and lead the company 
Increase the value of the company 
 
   Hire and fire the Chief Executive 
 
 
 
 
 
      
3 
    
In the normal course of business when a company is trading profitably who should be responsible for the following tasks?  
 Board Management No preference Don’t know 
Setting company strategy     
Setting company performance objectives     
Setting annual budgets     
Approving major investment expenditure     
Ensuring clear lines of accountability throughout the organisation     
When necessary replace CEO     
When necessary replace senior executives     
Setting Occupational Health and Safety Policy     
Ensuring that the company complies with its legal obligations     
Ensuring that the company meets its financial obligations  
(e.g. meet banking covenants) 
    
Overseeing the work of the Auditors     
Reviewing and guiding risk policy     
Reporting to shareholders     
Communicating with the public      
Communicating with other external stakeholders e.g. suppliers, 
bankers 
    
Approving related party transactions     
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4 
    
When a company is in a financial crisis who should be responsible for the following tasks? 
 Board Management No preference Don’t know 
Setting company strategy     
Setting company performance objectives     
Setting annual budgets     
Approving major investment expenditure     
Ensuring clear lines of accountability throughout the organisation     
When necessary replace CEO     
When necessary replace senior executives     
Setting Occupational Health and Safety Policy     
Ensuring that the company complies with its legal obligations     
Ensuring that the company meets its financial obligations (e.g. meet 
banking covenants) 
    
Overseeing the work of the Auditors     
Reviewing and guiding risk policy     
Reporting to shareholders     
Communicating with the public      
Communicating with other external stakeholders e.g. suppliers, 
bankers 
    
Approving related party transactions     
5 Given the level of risk associated with investing in the shares of companies listed on the NZX exchange are the returns from 
these companies generally. Please tick one 
 
  1.   
Less than 
required   
2.   
  
3.   
  
4.   5.   
Better than 
required 
Don’t  
know/not 
applicable 
6 Do shareholders have realistic expectations of the returns they can expect from their investments in the shares of companies 
listed on the NZX exchange? Please tick one 
 
  1.   
Shareholders 
expect less than  is 
realistic  
2.   
  
3.   Realistic 4.   5.   
Shareholders 
expect more  
than is realistic 
7 Do companies listed on the NZX exchange provide their shareholders with the right amount of financial information? Please 
tick one 
  1.  Too little 2.   
  
3.   
 About right 
4.   5.   
Too much 
8 In general how well do NZX listed companies communicate with their shareholders. Please tick one   
  1.   
Poor  
2.   
  
3.   
  
4.   5.   
Very good 
Don’t  
know/not 
applicable 
  9 The role of the board in developing strategy is. Please tick one 
   To develop the strategy on its own 
To develop strategy in conjunction with management 
To review and approve the strategy developed by management 
Dependent on the company and the circumstances  
Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
  10 Most companies listed on the NZX exchange would benefit from: Please tick one 
   Only having independent directors on their board 
Having only independent directors and the CEO on the board 
Having a majority of independent directors on their board 
The number of independent directors is not important 
Don’t know 
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And that’s it! 
Thank you very much for taking the time to do this – its most appreciated. 
  
  11 Most companies listed on the NZX exchange would benefit from: Please tick one 
   Having a majority women on their board 
Having at least one women on their board 
Recruiting solely on merit even if it resulted in no women on the board 
Don’t know 
 
 
 
   
12 
All other things being equal if an NZX listed company had some excess cash do you think it would be more likely to: Please tick 
one         
   Increase its dividend 
Invest in its staff 
Don’t know 
 
 
  13 A quota should be set to ensure women are appointed to boards. Do you... Please tick one         
   Agree 
Disagree 
Don’t know 
 
 
14 Is the remuneration for directors of companies listed on the main board of the NZX exchange: Please tick one  
  1.   
Less than is  
reasonable 
2.   
  
3.   4.   5.   
More than is 
reasonable 
15 In your opinion how well do most NZ public company directors fully understand their legal obligations? Please 
tick one 
 
  1.   
Poor  
understanding 
2.   
  
3.   4.   5.   
Very good 
understanding 
16 Approximately how many years have you been a director of a public company? 
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It’s all about 
Governance  
  1 Please rank the following four statements in order of importance.  
The most important should be ranked number 1 and the least important ranked number 4. 
   The board is responsible for running the company  
The boards  role is to oversee management and monitor the company 
Board seats are a reward for executives who have had a distinguished 
career 
The board is an historical artefact with no real relevance to modern 
business 
 
 
 
  2 In your opinion in practice who is the board ultimately responsible to: Please tick one 
   Shareholders 
The company 
All stakeholders 
Other (please specify) ______________________________________ 
Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
  3 In your opinion which of the following best describes the primary role of the board? Please tick one 
   Ensure management keeps its promises to shareholders 
Keep the company out of trouble 
Look after the interests of all stakeholders 
Set the strategy and lead the company 
Increase the value of the company 
Other (please specify) ______________________________________ 
Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 In general do the boards of companies listed on the NZX exchange do a good job? Please tick one   
  1.   
Not very good  
2.   
  
3.   
  
4.   5.   
Very good 
Don’t  
know/not 
applicable 
      
5 
   In the normal course of business when a company is trading profitably who should be responsible for the following tasks?  
 Board Management No preference Don’t know 
Setting company strategy     
Setting company performance objectives     
Setting annual budgets     
Approving major investment expenditure     
Ensuring clear lines of accountability throughout the organisation     
When necessary replace CEO     
When necessary replace senior executives     
Setting Occupational Health and Safety Policy     
Ensuring that the company complies with its legal obligations     
Ensuring that the company meets its financial obligations      
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Overseeing the work of the Auditors     
Reviewing and guiding risk policy     
Reporting to shareholders     
Communicating with other external parties e.g. suppliers, bankers     
Approving related party transactions     
 
      
6 
   When a company is in a financial crisis who in your opinion should be responsible for the following tasks?   
 Board Management No preference Don’t know 
Setting company strategy     
Setting company performance objectives     
Setting annual budgets     
Approving major investment expenditure     
Ensuring clear lines of accountability throughout the organisation     
When necessary replace CEO     
When necessary replace senior executives     
Setting Occupational Health and Safety Policy     
Ensuring that the company complies with its legal obligations     
Ensuring that the company meets its financial obligations      
Overseeing the work of the Auditors     
Reviewing and guiding risk policy     
Reporting to shareholders     
Communicating with other external parties e.g. suppliers, bankers     
Approving related party transactions     
  7 When a company is in financial crisis in your  
Please mark their first interest with the num 
opinion whose interests’ do directors generally put first and second?  
ber 1 and their second interest with the number  2 
  Their own  
The company’s 
All shareholders  
Institutional shareholders  
Employees 
Other (please specify) ______________________________________ 
Don’t know  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  8 All other things being equal if an NZX listed company had some excess cash do you think it would be more likely to: Please tick 
one 
   Increase its dividend 
Invest in its staff 
Don’t know 
 
 
9 Given the level of risk associated with investing in the shares of companies listed on the NZX exchange are the returns generally   
Please tick one 
 
  1.   
Less than  required 
2.   
  
3.   4.   5.   
Better than 
required 
10 In general how would you rate the financial information provided to shareholders by NZX listed companies? Please tick one 
  1.   
Poor  
2.   
  
3.   
  
4.   5.   
Very good 
Don’t  
know/not 
applicable 
11 In general how well do NZX listed companies communicate with their shareholders. Please tick one   
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  1.   
Poor  
2.   
  
3.   
  
4.   5.   
Very good 
Don’t  
know/not 
applicable 
  12 An independent director is not associated with either management or a major shareholder. In your opinion would NZ’s public  
companies most benefit from:  Please tick one 
   Only having independent directors on their board 
Having only independent directors and the CEO on the board 
Having a majority of independent directors on their board 
The number of independent directors is not important 
Don’t know 
 
 
 
 
  13 Would most NZ’s public companies would most benefit from: Please tick one 
   Having a majority women on their board 
Having at least one women on their board 
Recruiting solely on merit even if it resulted in no women on the board 
Don’t know 
 
 
 
14 Is the remuneration for directors of companies listed on the NZX exchange: Please tick one    
  1.   
Less than is 
reasonable  
2.   
  
3.   
 About right 
4.   5.   
More than is 
reasonable 
Don’t  
know/not 
applicable 
15 For approximately how many years have you invested in NZ company shares? 
16 Approximately how many companies listed on the NZX do you hold shares in? 
   
17 
When you buy shares is usually your intention to. Please tick one         
   Own the shares for less than a year 
Own the shares for more than a year 
No set plan 
 
 
  18 Which of the following best describes your approach to the share market. Please tick one         
   I don’t take it too seriously – I invest occasionally and for fun 
I’m not that experienced, I rely on brokers or other experts to select 
almost all the shares I purchase  
I am reasonably knowledgeable and experienced and I often rely on 
advice from brokers or other experts before buying or selling shares 
I know what I’m doing and I buy and sell shares regularly 
 
 
 
   
17 
Are you a male or female? Please tick one          
 female  male 
     
And that’s it! 
Thank you very much for taking the time to do this – its most appreciated.
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13 APPENDIX C DIRECTORS’ AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EXPECTATIONS OF THE TASKS A BOARD SHOULD PERFORM COMPARED 
Table 42  
 
Directors’ and shareholder’ expectations of the tasks a board should perform when a company is trading normally. 
  Director Expectations   Shareholder Expectations   
  Board 
Manag
ement Both 
No 
Pref 
Don't 
Know Total   Board 
Manag
ement Both 
No 
Pref 
Don't 
Know Total  P value 
Setting company strategy 100 11 17 0 0 128  281 63 7 1 19 371 <0.000 
Setting company performance objectives 85 26 17 0 0 128  153 196 5 1 16 371 <0.000 
Setting annual budgets 53 58 16 0 0 128  86 266 5 1 12 370 <0.000 
Approving major investment expenditure 115 7 3 2 0 128  333 28 0 2 5 368 0.016 
Ensuring clear lines of accountability 
throughout the organisation 41 74 11 0 0 128  134 227 4 1 5 371 <0.000 
Where necessary replacing CEO 123 3 0 0 0 128  353 14 1 3 3 374 0.556 
Where necessary replacing senior 
executives 7 113 8 0 0 126  120 231 5 3 15 374 <0.000 
Setting occupational health and safety 
policy 85 29 14 0 0 128  64 294 7 2 8 375 <0.000 
Ensuring the company complies with its 
legal obligations 62 44 21 1 0 127  163 174 10 2 25 374 <0.000 
Ensuring the company meets its financial 
obligations 65 45 16 2 0 128  190 140 9 3 29 371 <0.000 
Overseeing the work of the auditors 97 24 3 2 0 128  206 129 12 9 10 366 0.001 
Reviewing and guiding risk policy 106 12 8 2 0 126  214 124 11 16 15 380 <0.000 
Reporting to shareholders 103 9 14 2 0 127  281 38 9 3 39 370 <0.000 
Communicating with external 
stakeholders 5 111 11 1 0 127  21 329 7 2 14 373 <0.002 
Approving related party transactions 117 7 3 0 0 128  249 71 15 23 10 368 <0.000 
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Table 43  
 
Directors’ and shareholders’ expectations of the tasks a board should perform when a company is under financial stress 
  Director Expectations   Shareholder Expectations   
  Board 
Manag
ement Both 
No 
Pref 
Don't 
Know Total   Board 
Manag
ement Both 
No 
Pref 
Don't 
Know Total  P value 
Setting company strategy 99 7 16 1 0 123  311 23 4 1 17 356 <0.000 
Setting company performance objectives 98 9 15 0 0 123  227 96 2 1 22 348 <0.000 
Setting annual budgets 69 40 13 0 0 123  160 164 3 2 17 346 <0.000 
Approving major investment expenditure 115 4 2 1 0 123  326 10 5 3 7 351 0.638 
Ensuring clear lines of accountability 
throughout the organisation 64 50 8 1 0 123  147 176 7 1 20 351 0.002 
Where necessary replacing CEO 118 3 2 0 0 122  336 9 3 3 0 351 0.666 
Where necessary replacing senior 
executives 35 77 10 1 0 123  181 144 5 3 19 352 <0.000 
Setting occupational health and safety 
policy 81 30 12 0 0 122  75 254 8 1 13 351 <0.000 
Ensuring the company complies with its 
legal obligations 87 20 14 2 0 123  206 117 8 2 20 353 <0.000 
Ensuring the company meets its financial 
obligations 90 17 15 1 0 123  225 92 7 2 24 350 <0.000 
Overseeing the work of the auditors 102 17 2 1 0 123  219 91 11 11 11 343 0.001 
Reviewing and guiding risk policy 109 6 8 2 0 122  231 87 8 2 20 348 <0.000 
Reporting to shareholders 107 6 8 2 0 122  291 20 8 1 32 352 0.001 
Communicating with external 
stakeholders 46 53 22 2 0 122  105 208 8 2 28 351 <0.000 
Approving related party transactions 116 4 2 0 0 123  259 47 12 24 5 347 <0.000 
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14 APPENDIX D CHANGES TO BOARD ACTIVITY WHEN COMPANY IS UNDER FINANCIAL STRESS 
Table 44  
 
Changes in director expectations based on financial state of corporation 
  Trading normally   Trading under financial stress 
  
  
 Board 
Manage
ment Both 
No 
Pref 
Sample 
size  Board 
Manage
ment Both 
No 
Pref 
Sample 
size  
P 
Value 
Where necessary replacing senior executives 7 113 8 0 128  35 77 10 1 123  <0.001 
Reviewing and guiding risk policy 106 12 8 2 128  109 6 8 0 123  <0.001 
Communicating with external stakeholders 5 111 11 1 128  46 53 22 2 123  <0.001 
Ensuring the company meets its financial obligations 65 45 16 2 128  90 17 15 1 123  0.001 
Ensuring the company complies with its legal obligations 62 44 21 1 128  87 20 14 2 123  0.002 
Setting company performance objectives 85 26 17 0 128  98 9 15 0 122  0.010 
Ensuring clear lines of accountability throughout the 
organisation 41 74 11 0 126  64 50 8 1 123  0.011 
Setting annual budgets 53 59 16 0 128  69 40 13 0 122  0.052 
Where necessary replacing CEO 124 3 0 0 127  118 3 2 0 123  0.353 
Reporting to shareholders 103 9 14 2 128  107 6 8 2 123  0.529 
Setting company strategy 100 11 17 0 128  99 7 16 1 123  0.609 
Overseeing the work of the auditors 97 24 3 2 126  102 17 2 1 122  0.617 
Approving related party transactions 117 7 3 0 127  116 4 2 0 122  0.631 
Approving major investment expenditure 115 7 3 2 127  115 4 2 1 122  0.741 
Setting occupational health and safety policy 85 29 14 0 128  81 30 12 0 123  0.920 
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Table 45  
 
Changes in shareholder expectations based on financial state of corporation 
  Trading normally   Trading under financial stress   
  Board 
Manag
ement Both 
No 
Pref 
Don't 
Know Total   Board 
Manag
ement Both 
No 
Pref 
Don't 
Know Total  P value 
Setting company strategy 281 63 7 1 19 371  311 23 4 1 17 356 <0.001 
Setting company performance objectives 153 196 5 1 16 371  227 96 2 1 22 348 <0.001 
Setting annual budgets 86 266 5 1 12 370  160 164 3 2 17 346 <0.001 
Approving major investment expenditure 333 28 0 2 5 368  326 10 5 3 7 351 0.008 
Ensuring clear lines of accountability 
throughout the organisation 134 227 4 1 5 371  147 176 7 1 20 351 0.003 
Where necessary replacing CEO 353 14 1 3 3 374  336 9 3 3 0 351 <0.000 
Where necessary replacing senior 
executives 120 231 5 3 15 374  181 144 5 3 19 352 <0.000 
Setting occupational health and safety 
policy 64 294 7 2 8 375  75 254 8 1 13 351 0.332 
Ensuring the company complies with its 
legal obligations 163 174 10 2 25 374  206 117 8 2 20 353 0.003 
Ensuring the company meets its financial 
obligations 190 140 9 3 29 371  225 92 7 2 24 350 0.010 
Overseeing the work of the auditors 206 129 12 9 10 366  219 91 11 11 11 343 0.164 
Reviewing and guiding risk policy 214 124 11 16 15 380  231 87 8 2 20 348 0.001 
Reporting to shareholders 281 38 9 3 39 370  291 20 8 1 32 352 0.132 
Communicating with external 
stakeholders 21 329 7 2 14 373  105 208 8 2 28 351 <0.001 
Approving related party transactions 249 71 15 23 10 368  259 47 12 24 5 347 0.166 
 
